Azadegan Encyclopedia - User contributions [en]

Forced Labour

2026-11-07T17:18:28Z

Marjan-khanlari:

According to the Dehkhoda Dictionary, bigari (forced labour or unfree labour) refers to "unpaid compulsory work or work without remuneration." Such labour may be imposed through threats, intimidation, violence, or other forms of coercion. Under the definition adopted by the International Labour Organization (ILO) in the 1930 Forced Labour Convention (No. 29), however, labour performed as part of compulsory military service or during lawful detention or imprisonment does not constitute forced labour. Similarly, Article 89(3) of the Third Geneva Convention, which regulates the employment of [[Prisoners of War Administration Commission|prisoners of war]] (POW), permits compulsory labour provided that it does not exceed two hours per day. During captivity, prisoners' work generally fell into two categories: compulsory and voluntary. Among these, compulsory labour had the greatest impact on prisoners' psychological well-being<ref>Kana’ni, Mohammad Taher, Hajar Siah-Rostami, and Katayoun Hossein-Nejad. International Humanitarian Law Concerning the Protection of Persons in Armed Conflicts (Collection of Geneva Instruments). 2nd ed. Tehran: Iranian Red Crescent Society, 2006. </ref>.

During the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), the Iraqi Ba'athist military compelled Iranian prisoners of war to perform fatigue duties for the following purposes:

# To deprive prisoners of their capacity for independent thought and creativity, thereby limiting their ability to engage in constructive or meaningful activities.
# To facilitate control over the prisoners by subjecting them to physically and mentally exhausting work, leaving them fatigued, demoralized, and more easily managed.
# To erode their morale by fostering feelings of humiliation, suffering, anxiety, defeat, and other forms of psychological distress.
# To exploit their labour for construction and infrastructure projects, including the erection of buildings, the excavation of wells, the expansion of prison camps, and the installation of barbed-wire fences.
# To keep the prisoners continuously occupied.

== Forms of Forced Labour During Captivity ==
[[fa:بیگاری]]

=== 1. Labour Outside the Camp ===
Labour assignments outside the camp typically involved groups of ten to twenty prisoners. Early each morning, these groups were escorted from the camp and assigned a variety of tasks, including manufacturing mud bricks, producing concrete blocks, constructing buildings, operating the concrete-block factory near Salahuddin Camp, performing technical work, and engaging in agricultural activities. The crops cultivated by prisoners on these lands were primarily used by the Iraqi authorities.

=== 2. Labour Inside the Camp ===
Most forced labour assignments were transferred from areas outside the camps to locations within the camp boundaries after two prisoners escaped. Thereafter, prisoners were required to perform a wide range of tasks, including construction work, concrete-block production, landscaping and maintenance of camp grounds, agricultural labour, the installation of barbed-wire fences and reinforcement of perimeter defenses, stone carving, masonry, and the manufacture of handicrafts and other essential items. Construction work became a defining feature of Iraqi prisoner-of-war camps. Salahuddin Camp 17, for instance, an abandoned military barracks, was restored and expanded largely through the labour of Iranian prisoners of war. Among the most demanding and widespread forms of labour was concrete-block production. Block-making machines operated continuously from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., producing approximately 1,000 to 1,200 concrete blocks per day. The blocks then were loaded onto trucks and removed from the camp each evening. Prisoners were also tasked with improving and maintaining the physical conditions of the camps. During the early stages of captivity, camp courtyards were uneven and covered with weeds. Using basic tools, including food containers repurposed for transporting soil and sand, as well as improvised rollers made from tree trunks, they gradually levelled and cleared the grounds. Other fatigue duties included collecting stones from the grounds of Tikrit Camp 12, cultivating agricultural plots, erecting barbed-wire fences, strengthening camp perimeter defenses, and carrying out stone carving and masonry. Another widespread activity was the production of handicrafts and everyday necessities. Although such work was not always classified as forced labour, as prisoners occasionally received nominal payments, the remuneration provided was minimal. Prisoners produced a variety of handmade items, including photograph albums, polished stone crafts, clay prayer tablets (mohr), prayer beads (tasbih), embroidered goods, bags, shoes, traditional giveh footwear, and other handicrafts. In practice, however, these activities frequently constituted a form of forced labour for several reasons:

# The handicrafts were traded to Iraqi guards and officers in exchange for small amounts of food or cigarettes.
# Prisoners often felt compelled to offer the items as gifts to guards in order to avoid torture or other forms of abuse.
# Iraqi soldiers frequently obtained the handicrafts through coercion, intimidation, and extortion.
# Guards also confiscated many of the prisoners' handmade products under the pretext of conducting searches for prohibited items<ref>Jafari, Ali Akbar. Interview, 2016.</ref>.

== Benefits of Forced Labour ==
Despite its exploitative nature, forced labour occasionally provided prisoners with certain advantages during captivity:

# Prisoners were sometimes paid a nominal wage for their labour, which helped them partially alleviate their material hardships.
# Those assigned to labour details occasionally received an extra loaf of bread, providing limited but meaningful relief from food shortages.
# Participation in labour assignments could reduce the likelihood of individual or collective punishment by camp authorities.
# Many prisoners considered forced labour preferable to prolonged inactivity, as it imposed structure on their daily lives, occupied their time, and helped mitigate the monotony and psychological pressures of captivity.
# Performing compulsory labour also enabled prisoners to follow the guidance of camp leaders, particularly Seyed Ali Akbar Abutorabi-Fard, who consistently encouraged patience, perseverance, compliance with camp regulations, and avoidance of confrontation with Iraqi guards. Prisoners who refused to participate in labour assignments were often subjected to severe punishment, resulting in further hardship. Numerous memoirs of former prisoners of war suggest that adherence to the guidance of Abutorabi-Fard and other camp representatives contributed to maintaining internal order, reducing tensions with Iraqi guards, and improving prisoners’ overall conditions.
# Doing fatigue duties helped reducing psychological stress and emotional distress. As Mr. Abutorabi-Fard advised: "Everyone should keep busy. Whatever work is assigned should be done, even forced labour. If the Iraqis tell you to make concrete blocks, then do it."<ref>Alidoost Qazvini, Ali. Abar Fayyaz. 3rd ed. Tehran: Payam-e Azadegan Institute, 2014, pp. 17–26.</ref> His emphasis on maintaining activity and engagement led camp representatives to request that Iraqi authorities allocate a plot of land for cultivation. They believed that productive work could help occupy prisoners' time and reduce the psychological burdens associated with prolonged captivity.
# Labour assignments also provided prisoners with indirect benefits, including opportunities to gather information, access radios, obtain writing materials, and collect discarded items that could be repurposed within the camps. For example, prisoners returning from labour duties sometimes concealed empty cement sacks beneath their clothing and secretly brought them back into the camps to use as makeshift writing paper.<ref>Kana’ni, Mohammad Taher, Hajar Siah-Rostami, and Katayoun Hossein-Nejad. International Humanitarian Law Concerning the Protection of Persons in Armed Conflicts (Collection of Geneva Instruments). 2nd ed. Tehran: Iranian Red Crescent Society, 2006.</ref>

== Adverse Effects of Forced Labour ==
Forced labour subjected prisoners to substantial physical and psychological hardships. Its adverse effects included the following:

# One method used by the Iraqi authorities to pacify prisoners, or, more precisely, to keep them constantly occupied, was the assignment of unnecessary and meaningless tasks. For example, following a [[protest]] and hunger strike at one of the camps, which resulted in collective torture and severe physical abuse, Iraqi authorities ordered prisoners to construct decorative features inside the barracks. Using only basic tools and whatever limited materials were available, the prisoners were forced to carry out these tasks, even while fasting during the holy month of Ramadan.<ref>Razian, Kamal. Interview, 2017.</ref>
# The harsh working conditions and physically demanding nature of labour contributed to the spread of various in the Mosul prison camps.
# Forced labour was also used as a means of humiliation and degradation.
# POWs believed certain forms of labour indirectly contributed to Iraq’s military objectives. In particular, the production of concrete blocks was a source of concern, as these materials could potentially be used in the construction of defensive fortifications.
# Prisoners were also subjected to torture and physical abuse.

== See Also ==

* Forms of Forced Labour During Captivity
* Prison Camps
* Innovation and Creativity

== Bibliography ==
<references />'''Seyed Razi Nabavi Chashemi'''
[[ar:السُّخرة]]

Forced Labour

2026-11-07T17:17:52Z

Marjan-khanlari:

Liberated Captives in the Statements of the Supreme Leader 4

2026-09-30T18:44:54Z

Marjan-khanlari: /* Author */

'''Liberated Captives; The Best Soldiers of the Islamic Revolution.'''

In the intellectual framework of Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, the martyred leader of the Islamic Revolution, liberated captives hold a position beyond that of freed prisoners of the imposed war.

In this section, by examining his statements and messages from 1992 to 2012, liberated captives have been introduced as "the best soldiers of the Revolution," "the most tested fellows of the nation," "the symbol of the Iranian nation's steadfastness," and a cultural and spiritual asset for the country's future. From this perspective, the period of captivity is not the end of struggle, but rather a stage of spiritual training, self-improvement, resilience, and preparation for undertaking greater social responsibilities.

By examining the statements and messages of the Supreme Leader between August 17th, 1992, and August 15th, 2012, the most important aspects of this perspective are highlighted as follow:

=== a) The Divine and Spiritual Status of Liberated Captives ===
1. The period of captivity is a divine test and a path for the spiritual growth of a faithful individual.

Ayatollah Khamenei assumes captivity as one of the most difficult divine tests, from which the liberated captives emerged victorious with patience, faith, and perseverance, and for this reason, he refers to them as tested and worthy individuals<ref name=":0">Retrieved from https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=2631</ref><ref name=":1">Retrieved from https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=7762</ref><ref name=":2">Retrieved from https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=20751</ref>.

2. Every moment of suffering during captivity is preserved by God.

Various statements emphasize that none of the hardships, patience, and struggles of the liberated captives is erased from the divine record, and all of them are registered by the divine archival system and have eternal rewards<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":2" />.

3. The sufferings of captivity are an asset for the individual and society.

In his view, the years of captivity were not merely enduring hardship, but rather created a reserve of experience, patience, faith, and social capital for the liberated captives and Iranian society<ref name=":0" />.

=== b) The Return of the Freed POWs; A Manifestation of Divine Power ===
1. The liberation of the POWs, contrary to ordinary calculations, was a manifestation of divine power and grace.

The Leader of the Revolution considers the liberation of tens of thousands of Iranian prisoners of war an event beyond political calculations and attributes it to divine power and will<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":3">Retrieved from https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=2897</ref>.

2. The return of the freed POWs is one of the great memories in the history of the Islamic Revolution.

He considers the return of the freed POWs as one of the greatest memories in the history of the Revolution and even contemporary Iranian history, emphasizing the necessity of keeping this memory alive in the national consciousness<ref name=":3" />.

=== d) The Status of Freed POWs in the Islamic Society ===
1. Freed POWs are the best soldiers of the Revolution and the most tested fellows of the nation.

From this perspective, freed POWs, due to enduring years of captivity and preserving their faith and revolutionary identity, are introduced as the most deserving individuals to defend the Revolution and the Islamic Republic system<ref name=":0" />.

2. Freed POWs are regarded as a symbol of the Iranian nation's steadfastness.

He considers the [[resistance]] of the freed POWs a source of pride for the Iranian nation and introduces them as a symbol of national resilience<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":3" />.

3. Freed POWs are among the most prominent examples of self-sacrificing individuals.

In statements from 1995, freed POWs, MIA (missing in action), and their families were identified as true examples of self-sacrificing individuals<ref>Retrieved from https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=9853</ref>.

=== e) The Mission of Freed POWs After Liberation ===
1. Freed POWs must march in the vanguard of national reconstruction.

The Leader of the Revolution emphasizes that the experience, resilience, and spiritual capital of the freed POWs must be utilized for the country's progress and reconstruction<ref name=":0" />.

2. Defending the Revolution and confronting enemies is the continuing mission of the freed prisoners of war (POWs).

From this perspective, the responsibility of freed POWs does not end with their captivity; rather, they must continue to play a role in defending the Revolution's values and countering enemy propaganda<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":4">Retrieved from https://farsi.khamenei.ir/message-content?id=3136</ref>.

=== f) Families of Freed POWs ===
1. The families of freed POWs shared in the sufferings of captivity and are blessed with divine reward.

The Supreme Leader has repeatedly praised the patience and resilience of the spouses, parents, and children of freed POWs, considering them partners in the spiritual reward of this struggle<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":2" />.

2. The waiting of a captive's [[family]] was one of the most difficult experiences of the war.

He describes this situation, referring to the constant worry of the captives' families, as one of the most harrowing experiences of the war<ref name=":2" />.

=== g) Freed POWs: Cultural Capital and Historical Memory of the Nation ===
1. The experience of captivity is a cultural treasure for future generations.

Since 2002, in the Supreme Leader's statements, the experience of freed POWs has been presented as a cultural reserve for strengthening the faith, hope, and [[resistance]] of future generations<ref name=":4" />.

2. Recording captivity memoirs is a national necessity.

He criticizes the lack of efforts in recording the memoirs of freed POWs and emphasizes the production of books, films, artistic works, and research documentaries on the captivity<ref name=":2" />.

3. The artistic narration of captivity is part of the Iranian nation's victory document.

In his view, the correct representation of the freed POWs' experience in artistic and media works solidifies historical memory and expresses the Iranian nation's victory in the Sacred Defense<ref name=":2" />.

=== h) Hope, Perseverance, and Future ===
1. The freed prisoners exemplify hope triumphing over despair.

The Leader of the Revolution, referring to the harsh conditions in the POW camps, emphasizes that the freed prisoners, by maintaining hope and faith, overcame despair, and this characteristic made them a role model for the society<ref name=":0" />.

2. The lives of the freed prisoners can guide future generations.

In his last meeting with the freed prisoners, he described their lives as a "guiding star" or a beacon for society's passage through future transformations<ref name=":2" />.

== Conclusion ==
In the intellectual framework of Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, the freed prisoners are not merely former POWs of the imposed war, but rather symbols of faith, steadfastness, patience, hope, and social responsibility. In his view, captivity is thought of as a school for self-improvement and spiritual growth, the return of the freed prisoners a manifestation of divine grace, and their experience a cultural capital for the continuation of historical identity and the transmission of Sacred Defense values to future generations.

== See also ==

* Freed Prisoners in the Words of the Supreme Leader

== Bibliography ==
<references />

== Author ==
Hassan Beheshtipour
[[Category:Captivity and captives]]
[[fa:آزادگان در بیانات رهبری 4]]
[[ar:الأحرار في بيانات قائد الثورة الإسلامية 4]]

Liberated Captives in the Statements of the Supreme Leader 4

2026-09-30T18:44:22Z

Marjan-khanlari: /* Bibliography */

Liberated Captives in the Statements of the Supreme Leader 4

2026-09-30T18:41:09Z

Marjan-khanlari: Created page with "'''Liberated Captives; The Best Soldiers of the Islamic Revolution.''' In the intellectual framework of Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, the martyred leader of the Islamic Revolution, liberated captives hold a position beyond that of freed prisoners of the imposed war. In this section, by examining his statements and messages from 1992 to 2012, liberated captives have been introduced as "the best soldiers of the Revolution," "the most tested fellows of the nation," "the..."

'''Liberated Captives; The Best Soldiers of the Islamic Revolution.'''

In the intellectual framework of Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, the martyred leader of the Islamic Revolution, liberated captives hold a position beyond that of freed prisoners of the imposed war.

In this section, by examining his statements and messages from 1992 to 2012, liberated captives have been introduced as "the best soldiers of the Revolution," "the most tested fellows of the nation," "the symbol of the Iranian nation's steadfastness," and a cultural and spiritual asset for the country's future. From this perspective, the period of captivity is not the end of struggle, but rather a stage of spiritual training, self-improvement, resilience, and preparation for undertaking greater social responsibilities.

By examining the statements and messages of the Supreme Leader between August 17th, 1992, and August 15th, 2012, the most important aspects of this perspective are highlighted as follow:

=== A) The Divine and Spiritual Status of Liberated Captives ===
1. The period of captivity is a divine test and a path for the spiritual growth of a faithful individual.

Ayatollah Khamenei assumes captivity as one of the most difficult divine tests, from which the liberated captives emerged victorious with patience, faith, and perseverance, and for this reason, he refers to them as tested and worthy individuals<ref name=":0">Retrieved from https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=2631</ref><ref name=":1">Retrieved from https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=7762</ref><ref name=":2">Retrieved from https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=20751</ref>.

2. Every moment of suffering during captivity is preserved by God.

Various statements emphasize that none of the hardships, patience, and struggles of the liberated captives is erased from the divine record, and all of them are registered by the divine archival system and have eternal rewards<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":2" />.

3. The sufferings of captivity are an asset for the individual and society.

In his view, the years of captivity were not merely enduring hardship, but rather created a reserve of experience, patience, faith, and social capital for the liberated captives and Iranian society<ref name=":0" />.

=== b) The Return of the Freed POWs; A Manifestation of Divine Power ===
1. The liberation of the POWs, contrary to ordinary calculations, was a manifestation of divine power and grace.

The Leader of the Revolution considers the liberation of tens of thousands of Iranian prisoners of war an event beyond political calculations and attributes it to divine power and will<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":3">Retrieved from https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=2897</ref>.

2. The return of the freed POWs is one of the great memories in the history of the Islamic Revolution.

He considers the return of the freed POWs as one of the greatest memories in the history of the Revolution and even contemporary Iranian history, emphasizing the necessity of keeping this memory alive in the national consciousness<ref name=":3" />.

=== c) The Status of Freed POWs in the Islamic Society ===
1. Freed POWs are the best soldiers of the Revolution and the most tested fellows of the nation.

From this perspective, freed POWs, due to enduring years of captivity and preserving their faith and revolutionary identity, are introduced as the most deserving individuals to defend the Revolution and the Islamic Republic system<ref name=":0" />.

2. Freed POWs are regarded as a symbol of the Iranian nation's steadfastness.

He considers the [[resistance]] of the freed POWs a source of pride for the Iranian nation and introduces them as a symbol of national resilience<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":3" />.

3. Freed POWs are among the most prominent examples of self-sacrificing individuals.

In statements from 1995, freed POWs, MIA (missing in action), and their families were identified as true examples of self-sacrificing individuals<ref>Retrieved from https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=9853</ref>.

=== d) The Mission of Freed POWs After Liberation ===
1. Freed POWs must march in the vanguard of national reconstruction.

The Leader of the Revolution emphasizes that the experience, resilience, and spiritual capital of the freed POWs must be utilized for the country's progress and reconstruction<ref name=":0" />.

2. Defending the Revolution and confronting enemies is the continuing mission of the freed prisoners of war (POWs).

From this perspective, the responsibility of freed POWs does not end with their captivity; rather, they must continue to play a role in defending the Revolution's values and countering enemy propaganda<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":4">Retrieved from https://farsi.khamenei.ir/message-content?id=3136</ref>.

=== C) Families of Freed POWs ===
1. The families of freed POWs shared in the sufferings of captivity and are blessed with divine reward.

The Supreme Leader has repeatedly praised the patience and resilience of the spouses, parents, and children of freed POWs, considering them partners in the spiritual reward of this struggle<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":2" />.

2. The waiting of a captive's [[family]] was one of the most difficult experiences of the war.

He describes this situation, referring to the constant worry of the captives' families, as one of the most harrowing experiences of the war [3].

=== D) Freed POWs: Cultural Capital and Historical Memory of the Nation ===
1. The experience of captivity is a cultural treasure for future generations.

Since 2002, in the Supreme Leader's statements, the experience of freed POWs has been presented as a cultural reserve for strengthening the faith, hope, and resistance of future generations<ref name=":4" />.

2. Recording captivity memoirs is a national necessity.

He criticizes the lack of efforts in recording the memoirs of freed POWs and emphasizes the production of books, films, artistic works, and research documentaries on the captivity<ref name=":2" />.

3. The artistic narration of captivity is part of the Iranian nation's victory document.

In his view, the correct representation of the freed POWs' experience in artistic and media works solidifies historical memory and expresses the Iranian nation's victory in the Sacred Defense<ref name=":2" />.

=== E) Hope, Perseverance, and Future ===
1. The freed prisoners exemplify hope triumphing over despair.

The Leader of the Revolution, referring to the harsh conditions in the POW camps, emphasizes that the freed prisoners, by maintaining hope and faith, overcame despair, and this characteristic made them a role model for the society<ref name=":0" />.

2. The lives of the freed prisoners can guide future generations.

In his last meeting with the freed prisoners, he described their lives as a "guiding star" or a beacon for society's passage through future transformations<ref name=":2" />.

== Conclusion ==
In the intellectual framework of Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, the freed prisoners are not merely former POWs of the imposed war, but rather symbols of faith, steadfastness, patience, hope, and social responsibility. In his view, captivity is thought of as a school for self-improvement and spiritual growth, the return of the freed prisoners a manifestation of divine grace, and their experience a cultural capital for the continuation of historical identity and the transmission of Sacred Defense values to future generations.

== See also ==

* Freed Prisoners in the Words of the Supreme Leader

== Bibliography ==

Liberated POWs in the Supreme Leader's Statements 3

2026-09-30T18:29:45Z

Marjan-khanlari: /* Author */

'''Liberated POWs, the best soldiers of the Islamic Revolution.'''

In the statements of the Supreme Leader, the liberated POWs are introduced not only as righteous servants but also as "the best soldiers of the Revolution," "the most tested offspring of the nation," and "living martyrs," whose period of captivity is assumed as a glorious chapter of "blessed and rewarding years of youth."

By examining the statements of the Supreme Leader between September 16th, 1990, and August 17th, 1992, the following points can be highlighted as the most important ones:

=== A: The Divine and Spiritual Status of Liberated POWs (The Celestial Value of Sufferings) ===
1. All moments of captivity (long nights, fear, hunger, cold and heat, loneliness, the tyranny of the unworthy, and steadfastness against the enemies of God) are preserved in the Divine Records like audio and video tapes, and not a single moment of it has perished<ref name=":0">Available from https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=2372</ref>.

2. Liberated POWs are regarded as a collection of divine blessings and God's graces upon righteous servants, as well as a collection of difficult tests ordeals for faithful human beings<ref name=":1">Available from https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=8840</ref>.

3.The gist of the Quranic verse equal to “ Patience is a virtue” was demonstrated to the liberated captives in effect and God practically enabled them to taste the sweet fruits of patience<ref>Available from https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=2384</ref>.

4. The liberation of the POWs from the clutches of the Ba'athist regime was a sign of God's extraordinary power and one of the divine rewards to the Iranian nation<ref>Available from https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=2623</ref>.

=== B: The Value and Weight of Each Moment of Captivity (The Grandeur of Endurance) ===
1. One hour of captivity in the hands of a treacherous, tyrannical, irreligious enemy who is totally devoid of humanity, is hard and unbearable let alone an exponential sum of days<ref name=":1" />.

2. The moment-by-moment sufferings of captivity cannot be verbalized or fully explained by art and literature; hearing about it is not like seeing and touching it<ref name=":2">Available from https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=2589</ref>.

=== Q: The Historical and Identity Role of LCs (Keeping the Resistance Movement Alive) ===
1. The Liberated Captives revive the memories of days, hours, and moments(of captivity), and keep the historical memory of [[resistance]] alive in the society<ref name=":0" />.

2. In the harshest conditions of captivity, the LCs preserved their revolutionary and spiritual character and fighting spirit in a way that is unparalleled among any nation<ref name=":2" />.

3. The LCs symbolize loyalty to Islamic ideals and act as a beacon of enlightenment against the intentions of Imperialism<ref>Available from https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=2479</ref>.

=== T: The LCs in the Field of National Development and Future-Making (Post-Captivity Function) ===
1. The LCs have returned with a valuable reserve of experience, awareness, competence, patience, steadfastness, and forbearance, and these assets must be employed for the national development<ref name=":1" />.

2. They must march in the vanguard of the country's development movement in all spheres (army, IRGC, the Islamic Militia, and society)<ref name=":1" />.

3. The hardships of captivity have strengthened their resolve to advance towards the goals of the revolution, and they are the most eligible individuals to defend the system<ref name=":3">Available from https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=2631</ref>.

=== Th: The Duty of Sustaining Revolutionary Spirit (Countering Despair and Distortion) ===
1. The Islamic Revolution is not confined to a specific time; with the passage of time, revolutionary spirit does not weaken. The LCs must contend with the illusion of the revolution weakening by means of enthusiasm, reliance on God, and steadfast<ref name=":3" />.

2. Despair and hopelessness are the greatest enemies of idealistic people; The LCs, drawing on their great spiritual reserve that stems from captivity, should continue their struggle and never give up hope for the future<ref name=":3" />.

== Final Summary ==
Within the intellectual framework of the Supreme Leader, the Liberated POWs do not represent a historical phenomenon of the past, but rather a living treasure of faith, patience, and insight into the Islamic Revolution forever. God has particularly noted the magnitude of LCs ` sufferings; their return is a divine reward; and their presence in the scene of construction and defense of values is considered a continuation of that epic of resistance in a new form.

== See also ==

* The LCs in the remarks of the Supreme Leader

== Bibliography ==
<references />

== Author ==
Hassan Beheshtipour
[[Category:Captivity and captives]]
[[fa:آزادگان در بیانات رهبری 3]]
[[ar:الأحرار في بيانات قائد الثورة الإسلامية 3]]

Liberated POWs in the Supreme Leader's Statements 3

2026-09-30T18:29:10Z

Marjan-khanlari: /* Bibliography */

Liberated POWs in the Supreme Leader's Statements 3

2026-09-30T18:28:13Z

Marjan-khanlari: Created page with "'''Liberated POWs, the best soldiers of the Islamic Revolution.''' In the statements of the Supreme Leader, the liberated POWs are introduced not only as righteous servants but also as "the best soldiers of the Revolution," "the most tested offspring of the nation," and "living martyrs," whose period of captivity is assumed as a glorious chapter of "blessed and rewarding years of youth." By examining the statements of the Supreme Leader between September 16th, 1990, an..."

The Liberated Captives(LCs) in the Statements of the Leader 2

2026-09-30T18:18:05Z

Marjan-khanlari: /* Author */

'''The LCs, "great divine reserves" and "national assets".'''

The return of Iranian prisoners in 1990 was one of the most glorious events after the imposed war. The Supreme Leader of the Revolution, Ayatollah Khamenei, in three separate meetings over several days (May 29th, June 1st, and June 4th, 1990) with a group of LCs, explained their personal capabilities, performance, and messages for the society. Under this entry, the main points of his speeches directly pertaining to the LCs are categorized<ref>The official website of the Office of the Supreme Leader (Leader.ir): Archive of speeches from 1990 and topics pertaining to meetings with families of martyrs, veterans, and the LCs. Available at [https://www.leader.ir/fa/speech/343; https://www.leader.ir/fa/speech/343;] [https://www.leader.ir/fa/content/346; https://www.leader.ir/fa/content/346;]</ref>.

== First Thematic Axis: LCs, "Great Divine Reserves" and "National Assets" ==
Key phrase: "Our dear LCs are great reserves of the revolution and Islam, whom God returned to the embrace of the grateful nation."

Analysis: The Leader of the Revolution introduced the LCs not merely as individuals returned from captivity, but as spiritual and national assets whose existence is essential for the survival of the system and the revolution. This perspective elevates their status from human elements to a divine assets<ref>Available at https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=2342</ref>.

== Second Thematic Axis: Maintaining Dignity and Honor During the most Intolerable Hours and Moments of Captivity ==
Key phrase: "You(Dear LCs) who have returned honorably and proudly; you preserved your religion, beliefs, and devotion to the Imam, Islam, and the Revolution; you protected the nation's honor against the enemy and did not bring shame upon the nation."

Analysis: This axis identifies the most important characteristic of the LCs such as "dignity-seeking" in the most possibly difficult conditions. The emphasis that they not only preserved their faith in captivity but also did not allow the enemy to exploit them for propaganda purposes, demonstrates their deep understanding of national and Islamic responsibility<ref>Available at https://farsi.khamenei.ir/news-content?id=432</ref>.

== Third Thematic Axis: LCs and "Glorious Letters" from the Heart of the Camps ==
Key phrase: "We have received letters from some of the LCs during these two years since the ceasefire commenced... ‘They wrote that we should not bribe the enemy for their liberation.’ The is what our captives wrote. These are among the documents of our national honor and will be preserved forever."

Analysis: The martyred leader of the revolution, by revealing these correspondences, highlights the moral and political genius of the LCs. While in the clutches of a callous enemy, they asked the authorities not to accept humiliation in return for their freedom. This noble action demonstrates prioritizing national honor over individual liberation, which depicts the highest level of "religious zeal" and "patriotism"<ref name=":0">Available at https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=2345</ref>.

== Fourth Thematic axis: Spiritual achievements during captivity (exemplification of individual resistance) ==
Key phrase: "When our LCs returned, they brought me news from the camps that our loved ones are people accustomed to pray, piety, keep night vigil, , and commune with God; preserve these( the LCs), they are very valuable, and our victory is the direct result of their zealous efforts."

Analysis: By emphasizing praying, keeping vigil, and familiarity with the Quran in the camps, he shows how the LCs achieved spiritual sublimity from the depths of captivity. This achievement makes them a model for all segments of the society to consider God as the main support in crises<ref name=":0" />.

== Fifth Thematic Axis: LCs as an “ Assessment Criterion” for the nation and officials ==
Key phrase: "You, the liberated prisoners... have made your point by presenting a truly cogent argument to the officials and to us."

Analysis: The Supreme Leader introduces the patience and [[resistance]] of the LCs as a factor enabling their argument to be so cogent to the officials; meaning they proved that one can live with dignity without having to sacrifice human dignity to achieve goals. This approach is a measure for evaluating the performance of officials in confronting crises<ref name=":0" />.

== Sixth Thematic Axis: Recommendations of the Supreme Leader to the liberated prisoners for the future ==
Key phrase: "You, dear ones, put your trust in God as before; maintain your connection with God; keep the achievement of the captivity period, which is familiarity with God and the Quran and patience in the face of adversities and problems, as a valuable treasure to yourselves."

Analysis: He asks the LCs to maintain the spiritual identity gained during the captivity while you live as free men. This recommendation implies that the glory of the LCs is not limited to their past, but their duty to the society is to transfer this spirit of resistance to future generations<ref name=":0" />.

== Final Conclusion ==
LCs: Symbols of "National Honor" and "Power of Faith"

From the perspective of the Supreme Leader in 1990, based on the three speeches mentioned above, the LCs possessed the following three prominent characteristics:

1. Creating honor in the most difficult conditions; by maintaining their dignity against the enemy.

2. Faith-centeredness and transforming captivity into an opportunity for spiritual transcendence; through praying and communion with God and the Quran.

3. Political awareness, reflected in the influential letters written by the LCs, urging the system to preserve national dignity.

These principles make the LCs perfect role models for Iranian society, where "physical captivity" never means "spiritual defeat," and "true victory" is summarized in preserving belief and honor against the enemy.

== See also ==

* The LCs in the Remarks of the Supreme Leader

== Bibliography ==
<references />

== Author ==
Hassan Beheshtipour
[[Category:Captivity and captives]]
[[fa:آزادگان در بیانات رهبری 2]]
[[ar:الأحرار في بيانات قائد الثورة الإسلامية 2]]

The Liberated Captives(LCs) in the Statements of the Leader 2

2026-09-30T18:17:38Z

Marjan-khanlari: /* Bibliography */

The Liberated Captives(LCs) in the Statements of the Leader 2

2026-09-30T18:16:10Z

Marjan-khanlari: Created page with "'''The LCs, "great divine reserves" and "national assets".''' The return of Iranian prisoners in 1990 was one of the most glorious events after the imposed war. The Supreme Leader of the Revolution, Ayatollah Khamenei, in three separate meetings over several days (May 29th, June 1st, and June 4th, 1990) with a group of LCs, explained their personal capabilities, performance, and messages for the society. Under this entry, the main points of his speeches directly pertain..."

'''The LCs, "great divine reserves" and "national assets".'''

The return of Iranian prisoners in 1990 was one of the most glorious events after the imposed war. The Supreme Leader of the Revolution, Ayatollah Khamenei, in three separate meetings over several days (May 29th, June 1st, and June 4th, 1990) with a group of LCs, explained their personal capabilities, performance, and messages for the society. Under this entry, the main points of his speeches directly pertaining to the LCs are categorized<ref>The official website of the Office of the Supreme Leader (Leader.ir): Archive of speeches from 1990 and topics pertaining to meetings with families of martyrs, veterans, and the LCs. Available at [https://www.leader.ir/fa/speech/343; https://www.leader.ir/fa/speech/343;] [https://www.leader.ir/fa/content/346; https://www.leader.ir/fa/content/346;]</ref>.

== First Thematic Axis: LCs, "Great Divine Reserves" and "National Assets" ==
Key phrase: "Our dear LCs are great reserves of the revolution and Islam, whom God returned to the embrace of the grateful nation."

Analysis: The Leader of the Revolution introduced the LCs not merely as individuals returned from captivity, but as spiritual and national assets whose existence is essential for the survival of the system and the revolution. This perspective elevates their status from human elements to a divine assets<ref>Available at https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=2342</ref>.

== Second Thematic Axis: Maintaining Dignity and Honor During the most Intolerable Hours and Moments of Captivity ==
Key phrase: "You(Dear LCs) who have returned honorably and proudly; you preserved your religion, beliefs, and devotion to the Imam, Islam, and the Revolution; you protected the nation's honor against the enemy and did not bring shame upon the nation."

Analysis: This axis identifies the most important characteristic of the LCs such as "dignity-seeking" in the most possibly difficult conditions. The emphasis that they not only preserved their faith in captivity but also did not allow the enemy to exploit them for propaganda purposes, demonstrates their deep understanding of national and Islamic responsibility<ref>Available at https://farsi.khamenei.ir/news-content?id=432</ref>.

== Third Thematic Axis: LCs and "Glorious Letters" from the Heart of the Camps ==
Key phrase: "We have received letters from some of the LCs during these two years since the ceasefire commenced... ‘They wrote that we should not bribe the enemy for their liberation.’ The is what our captives wrote. These are among the documents of our national honor and will be preserved forever."

Analysis: The martyred leader of the revolution, by revealing these correspondences, highlights the moral and political genius of the LCs. While in the clutches of a callous enemy, they asked the authorities not to accept humiliation in return for their freedom. This noble action demonstrates prioritizing national honor over individual liberation, which depicts the highest level of "religious zeal" and "patriotism"<ref name=":0">Available at https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=2345</ref>.

== Fourth Thematic axis: Spiritual achievements during captivity (exemplification of individual resistance) ==
Key phrase: "When our LCs returned, they brought me news from the camps that our loved ones are people accustomed to pray, piety, keep night vigil, , and commune with God; preserve these( the LCs), they are very valuable, and our victory is the direct result of their zealous efforts."

Analysis: By emphasizing praying, keeping vigil, and familiarity with the Quran in the camps, he shows how the LCs achieved spiritual sublimity from the depths of captivity. This achievement makes them a model for all segments of the society to consider God as the main support in crises<ref name=":0" />.

== Fifth Thematic Axis: LCs as an “ Assessment Criterion” for the nation and officials ==
Key phrase: "You, the liberated prisoners... have made your point by presenting a truly cogent argument to the officials and to us."

Analysis: The Supreme Leader introduces the patience and [[resistance]] of the LCs as a factor enabling their argument to be so cogent to the officials; meaning they proved that one can live with dignity without having to sacrifice human dignity to achieve goals. This approach is a measure for evaluating the performance of officials in confronting crises<ref name=":0" />.

== Sixth Thematic Axis: Recommendations of the Supreme Leader to the liberated prisoners for the future ==
Key phrase: "You, dear ones, put your trust in God as before; maintain your connection with God; keep the achievement of the captivity period, which is familiarity with God and the Quran and patience in the face of adversities and problems, as a valuable treasure to yourselves."

Analysis: He asks the LCs to maintain the spiritual identity gained during the captivity while you live as free men. This recommendation implies that the glory of the LCs is not limited to their past, but their duty to the society is to transfer this spirit of resistance to future generations<ref name=":0" />.

== Final Conclusion ==
LCs: Symbols of "National Honor" and "Power of Faith"

From the perspective of the Supreme Leader in 1990, based on the three speeches mentioned above, the LCs possessed the following three prominent characteristics:

1. Creating honor in the most difficult conditions; by maintaining their dignity against the enemy.

2. Faith-centeredness and transforming captivity into an opportunity for spiritual transcendence; through praying and communion with God and the Quran.

3. Political awareness, reflected in the influential letters written by the LCs, urging the system to preserve national dignity.

These principles make the LCs perfect role models for Iranian society, where "physical captivity" never means "spiritual defeat," and "true victory" is summarized in preserving belief and honor against the enemy.

== See also ==
• The LCs in the Remarks of the Supreme Leader

== Bibliography ==

The Liberated Captives in the Supreme Leader's Statements 1

2026-09-30T18:06:57Z

Marjan-khanlari:

'''The Liberated Captives; treasures of faith and sources of national pride.'''

In a meeting with various groups of people on November 15th, 1989, Ayatollah Khamenei, while appreciating the sacrifice of liberated captives and their families, emphasized the courage, resilience, and moral rectitude and national status of the liberated captives, and warned against the enemy's political efforts as to exploit the issue of prisoners<ref>nformation website of the Office of the Supreme Leader (Leader.ir): Archive of statements from 1989 and topics related to meetings with the families of martyrs, veterans, and liberated prisoners of war. Available at https://www.leader.ir/fa/content/206</ref>.

== Praising [[resistance]] of the LCs(=Liberated Captives) against Imperialism ==
The Supreme Leader, referring to the position of Iranian fighters and prisoners, introduces them as a real and potential danger not only for the Ba'athist regime of Iraq but also for the entire front of Imperialism. He emphasizes that the young LCs, with their steadfastness and gallantry, have taught a hard lesson to the enemies.

Ayatollah Khamenei called the LCs an example of gallantry and resilience who showed resistance even in the difficult conditions of captivity. The Leader emphasized that each of the prisoners was considered a potential danger to the enemy's imperial system, and this steadfastness shows their national and moral value.

== Families’ Pride in the LCs ==
The Leader of the Revolution called upon the families of prisoners to be proud of their liberated loved ones, placing them on par with the families of martyrs. He emphasized that the patience and honor of the liberated captives are at least as worthy of respect as the sacrifices of martyrs and veterans, and their families should, like the families of martyrs, be proud of these dear ones. This perspective views captivity not as a weakness, but as an arena for demonstrating the power of faith and defeating enemies in the hidden trenches of captivity.

== Faith, Gallantry, and Inner Strength of the LCs ==
In these statements, the LCs were introduced as models of "gallantry" and "inner strength" who, during their years of captivity, despite various pressures and strictures from the Ba'athist regime, did not surrender. The Leader of the Revolution emphasized that the enemy, despite inflicting tortures and restrictions, failed to "digest" the spirit and the faithful and revolutionary identity of these prisoners and have it dissolved. Throughout the years of captivity, the Ba'athist regime had imposed severe behaviors and numerous pressures on the prisoners. Nevertheless, the liberated captives, through faith and endurance, were able to withstand the pressures and rendered the enemy incapable of destroying their morale.

== Exposure of Inhuman Enemy Behavior; From Concealment to Political Exploitation ==
In a significant part of these statements, the dual and inhuman nature of the Ba'athist regime and its Western supporters is exposed. He condemned these actions, pointing out that thousands of Iranian prisoners in Iraqi camps were not even registered, and the Red Cross also fell short in this regard. In contrast, the enemy's framing of the issue of prisoners as a "humanitarian issue" is assessed as a deceptive and political maneuver aimed at making people forget the crimes of the eight-year war and preventing the pursuit of the fate of the missing and unregistered prisoners.

== Honoring the Exalted Status of Veterans and Their Families ==
At the end of these statements, the lofty status of martyrs, veterans, and especially liberated prisoners of war and their families, was emphasized and they were hailed as "the most prominent and noblest of people." The Supreme Leader regards showing gratitude to these dear ones as everyone's duty, from the public to government agencies. At the same time, he describes God's reward and transaction with these great individuals as beyond any material compensation and value, and as the most enduring reward<ref>Retrieved from https://farsi.khamenei.ir/news-content?id=357</ref>.

== See also ==

* Liberated Prisoners of War in the Remarks of the Leader

== Bibliography ==
<references />

== Author ==
Hassan Beheshtipour
[[Category:Captivity and captives]]
[[fa:آزادگان در بیانات رهبری 1]]
[[ar:الأحرار في بيانات قائد الثورة الإسلامية 1]]

The Liberated Captives in the Supreme Leader's Statements 1

2026-09-30T18:05:21Z

Marjan-khanlari: /* Author */

'''The Liberated Captives; treasures of faith and sources of national pride.'''

In a meeting with various groups of people on November 15th, 1989, Ayatollah Khamenei, while appreciating the sacrifice of liberated captives and their families, emphasized the courage, resilience, and moral rectitude and national status of the liberated captives, and warned against the enemy's political efforts as to exploit the issue of prisoners<ref>nformation website of the Office of the Supreme Leader (Leader.ir): Archive of statements from 1989 and topics related to meetings with the families of martyrs, veterans, and liberated prisoners of war. Available at https://www.leader.ir/fa/content/206</ref>.

== Praising [[resistance]] of the LCs(=Liberated Captives) against Imperialism ==
The Supreme Leader, referring to the position of Iranian fighters and prisoners, introduces them as a real and potential danger not only for the Ba'athist regime of Iraq but also for the entire front of Imperialism. He emphasizes that the young LCs, with their steadfastness and gallantry, have taught a hard lesson to the enemies.

Ayatollah Khamenei called the LCs an example of gallantry and resilience who showed resistance even in the difficult conditions of captivity. The Leader emphasized that each of the prisoners was considered a potential danger to the enemy's imperial system, and this steadfastness shows their national and moral value.

== Families’ Pride in the LCs ==
The Leader of the Revolution called upon the families of prisoners to be proud of their liberated loved ones, placing them on par with the families of martyrs. He emphasized that the patience and honor of the liberated captives are at least as worthy of respect as the sacrifices of martyrs and veterans, and their families should, like the families of martyrs, be proud of these dear ones. This perspective views captivity not as a weakness, but as an arena for demonstrating the power of faith and defeating enemies in the hidden trenches of captivity.

== Faith, Gallantry, and Inner Strength of the LCs ==
In these statements, the LCs were introduced as models of "gallantry" and "inner strength" who, during their years of captivity, despite various pressures and strictures from the Ba'athist regime, did not surrender. The Leader of the Revolution emphasized that the enemy, despite inflicting tortures and restrictions, failed to "digest" the spirit and the faithful and revolutionary identity of these prisoners and have it dissolved. Throughout the years of captivity, the Ba'athist regime had imposed severe behaviors and numerous pressures on the prisoners. Nevertheless, the liberated captives, through faith and endurance, were able to withstand the pressures and rendered the enemy incapable of destroying their morale.

== Exposure of Inhuman Enemy Behavior; From Concealment to Political Exploitation ==
In a significant part of these statements, the dual and inhuman nature of the Ba'athist regime and its Western supporters is exposed. He condemned these actions, pointing out that thousands of Iranian prisoners in Iraqi camps were not even registered, and the Red Cross also fell short in this regard. In contrast, the enemy's framing of the issue of prisoners as a "humanitarian issue" is assessed as a deceptive and political maneuver aimed at making people forget the crimes of the eight-year war and preventing the pursuit of the fate of the missing and unregistered prisoners.

== Honoring the Exalted Status of Veterans and Their Families ==
At the end of these statements, the lofty status of martyrs, veterans, and especially liberated prisoners of war and their families, was emphasized and they were hailed as "the most prominent and noblest of people." The Supreme Leader regards showing gratitude to these dear ones as everyone's duty, from the public to government agencies. At the same time, he describes God's reward and transaction with these great individuals as beyond any material compensation and value, and as the most enduring reward<ref>Retrieved from https://farsi.khamenei.ir/news-content?id=357</ref>.

== See also ==

* Liberated Prisoners of War in the Remarks of the Leader

== Bibliography ==
<references />

== Author ==
Hassan Beheshtipour
[[Category:Captivity and captives]]
fa:[[آزادگان در بیانات رهبری 1]]

The Liberated Captives in the Supreme Leader's Statements 1

2026-09-30T18:04:49Z

Marjan-khanlari: /* Bibliography */

The Liberated Captives in the Supreme Leader's Statements 1

2026-09-30T18:03:20Z

Marjan-khanlari: Created page with "'''The Liberated Captives; treasures of faith and sources of national pride.''' In a meeting with various groups of people on November 15th, 1989, Ayatollah Khamenei, while appreciating the sacrifice of liberated captives and their families, emphasized the courage, resilience, and moral rectitude and national status of the liberated captives, and warned against the enemy's political efforts as to exploit the issue of prisoners<ref>nformation website of the Office of the..."

'''The Liberated Captives; treasures of faith and sources of national pride.'''

In a meeting with various groups of people on November 15th, 1989, Ayatollah Khamenei, while appreciating the sacrifice of liberated captives and their families, emphasized the courage, resilience, and moral rectitude and national status of the liberated captives, and warned against the enemy's political efforts as to exploit the issue of prisoners<ref>nformation website of the Office of the Supreme Leader (Leader.ir): Archive of statements from 1989 and topics related to meetings with the families of martyrs, veterans, and liberated prisoners of war. Available at https://www.leader.ir/fa/content/206</ref>.

== Praising [[resistance]] of the LCs(=Liberated Captives) against Imperialism ==
The Supreme Leader, referring to the position of Iranian fighters and prisoners, introduces them as a real and potential danger not only for the Ba'athist regime of Iraq but also for the entire front of Imperialism. He emphasizes that the young LCs, with their steadfastness and gallantry, have taught a hard lesson to the enemies.

Ayatollah Khamenei called the LCs an example of gallantry and resilience who showed resistance even in the difficult conditions of captivity. The Leader emphasized that each of the prisoners was considered a potential danger to the enemy's imperial system, and this steadfastness shows their national and moral value.

== Families’ Pride in the LCs ==
The Leader of the Revolution called upon the families of prisoners to be proud of their liberated loved ones, placing them on par with the families of martyrs. He emphasized that the patience and honor of the liberated captives are at least as worthy of respect as the sacrifices of martyrs and veterans, and their families should, like the families of martyrs, be proud of these dear ones. This perspective views captivity not as a weakness, but as an arena for demonstrating the power of faith and defeating enemies in the hidden trenches of captivity.

== Faith, Gallantry, and Inner Strength of the LCs ==
In these statements, the LCs were introduced as models of "gallantry" and "inner strength" who, during their years of captivity, despite various pressures and strictures from the Ba'athist regime, did not surrender. The Leader of the Revolution emphasized that the enemy, despite inflicting tortures and restrictions, failed to "digest" the spirit and the faithful and revolutionary identity of these prisoners and have it dissolved. Throughout the years of captivity, the Ba'athist regime had imposed severe behaviors and numerous pressures on the prisoners. Nevertheless, the liberated captives, through faith and endurance, were able to withstand the pressures and rendered the enemy incapable of destroying their morale.

Exposure of Inhuman Enemy Behavior; From Concealment to Political Exploitation

In a significant part of these statements, the dual and inhuman nature of the Ba'athist regime and its Western supporters is exposed. He condemned these actions, pointing out that thousands of Iranian prisoners in Iraqi camps were not even registered, and the Red Cross also fell short in this regard. In contrast, the enemy's framing of the issue of prisoners as a "humanitarian issue" is assessed as a deceptive and political maneuver aimed at making people forget the crimes of the eight-year war and preventing the pursuit of the fate of the missing and unregistered prisoners.

== Honoring the Exalted Status of Veterans and Their Families ==
At the end of these statements, the lofty status of martyrs, veterans, and especially liberated prisoners of war and their families, was emphasized and they were hailed as "the most prominent and noblest of people." The Supreme Leader regards showing gratitude to these dear ones as everyone's duty, from the public to government agencies. At the same time, he describes God's reward and transaction with these great individuals as beyond any material compensation and value, and as the most enduring reward<ref>Retrieved from https://farsi.khamenei.ir/news-content?id=357</ref>.

== See also ==

* [[Liberated Prisoners of War in the Remarks of the Leader]]

== Bibliography ==

Forcing POWs to Beat One Another

2026-09-03T13:06:14Z

Marjan-khanlari:

One method of [[Punishment and torture|punishment]] and psychological torture used on Iranian prisoners of war (POWs) was forcing them to beat one another.

Ba'athist officers would compel prisoners to hit each other, and anyone who refused to do so, was severely punished<ref>Scientific Council of the Azadegan Encyclopedia. (2020). Azadegan Encyclopedia: Released Iranian Prisoners of Iraq’s War against Iran. Tehran: Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies; [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam-e Azadegan].</ref>.

In the detention camps of Iraq's Ba'athist regime, one way of humiliating and torturing Iranian prisoners was, on occasions when the large number of detainees made it feasible, to line them up in pairs and force them to slap or strike one another in the face. This practice had deep psychological and moral consequences, which I will address below.

== This violent and degrading method had multiple dimensions: ==
1. '''Breaking solidarity:''' It placed prisoners in a position where they were forced to harm their own compatriots, which in itself represented a major psychological victory for the Iraqis, as it sought to drive a wedge between the prisoners.

2. '''Playing for time:''' The delay and prolongation of the act was itself a form of torture; prisoners knew that eventually they would either have to strike or face even harsher punishment.

3. '''Resentment and guilt:''' Even when prisoners understood that they were being coerced, the act instilled feelings of shame and inner guilt, and in some cases even sowed hidden grudges between friends.

4. '''Passive [[resistance]] as a strategy:''' Prisoners acted shrewdly; they maintained the appearance of compliance (to avoid direct punishment) while, in reality, delivering light blows or merely going through the motions, so as neither to be punished nor to seriously hurt their fellow prisoners.

This was a prime example of moral [[resistance]] under the harshest of conditions. In one instance, in the autumn of 1988, at Camp No. 12 in Tikrit, Ward No. 6, Abdolreza, who was barely twenty-one at the time, was a highly energetic young student who had voluntarily left his first year of university to go to the front lines, feeling it was his religious duty to his country in the face of the Ba’athist regime's aggression.

In [[protest]] against this form of punishment, he stood up and cried out:<blockquote>"We are prisoners, and this is a POW camp. It is your duty to punish us yourselves, not to set us upon one another.<ref>Nekouian, Abdolreza. Memoirs.</ref>"</blockquote>Abdolreza's act gave courage to the others who were being punished there. It was as though his defiance instilled in them a renewed energy; they all broke into a collective chant of "Allahu Akbar" and stood firm against the Iraqis.

As soon as the Iraqis saw the unity among these men, they immediately halted this method of punishment.

Despite his youth, Abdolreza displayed remarkable courage. Through a principled and humane stance, he not only preserved his own dignity but also revived unity and solidarity among the other prisoners.

The prisoners' collective cry of "Allahu Akbar" signified a surge of energy and collective [[resistance]] against the acceptance of humiliation, inspired by Abdolreza's act and giving meaning to an effective protest movement.

When the Iraqis witnessed the prisoners' unity and steadfastness, they backed down and ceased that degrading practice, realizing that continuing it would only provoke further collective [[resistance]].

This was a truly inspiring example of moral and collective [[resistance]] in the most difficult of circumstances.

"It was a great lesson for all of us that the courage of one individual can teach both himself and others how to stand firm against the enemy."

== Analysis and Elaboration ==
1. '''Individual courage can spark a collective flame.''' A single person with a well-timed "no" can break the chain of silence and passivity. Abdolreza showed that moral courage is sometimes more effective than weapons.

2. '''[[Resistance]] is contagious.''' When the prisoners chanted "Allahu Akbar" and stood their ground, they proved that hope and solidarity can spread even in captivity; the enemy fears unity, not solitude.

3. '''The power of role-modeling.''' This act was not only impactful in that moment but also became a behavioral model for other prisoners and future generations, proof that dignity can be preserved even under the greatest pressure.

4. '''A message for us today.''' This is not confined to war and captivity; in any arena where we face injustice, bullying, or humiliation, the courage of one person can be the beginning of change.

== See also ==

* [[Punishment and torture|Punishment and Torture]]
* Psychological [[Punishment and torture|Punishment and Torture]]
* Punishment in Captivity
* Torture in Captivity
* Physical Punishment and Torture

== Bibliography ==

[[Category:Punishment and Torture]]
<references />

== Author ==
Abdolreza Nekouian
[[fa:اجبار اسیران به کتک زدن یکدیگر]]
[[ar:إجبار الأسرى على ضرب بعضهم بعضًا]]

Forcing POWs to Beat One Another

2026-09-03T13:04:55Z

Marjan-khanlari: /* Bibliography */

Forcing POWs to Beat One Another

2026-09-03T13:01:19Z

Marjan-khanlari: Created page with "One method of punishment and psychological torture used on Iranian prisoners of war (POWs) was forcing them to beat one another. Ba'athist officers would compel prisoners to hit each other, and anyone who refused to do so, was severely punished<ref>Scientific Council of the Azadegan Encyclopedia. (2020). Azadegan Encyclopedia: Released Iranian Prisoners of Iraq’s War against Iran. Tehran: Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies; [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam-e Aza..."

One method of punishment and psychological torture used on Iranian prisoners of war (POWs) was forcing them to beat one another.

Ba'athist officers would compel prisoners to hit each other, and anyone who refused to do so, was severely punished<ref>Scientific Council of the Azadegan Encyclopedia. (2020). Azadegan Encyclopedia: Released Iranian Prisoners of Iraq’s War against Iran. Tehran: Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies; [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam-e Azadegan].</ref>.

In the detention camps of Iraq's Ba'athist regime, one way of humiliating and torturing Iranian prisoners was, on occasions when the large number of detainees made it feasible, to line them up in pairs and force them to slap or strike one another in the face. This practice had deep psychological and moral consequences, which I will address below.

== This violent and degrading method had multiple dimensions: ==
1. '''Breaking solidarity:''' It placed prisoners in a position where they were forced to harm their own compatriots, which in itself represented a major psychological victory for the Iraqis, as it sought to drive a wedge between the prisoners.

2. '''Playing for time:''' The delay and prolongation of the act was itself a form of torture; prisoners knew that eventually they would either have to strike or face even harsher punishment.

3. '''Resentment and guilt:''' Even when prisoners understood that they were being coerced, the act instilled feelings of shame and inner guilt, and in some cases even sowed hidden grudges between friends.

4. '''Passive [[resistance]] as a strategy:''' Prisoners acted shrewdly; they maintained the appearance of compliance (to avoid direct punishment) while, in reality, delivering light blows or merely going through the motions, so as neither to be punished nor to seriously hurt their fellow prisoners.

This was a prime example of moral resistance under the harshest of conditions. In one instance, in the autumn of 1988, at Camp No. 12 in Tikrit, Ward No. 6, Abdolreza, who was barely twenty-one at the time, was a highly energetic young student who had voluntarily left his first year of university to go to the front lines, feeling it was his religious duty to his country in the face of the Ba’athist regime's aggression.

In [[protest]] against this form of punishment, he stood up and cried out:<blockquote>"We are prisoners, and this is a POW camp. It is your duty to punish us yourselves, not to set us upon one another.<ref>Nekouian, Abdolreza. Memoirs.</ref>"</blockquote>Abdolreza's act gave courage to the others who were being punished there. It was as though his defiance instilled in them a renewed energy; they all broke into a collective chant of "Allahu Akbar" and stood firm against the Iraqis.

As soon as the Iraqis saw the unity among these men, they immediately halted this method of punishment.

Despite his youth, Abdolreza displayed remarkable courage. Through a principled and humane stance, he not only preserved his own dignity but also revived unity and solidarity among the other prisoners.

The prisoners' collective cry of "Allahu Akbar" signified a surge of energy and collective resistance against the acceptance of humiliation, inspired by Abdolreza's act and giving meaning to an effective protest movement.

When the Iraqis witnessed the prisoners' unity and steadfastness, they backed down and ceased that degrading practice, realizing that continuing it would only provoke further collective resistance.

This was a truly inspiring example of moral and collective resistance in the most difficult of circumstances.

"It was a great lesson for all of us that the courage of one individual can teach both himself and others how to stand firm against the enemy."

== Analysis and Elaboration ==
1. '''Individual courage can spark a collective flame.''' A single person with a well-timed "no" can break the chain of silence and passivity. Abdolreza showed that moral courage is sometimes more effective than weapons.

2. '''Resistance is contagious.''' When the prisoners chanted "Allahu Akbar" and stood their ground, they proved that hope and solidarity can spread even in captivity; the enemy fears unity, not solitude.

3. '''The power of role-modeling.''' This act was not only impactful in that moment but also became a behavioral model for other prisoners and future generations, proof that dignity can be preserved even under the greatest pressure.

4. '''A message for us today.''' This is not confined to war and captivity; in any arena where we face injustice, bullying, or humiliation, the courage of one person can be the beginning of change.

== See also ==

* [[Punishment and torture|Punishment and Torture]]
* Psychological Punishment and Torture
* Punishment in Captivity
* Torture in Captivity
* Physical Punishment and Torture

== Bibliography ==

[[Category:Punishment and Torture]]

Clothing

2026-09-03T12:47:37Z

Marjan-khanlari:

In the early years of the war, Iranian prisoners of war (POWs) were sometimes held for months in Iraqi border prisons or camps wearing nothing but the same worn-out khaki combat uniforms they had been captured in. The Iraqi army had no specific provisions for prisoner clothing, and many captives went barefoot, clad in rags, or in some cases naked.

As the number of Iranian prisoners grew, a clothing allowance was introduced which included one duffel bag or military backpack, a ''dishdasha'', sneakers, slippers, a mirror, a razor, underwear, an undershirt, socks, a military uniform in maroon, green, or khaki, and later yellow, as well as a metal mug, two blankets, and a foam pillow.

Since the policies governing the detention and treatment of prisoners were modeled on those for ordinary Iraqi soldiers, the clothing allowance for POWs was initially the same as that of Iraqi troops. In practice, however, various factors meant that some items were missing, the total supply was cut to as little as one‑third of what was needed, and distribution, originally scheduled twice a year, was reduced to once a year. This was particularly common in camps not visited by the Red Cross, where missing prisoners were held. After the Islamic Republic of Iran accepted Resolution 598 in 1988, clothing rations were suspended entirely for a full year. In camps visited by the Red Cross, prisoners were required to write their name, their father's name, and their Red Cross number on the chest of their uniforms. Because the prisoners' uniforms closely resembled those of Iraqi soldiers, some camps began using identifying marks such as a red cross on the back of the clothing. Repeated demands by International Red Cross delegates that prisoner attire be clearly distinguishable, combined with an escape by a prisoner who had exploited the resemblance to Iraqi military dress, led to the introduction in 1987 of a special yellow uniform with the letters P.O.W. (Prisoner of War) printed on the back, which was included in the clothing allotment. In some Iraqi camps, a sewing machine was also available for mending clothes.

Due to shortages of [[water]], laundry powder, and soap, clothing was often washed only infrequently in certain camps, especially those for missing persons, giving rise to health problems such as scabies and lice infestations.

The Iranian prisoners made every possible effort with the meager resources at hand to use water for washing themselves and their clothes. But the scarcity of clothing only compounded their difficulties. In Tikrit’s Camp No.12, for instance, each prisoner had been provided with only one set of clothing, so they were forced to wait in their underwear for long stretches of time while their single outfit dried in the sun.

Under the Iran-Iraq agreement, upon release, prisoners were to be given a set of khaki clothes, a set of leisurewear, and a pair of sneakers, though even then, not all prisoners were treated equally.<ref>Kaeeni, Mohammad Reza (2018). Memoirs.</ref>

== See also ==
• Clothing

• Washing and Bathing

== Bibliography ==
<references />

== Author ==
Mohammad Reza Kaeeni
[[fa:پوشاک]]
[[ar:ملابس]]

Clothing

2026-09-03T12:46:18Z

Marjan-khanlari: /* See also */

Clothing

2026-09-03T12:45:15Z

Marjan-khanlari: Created page with "In the early years of the war, Iranian prisoners of war (POWs) were sometimes held for months in Iraqi border prisons or camps wearing nothing but the same worn-out khaki combat uniforms they had been captured in. The Iraqi army had no specific provisions for prisoner clothing, and many captives went barefoot, clad in rags, or in some cases naked. As the number of Iranian prisoners grew, a clothing allowance was introduced which included one duffel bag or military backp..."

The Tunnel of Death Punishment

2026-09-03T12:26:13Z

Marjan-khanlari: /* Author */

Among the physical punishments inflicted by the Iraqis during captivity was one that every single Iranian prisoner experienced time and again.

== Method of Punishment ==
The Tunnel of Death, or Tunnel of Terror, was a situation that every Iranian captive endured repeatedly, and each one carries a bitter memory of it from their first entry into a camp, from transfers, from exile, or from being moved to another camp:

"The Iraqis' routine was that whenever they wanted to transfer a group to another camp, they would line up a number of Ba'athist soldiers face to face at the camp gate, forming a corridor. The prisoners were forced to pass through this corridor, and the soldiers, who were already prepared with batons, cables, angle irons, sticks, thick ropes, belts, and other implements, would start beating the prisoners. Sometimes these blows led to serious physical injuries or permanent disability." <ref>Nowbarani, Amir (2012). Ranj o Ganj [Pain and Treasure]. Tehran: [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam-e Azadegan], p. 277.</ref><ref>Mahbouti, Ahmad (2010). Diyar-e Ghorbat [Land of Exile]. 2nd ed., Tehran: [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam-e Azadegan], pp. 51–52.</ref><ref>Salemi-Nejad, Abdolreza (2009). Dar Zendan-e Dezkhim [In the Tyrant's Prison]. 2nd ed., Tehran: [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam-e Azadegan], p. 59.</ref><ref>Akbarnia, Abdolhamid (2010). Tabassom-e Ashkha [The Smile of Tears]. Tehran: [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam-e Azadegan], p. 31.</ref>

Eventually the convoy of prisoners arrived in Baghdad. Our bus stopped after a short while. A two-column formation of military and plainclothes men, armed with multicolored cables, had formed a tunnel!

They carried sticks, clubs, and folding Kalashnikovs. The plainclothes men spoke fluent Persian, hurling curses and shouting. The moment we stepped off the bus, they fell upon us with sticks, cables, fists, and boots, showering us with blows. They threw some to the ground, grabbed others by the collar and slammed them against walls. Some were kicked in the back, while others were separated, laid down in the middle of the street, and beaten within an inch of their lives. The reception of the prisoners at the entrance of the Security Headquarters (Iraqi Intelligence) was an unbearably painful scene.

When my turn came to move and exit, I tried to rush through the tunnel to reduce the number of blows! But that tunnel was such that it was impossible to pass through unscathed. I kept my bound hands in front of my head and face to protect my eyes and face from the lashes of the cables. By the time I reached the prison yard, I could barely breathe from the impact of the heavy cables. Many prisoners suffered injuries to their eyes, heads, and hands during this reception, and some sustained internal injuries that left them with permanent disabilities, blindness, ruptured kidneys, dislocated joints in hands and feet, and other lasting mementos of that bitter day.<ref>Etesam, Ebrahim (2015). Be Samt-e Parvaz [Toward Flight]. Tehran: [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam-e Azadegan].</ref>

== See also ==

* [[Punishment and torture|Punishment and Torture]]
* Physical [[Punishment and torture|Punishment and Torture]]
* Punishment in Captivity

* Torture in Captivity

== Bibliography ==

[[Category:Punishment and Torture]]
<references />

== Author ==
Morad Shafiee
[[fa:تنبیه تونل مرگ]]
[[ar:عقاب نفق الموت]]

The Tunnel of Death Punishment

2026-09-03T12:25:32Z

Marjan-khanlari: /* Bibliography */

The Tunnel of Death Punishment

2026-09-03T12:23:13Z

Marjan-khanlari: Created page with "Among the physical punishments inflicted by the Iraqis during captivity was one that every single Iranian prisoner experienced time and again. == Method of Punishment == The Tunnel of Death, or Tunnel of Terror, was a situation that every Iranian captive endured repeatedly, and each one carries a bitter memory of it from their first entry into a camp, from transfers, from exile, or from being moved to another camp: "The Iraqis' routine was that whenever they wanted to..."

Written Report of Iranian POWs to UN Representatives

2026-09-03T11:53:01Z

Marjan-khanlari: /* Author */

Following a visit by representatives of the United Nations to the camps holding Iranian prisoners in Iraq, a group of prisoners from [[Musel camp 4|musel Camp No. 4]] (formerly musel Camp No. 3) prepared a multi-page report [1] documenting the mistreatment, torture, martyrdom of a number of prisoners in the camps, living conditions, and non-compliance with the Geneva Convention in dealing with prisoners. They had it translated and handed it over to these representatives.

On October 10, 1984, at the Naharkhoran Camp in Gorgan, one of the camps for Iraqi prisoners in Iran, a clash broke out in the presence of Red Cross delegates between prisoners known as Tawwabin and Muminin [penitents and believers] and Ba'athist prisoners, which resulted in the killing of three of the Tawwab and Mumin prisoners and the wounding of several others. After the clash escalated and the Ba'athists ignored the warnings of the guards, Iranian soldiers used batons and tear gas, and in the next stage, to protect the lives of the Red Cross delegates, they were compelled to fire warning shots into the air and then at ground level below the knees<ref>"What Was the Story of the Iraqi Prisoner Uprising in Gorgan?" Narrative of Amir Sartip Abdollah Najafi, Head of the POW and Missing Persons Exchange Commission, quoted from https://www.parsine.com</ref>.

According to the United Nations mission report (S/16962) [2], nine prisoners lost their lives in this incident (three at the hands of their fellow countrymen and the rest from gunfire), 47 were wounded and hospitalized, and many others sustained minor injuries treated on the spot.

The Iraqi government, having been informed of the deaths of its prisoners through the Red Cross, requested the UN Secretary-General to form a mission to investigate the incident. In the meantime, the terrorist Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO) also used the issue to mount propaganda against Iran in international circles. The Islamic Republic of Iran agreed to the request on the condition that the situation of Iranian prisoners in Iraq also be examined. Thus, an independent fact-finding mission was established by order of the UN Secretary-General to investigate the situation of prisoners of war and the claims of both Iran and Iraq regarding POWs, and it conducted visits to the camps holding prisoners in both countries. [3]

Iranian prisoners at [[Musel camp 4|musel Camp No. 4]] learned of the imminent arrival of a UN delegation through periodic visits by Red Cross delegates. For this reason, they took the initiative and set about preparing a report on the conduct and practices of Ba'athist officers:<blockquote>"The camp had an underground organization and cohesive leadership. So from the moment we learned that a UN delegation might come to the camp, we anticipated that Ba'athist officers might accompany the delegation and prevent our fellow prisoners from verbally expressing the tortures, harassment, and massacres. So we planned to prepare a text covering the Ba'athists' conduct and find a way to secretly hand it over to the delegation.<ref>Salehabadi, Ali Asghar (2024). Interview.</ref> "</blockquote>Even though paper and pen had not yet been permitted, these resourceful prisoners, with minimal access to paper and writing materials, prepared a report containing all the illegal conduct of Ba'athist officers and the camp's conditions and facilities, translated it into English, and placed it at the delegation's disposal.

"A group of prisoners identified as troublemakers had been gathered from other camps and brought to [[Musel camp 4|musel Camp No. 4]]. For this reason, those in this camp represented a cross-section of all the camps and could retain in their memory the news and history of captivity, meaning those who had been in Intelligence, in Anbar, Ramadi, musel 1, 2, 3, between the cages, and elsewhere. On this basis, we secretly asked them to share their information with us. Information was gathered through the camp leaders and those responsible for cultural affairs in each ward. We relayed questions through the cultural officers of the wards to groups that had information and asked them to write down the information on small pieces of paper (made from laundry powder packets and cigarette paper) and pass them to me. Once the information was collected, at night in the ward, in a hidden spot where I wouldn't be seen, whether sitting or lying down, I would write on cigarette papers or laundry powder boxes and then hide them. Because paper, pens, and pencils were forbidden, we tore them into small pieces and hid them in the seams of clothing or between blankets. Ultimately, this information was gathered over a period of more than two or three months, and wherever we found contradictions, we corrected them with the help of informed groups, so that nothing untrue would be written in the report. We aimed to include facts with names, dates, locations, and the names of the Iraqis involved in those events. The reports were translated into English and transcribed onto brown paper resembling cement bag paper, actually paper from Baghdad cigarette packs, which I then kept. I wrote the material very small and meticulously, and after finishing, I folded them into a very small size, placed them in a matchbox, and hid them in a secret place to later give to UN officials."<ref name=":0">"UN Delegation Visit to POW Camps," Interview with Freed Prisoner Ali Zardbani (Interviewer: Tayyebe Mohammadi-Nia), quoted from https://rasekhoon.net/article/show/141630</ref>

The mission visited Iraq from January 11 to 17, 1985:<blockquote>"The UN delegation arrived with a large contingent, including their own military personnel. The Iraqis left. The camp was emptied of Iraqis. Only the UN representatives remained. Their head was a Venezuelan general. He was white-skinned. Engineer Zardbani gave the report to the general. He was surprised. He said, 'Why have you written this on such paper?' The engineer explained that having paper here was forbidden. The general was even more surprised. He read the report. He spoke with everyone. He inspected the points mentioned in the report one by one, the baths, the toilets, the solitary confinement cells, the hospital, those who had been wounded during captivity. The inspection of the camp took a week."<ref>Closed Doors Period as Narrated by Prisoner No. 2961 Ali-Mohammad Ahad-Tajari, 2009: pp. 71–72.</ref></blockquote>"About two or three months later, we asked the Red Cross delegates who came to the camp:

'When the UN representatives visited the camps, what happened and what did they do?' They said: 'After visiting the camps in Iraq, they went to Iran and also visited the camps there, and published a report on both countries. It was very surprising for us that despite coming to the camp every month and speaking with you, the report contained things we had not understood over all these years, and this astonished all the Red Cross staff, as to how the UN could have obtained such detailed and extensive information in just a few hours!' Of course, we knew that the published UN report was based on the one we had prepared. In this way, we felt we had fulfilled our duty and made the best use of the opportunity that had come our way."<ref name=":0" />

The mission condemned Iran for "cultural and ideological measures on Iraqi prisoners" and Iraq for "torture, harassment, and mistreatment of Iranian prisoners." It should be noted that the cultural and ideological measures meant that Iraqi prisoners enjoyed opportunities for [[education]], learning, freedom of pen and paper, and even leaving the camp to attend Friday prayers and visit holy sites, whereas Iranian prisoners were deprived of such privileges. Regarding the torture, harassment, and mistreatment of Iranian prisoners, the UN Secretary-General's report explicitly states:

"Prisoners of war provided extensive information on physical mistreatment with instruments such as whips, beatings with clubs or cables, simultaneous blows to both ears, electric shocks, blows to the genitals and kicks to these organs, as well as blows and kicks to wounded limbs. Physical violence appeared to be particularly prevalent in POW camps in Iraq. We also received information on collective punishment measures such as prolonged detention and deprivation of food and [[water]]. While we could not reach definitive conclusions regarding the truth of individual allegations, we heard many similar complaints from prisoners in different camps, and they showed us signs, injuries, wounds, etc., which were consistent with the allegations."

== Footnotes ==
[1]. In the memoirs of freed prisoners, the number of pages in this report has been cited as ranging from thirty to one hundred.

[2]. The mission's report was published on February 22, 1985 under document number S/16962.

[3]. The members of this mission were: Professor Wolfram Karl (Professor of International Law at the University of Salzburg, Austria), Professor Terkel Ovesal (Professor of Constitutional Law and International Law at the University of Oslo, Norway), Major General Rafael Angel Val Huerta (Military Advisor and Permanent Delegate of Venezuela to the United Nations), Nebong Swan (Director of the UN Secretariat), and Francis Wonderl (Senior Political Affairs Officer). (Quoted from the UN Secretary-General's note, [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam-e Azadegan] Institute Archive.)

== See also ==

* [[Prisoners of War Administration Commission|Prisoners of War]]
* Intelligence (Iraqi)
* Torture
* Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO)

== Bibliography ==
<references />

== External Link ==
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/7755?ln=en&v=pdf

== Author ==
Masoud Amirkhani
[[Category:Captivity and captives]]
[[fa:گزارش مکتوب اسیران ایرانی به نمایندگان سازمان ملل]]
[[ar:تقرير مكتوب من الأسرى الإيرانيين إلى ممثلي الأمم المتحدة]]

Written Report of Iranian POWs to UN Representatives

2026-09-03T11:52:20Z

Marjan-khanlari: /* External Link */

Written Report of Iranian POWs to UN Representatives

2026-09-03T11:11:36Z

Marjan-khanlari:

Following a visit by representatives of the United Nations to the camps holding Iranian prisoners in Iraq, a group of prisoners from musel Camp No. 4 (formerly musel Camp No. 3) prepared a multi-page report [1] documenting the mistreatment, torture, martyrdom of a number of prisoners in the camps, living conditions, and non-compliance with the Geneva Convention in dealing with prisoners. They had it translated and handed it over to these representatives.

On October 10, 1984, at the Naharkhoran Camp in Gorgan, one of the camps for Iraqi prisoners in Iran, a clash broke out in the presence of Red Cross delegates between prisoners known as Tawwabin and Muminin [penitents and believers] and Ba'athist prisoners, which resulted in the killing of three of the Tawwab and Mumin prisoners and the wounding of several others. After the clash escalated and the Ba'athists ignored the warnings of the guards, Iranian soldiers used batons and tear gas, and in the next stage, to protect the lives of the Red Cross delegates, they were compelled to fire warning shots into the air and then at ground level below the knees<ref>"What Was the Story of the Iraqi Prisoner Uprising in Gorgan?" Narrative of Amir Sartip Abdollah Najafi, Head of the POW and Missing Persons Exchange Commission, quoted from https://www.parsine.com</ref>.

According to the United Nations mission report (S/16962) [2], nine prisoners lost their lives in this incident (three at the hands of their fellow countrymen and the rest from gunfire), 47 were wounded and hospitalized, and many others sustained minor injuries treated on the spot.

The Iraqi government, having been informed of the deaths of its prisoners through the Red Cross, requested the UN Secretary-General to form a mission to investigate the incident. In the meantime, the terrorist Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO) also used the issue to mount propaganda against Iran in international circles. The Islamic Republic of Iran agreed to the request on the condition that the situation of Iranian prisoners in Iraq also be examined. Thus, an independent fact-finding mission was established by order of the UN Secretary-General to investigate the situation of prisoners of war and the claims of both Iran and Iraq regarding POWs, and it conducted visits to the camps holding prisoners in both countries. [3]

Iranian prisoners at musel Camp No. 4 learned of the imminent arrival of a UN delegation through periodic visits by Red Cross delegates. For this reason, they took the initiative and set about preparing a report on the conduct and practices of Ba'athist officers:<blockquote>"The camp had an underground organization and cohesive leadership. So from the moment we learned that a UN delegation might come to the camp, we anticipated that Ba'athist officers might accompany the delegation and prevent our fellow prisoners from verbally expressing the tortures, harassment, and massacres. So we planned to prepare a text covering the Ba'athists' conduct and find a way to secretly hand it over to the delegation.<ref>Salehabadi, Ali Asghar (2024). Interview.</ref> "</blockquote>Even though paper and pen had not yet been permitted, these resourceful prisoners, with minimal access to paper and writing materials, prepared a report containing all the illegal conduct of Ba'athist officers and the camp's conditions and facilities, translated it into English, and placed it at the delegation's disposal.

"A group of prisoners identified as troublemakers had been gathered from other camps and brought to musel Camp No. 4. For this reason, those in this camp represented a cross-section of all the camps and could retain in their memory the news and history of captivity, meaning those who had been in Intelligence, in Anbar, Ramadi, musel 1, 2, 3, between the cages, and elsewhere. On this basis, we secretly asked them to share their information with us. Information was gathered through the camp leaders and those responsible for cultural affairs in each ward. We relayed questions through the cultural officers of the wards to groups that had information and asked them to write down the information on small pieces of paper (made from laundry powder packets and cigarette paper) and pass them to me. Once the information was collected, at night in the ward, in a hidden spot where I wouldn't be seen, whether sitting or lying down, I would write on cigarette papers or laundry powder boxes and then hide them. Because paper, pens, and pencils were forbidden, we tore them into small pieces and hid them in the seams of clothing or between blankets. Ultimately, this information was gathered over a period of more than two or three months, and wherever we found contradictions, we corrected them with the help of informed groups, so that nothing untrue would be written in the report. We aimed to include facts with names, dates, locations, and the names of the Iraqis involved in those events. The reports were translated into English and transcribed onto brown paper resembling cement bag paper, actually paper from Baghdad cigarette packs, which I then kept. I wrote the material very small and meticulously, and after finishing, I folded them into a very small size, placed them in a matchbox, and hid them in a secret place to later give to UN officials."<ref name=":0">"UN Delegation Visit to POW Camps," Interview with Freed Prisoner Ali Zardbani (Interviewer: Tayyebe Mohammadi-Nia), quoted from https://rasekhoon.net/article/show/141630</ref>

The mission visited Iraq from January 11 to 17, 1985:<blockquote>"The UN delegation arrived with a large contingent, including their own military personnel. The Iraqis left. The camp was emptied of Iraqis. Only the UN representatives remained. Their head was a Venezuelan general. He was white-skinned. Engineer Zardbani gave the report to the general. He was surprised. He said, 'Why have you written this on such paper?' The engineer explained that having paper here was forbidden. The general was even more surprised. He read the report. He spoke with everyone. He inspected the points mentioned in the report one by one, the baths, the toilets, the solitary confinement cells, the hospital, those who had been wounded during captivity. The inspection of the camp took a week."<ref>Closed Doors Period as Narrated by Prisoner No. 2961 Ali-Mohammad Ahad-Tajari, 2009: pp. 71–72.</ref></blockquote>"About two or three months later, we asked the Red Cross delegates who came to the camp:

'When the UN representatives visited the camps, what happened and what did they do?' They said: 'After visiting the camps in Iraq, they went to Iran and also visited the camps there, and published a report on both countries. It was very surprising for us that despite coming to the camp every month and speaking with you, the report contained things we had not understood over all these years, and this astonished all the Red Cross staff, as to how the UN could have obtained such detailed and extensive information in just a few hours!' Of course, we knew that the published UN report was based on the one we had prepared. In this way, we felt we had fulfilled our duty and made the best use of the opportunity that had come our way."<ref name=":0" />

The mission condemned Iran for "cultural and ideological measures on Iraqi prisoners" and Iraq for "torture, harassment, and mistreatment of Iranian prisoners." It should be noted that the cultural and ideological measures meant that Iraqi prisoners enjoyed opportunities for [[education]], learning, freedom of pen and paper, and even leaving the camp to attend Friday prayers and visit holy sites, whereas Iranian prisoners were deprived of such privileges. Regarding the torture, harassment, and mistreatment of Iranian prisoners, the UN Secretary-General's report explicitly states:

"Prisoners of war provided extensive information on physical mistreatment with instruments such as whips, beatings with clubs or cables, simultaneous blows to both ears, electric shocks, blows to the genitals and kicks to these organs, as well as blows and kicks to wounded limbs. Physical violence appeared to be particularly prevalent in POW camps in Iraq. We also received information on collective punishment measures such as prolonged detention and deprivation of food and [[water]]. While we could not reach definitive conclusions regarding the truth of individual allegations, we heard many similar complaints from prisoners in different camps, and they showed us signs, injuries, wounds, etc., which were consistent with the allegations."

== Footnotes ==
[1]. In the memoirs of freed prisoners, the number of pages in this report has been cited as ranging from thirty to one hundred.

[2]. The mission's report was published on February 22, 1985 under document number S/16962.

[3]. The members of this mission were: Professor Wolfram Karl (Professor of International Law at the University of Salzburg, Austria), Professor Terkel Ovesal (Professor of Constitutional Law and International Law at the University of Oslo, Norway), Major General Rafael Angel Val Huerta (Military Advisor and Permanent Delegate of Venezuela to the United Nations), Nebong Swan (Director of the UN Secretariat), and Francis Wonderl (Senior Political Affairs Officer). (Quoted from the UN Secretary-General's note, Payam-e Azadegan Institute Archive.)

== See also ==

* Captivity and Prisoners
* [[Prisoners of War Administration Commission|Prisoners of War]]
* Intelligence (Iraqi)
* Torture
* Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO)

== Bibliography ==
<references />

== External Link ==
<nowiki>https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/7755?ln=en&v=pdf</nowiki>

== Author ==
Masoud Amirkhani
[[Category:Captivity and captives]]

Written Report of Iranian POWs to UN Representatives

2026-09-03T11:07:33Z

Marjan-khanlari: Created page with "Following a visit by representatives of the United Nations to the camps holding Iranian prisoners in Iraq, a group of prisoners from Mosul Camp No. 4 (formerly Mosul Camp No. 3) prepared a multi-page report [1] documenting the mistreatment, torture, martyrdom of a number of prisoners in the camps, living conditions, and non-compliance with the Geneva Convention in dealing with prisoners. They had it translated and handed it over to these representatives. On O..."

Following a visit by representatives of the United Nations to the camps holding Iranian prisoners in Iraq, a group of prisoners from Mosul Camp No. 4 (formerly Mosul Camp No. 3) prepared a multi-page report [1] documenting the mistreatment, torture, martyrdom of a number of prisoners in the camps, living conditions, and non-compliance with the Geneva Convention in dealing with prisoners. They had it translated and handed it over to these representatives.

On October 10, 1984, at the Naharkhoran Camp in Gorgan, one of the camps for Iraqi prisoners in Iran, a clash broke out in the presence of Red Cross delegates between prisoners known as Tawwabin and Muminin [penitents and believers] and Ba'athist prisoners, which resulted in the killing of three of the Tawwab and Mumin prisoners and the wounding of several others. After the clash escalated and the Ba'athists ignored the warnings of the guards, Iranian soldiers used batons and tear gas, and in the next stage, to protect the lives of the Red Cross delegates, they were compelled to fire warning shots into the air and then at ground level below the knees<ref>"''What Was the Story of the Iraqi Prisoner Uprising in Gorgan''?" Narrative of Amir Sartip Abdollah Najafi, Head of the POW and Missing Persons Exchange Commission, quoted from https://www.parsine.com</ref>.

According to the United Nations mission report (S/16962) [2], nine prisoners lost their lives in this incident (three at the hands of their fellow countrymen and the rest from gunfire), 47 were wounded and hospitalized, and many others sustained minor injuries treated on the spot.

The Iraqi government, having been informed of the deaths of its prisoners through the Red Cross, requested the UN Secretary-General to form a mission to investigate the incident. In the meantime, the terrorist Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO) also used the issue to mount propaganda against Iran in international circles. The Islamic Republic of Iran agreed to the request on the condition that the situation of Iranian prisoners in Iraq also be examined. Thus, an independent fact-finding mission was established by order of the UN Secretary-General to investigate the situation of prisoners of war and the claims of both Iran and Iraq regarding POWs, and it conducted visits to the camps holding prisoners in both countries. [3]

Iranian prisoners at Mosul Camp No. 4 learned of the imminent arrival of a UN delegation through periodic visits by Red Cross delegates. For this reason, they took the initiative and set about preparing a report on the conduct and practices of Ba'athist officers:<blockquote>"The camp had an underground organization and cohesive leadership. So from the moment we learned that a UN delegation might come to the camp, we anticipated that Ba'athist officers might accompany the delegation and prevent our fellow prisoners from verbally expressing the tortures, harassment, and massacres. So we planned to prepare a text covering the Ba'athists' conduct and find a way to secretly hand it over to the delegation.<ref>Salehabadi, Ali Asghar (2024). Interview.</ref> "</blockquote>Even though paper and pen had not yet been permitted, these resourceful prisoners, with minimal access to paper and writing materials, prepared a report containing all the illegal conduct of Ba'athist officers and the camp's conditions and facilities, translated it into English, and placed it at the delegation's disposal.

"A group of prisoners identified as troublemakers had been gathered from other camps and brought to Mosul Camp No. 4. For this reason, those in this camp represented a cross-section of all the camps and could retain in their memory the news and history of captivity, meaning those who had been in Intelligence, in Anbar, Ramadi, Mosul 1, 2, 3, between the cages, and elsewhere. On this basis, we secretly asked them to share their information with us. Information was gathered through the camp leaders and those responsible for cultural affairs in each ward. We relayed questions through the cultural officers of the wards to groups that had information and asked them to write down the information on small pieces of paper (made from laundry powder packets and cigarette paper) and pass them to me. Once the information was collected, at night in the ward, in a hidden spot where I wouldn't be seen, whether sitting or lying down, I would write on cigarette papers or laundry powder boxes and then hide them. Because paper, pens, and pencils were forbidden, we tore them into small pieces and hid them in the seams of clothing or between blankets. Ultimately, this information was gathered over a period of more than two or three months, and wherever we found contradictions, we corrected them with the help of informed groups, so that nothing untrue would be written in the report. We aimed to include facts with names, dates, locations, and the names of the Iraqis involved in those events. The reports were translated into English and transcribed onto brown paper resembling cement bag paper, actually paper from Baghdad cigarette packs, which I then kept. I wrote the material very small and meticulously, and after finishing, I folded them into a very small size, placed them in a matchbox, and hid them in a secret place to later give to UN officials."<ref name=":0">"UN Delegation Visit to POW Camps," Interview with Freed Prisoner Ali Zardbani (Interviewer: Tayyebe Mohammadi-Nia), quoted from https://rasekhoon.net/article/show/141630</ref>

'''The mission visited Iraq from January 11 to 17, 1985:'''<blockquote>"The UN delegation arrived with a large contingent, including their own military personnel. The Iraqis left. The camp was emptied of Iraqis. Only the UN representatives remained. Their head was a Venezuelan general. He was white-skinned. Engineer Zardbani gave the report to the general. He was surprised. He said, 'Why have you written this on such paper?' The engineer explained that having paper here was forbidden. The general was even more surprised. He read the report. He spoke with everyone. He inspected the points mentioned in the report one by one, the baths, the toilets, the solitary confinement cells, the hospital, those who had been wounded during captivity. The inspection of the camp took a week."<ref>Closed Doors Period as Narrated by Prisoner No. 2961 Ali-Mohammad Ahad-Tajari, 2009: pp. 71–72.</ref></blockquote>"About two or three months later, we asked the Red Cross delegates who came to the camp:

'When the UN representatives visited the camps, what happened and what did they do?' They said: 'After visiting the camps in Iraq, they went to Iran and also visited the camps there, and published a report on both countries. It was very surprising for us that despite coming to the camp every month and speaking with you, the report contained things we had not understood over all these years, and this astonished all the Red Cross staff, as to how the UN could have obtained such detailed and extensive information in just a few hours!' Of course, we knew that the published UN report was based on the one we had prepared. In this way, we felt we had fulfilled our duty and made the best use of the opportunity that had come our way."<ref name=":0" />

The mission condemned Iran for "cultural and ideological measures on Iraqi prisoners" and Iraq for "torture, harassment, and mistreatment of Iranian prisoners." It should be noted that the cultural and ideological measures meant that Iraqi prisoners enjoyed opportunities for [[education]], learning, freedom of pen and paper, and even leaving the camp to attend Friday prayers and visit holy sites, whereas Iranian prisoners were deprived of such privileges. Regarding the torture, harassment, and mistreatment of Iranian prisoners, the UN Secretary-General's report explicitly states:

"Prisoners of war provided extensive information on physical mistreatment with instruments such as whips, beatings with clubs or cables, simultaneous blows to both ears, electric shocks, blows to the genitals and kicks to these organs, as well as blows and kicks to wounded limbs. Physical violence appeared to be particularly prevalent in POW camps in Iraq. We also received information on collective punishment measures such as prolonged detention and deprivation of food and [[water]]. While we could not reach definitive conclusions regarding the truth of individual allegations, we heard many similar complaints from prisoners in different camps, and they showed us signs, injuries, wounds, etc., which were consistent with the allegations."

== Footnotes ==
[1]. In the memoirs of freed prisoners, the number of pages in this report has been cited as ranging from thirty to one hundred.

[2]. The mission's report was published on February 22, 1985 under document number S/16962.

[3]. The members of this mission were: Professor Wolfram Karl (Professor of International Law at the University of Salzburg, Austria), Professor Terkel Ovesal (Professor of Constitutional Law and International Law at the University of Oslo, Norway), Major General Rafael Angel Val Huerta (Military Advisor and Permanent Delegate of Venezuela to the United Nations), Nebong Swan (Director of the UN Secretariat), and Francis Wonderl (Senior Political Affairs Officer). (Quoted from the UN Secretary-General's note, Payam-e Azadegan Institute Archive.)

== See also ==

* Captivity and Prisoners
* Prisoners of War
* Intelligence (Iraqi)
* Torture
* Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO)

== Bibliography ==

Musel camp 4

2026-09-01T10:37:32Z

Marjan-khanlari:

'''One of the detention camps of Iranian prisoners in Iraq.'''

== Geographical and architectural characteristics ==
The musel camp 4 had been built in the shape of a castle and there were four towers in its four corners, where the Iraqi sentries were stationed to keep guard. The barracks were located next to and between the towers and there was a courtyard in the middle. Like other camps in the musel region, this camp also had two floors. In this camp, there were fourteen barracks on each floor. In front of each barrack, there was a lawn. There were two toilets at the end of the camp, each with 16 toilet cistern flush siphon springs. Due to the broken and clogged sewer pipes, the toilets were not in a good condition, but over time, with the efforts of the prisoners, the toilets were cleansed and made tidy. The [[radio]] speaker was installed inside the barracks and was controlled by Iraqis themselves. The Iraqi Radio program or music from this speaker was played about 14 hours a day; So that it started in the morning, before the counting process started and continued until the late hours of the night.

== History and dwellers of musel camp 4 ==
After the clashes that happened in the [[musel camp 2]], on 6th of September 1982, about 700 prisoners of this camp were transferred to musel camp 4. The prisoners of this group were the first to set foot in the musel camp 4, and with their arrival, this camp was set up. A few days later, Hojjat -ol-Islam Seyyed [[Abu Torabifard, Seyyed Aliakbar|Ali Akbar Abu Torabi Fard]] entered this camp. For the first ten days, all the people inside the barracks were prisoners, and the barrack doors were opened only once a day, and people were allowed to go to the toilets which had no [[water]]. On the whole, it would take the captives of one barrack less than half an hour per day to go to the toilet and get back again, and during this short time, Iraqi soldiers beat them up with cables and batons. After that, prisoners were given one hour each day to take fresh air; Of course, the length of break time varied from one barrack to another..gradually, this time increased until it reached about 7 hours a day<ref name=":0">Khaji, Ali (1391). Description of cages, prisoners of war camps. Tehran: [https://mfpa.ir Payam Azadegan].</ref>.

Not even a month had passed since the prisoners arrived in this camp when representatives of the Red Cross came to visit. On February 10th 1982, about 500 prisoners of the old [[musel camp 2]], who had been captured in the Ramadan and Muharram operations, were transferred to the [[musel camp 3]]. At the beginning of March 1983, about 150 prisoners of this camp were sent to Ramadi region, and after that, 600 prisoners of the old [[musel camp 2]], who had been captured by the Iraqis in the preliminary Wal-Fajr operation, were transferred to this camp. On the same day, the Iraqi soldiers punished the new prisoners with cables and batons, as a result of which one of the prisoners named Habibullah Barghaman lost one of his eyes. After that, they accommodated 150 to 160 prisoners in each asylum, which was more than the capacity of the asylums and caused trouble for the prisoners. The last transfer of this camp took place on May 16th 1984, during which about 500 prisoners were transferred to musel camp 3<ref name=":0" />. (→History of musel camp 4).

== Important events ==
1. The prisoners were always seeking to get new news about the circumstances in Iran and to learn about the developments of the imposed war. One of the ways bound to grant this wish was accessing a radio. For this reason, they spent a lot of efforts on the procurement of a radio at any cost. But more important than the procurement of the radio was its maintenance and care, which was considered one of the most difficult tasks and involved many risks. If the Iraqi soldiers suspected the existence of a radio in the camp, they would try to find it in any possible way and would not hesitate to kill the prisoners. Because according to the Iraqis, it was forbidden for prisoners to have a [[radio]].

Prisoners in the musel camp 4 were able to get a radio and use it to get news from Iran and the war fronts. This radio fell into the hands of Iraqi soldiers during one of the daily inspections. After some time, the prisoners obtained another [[radio]] through their intermediaries among the Iraqi guards and kept it until the end of the captivity and brought it back with them when they returned to Iran. In the meeting they had with the Supreme Leader, they presented him with the above-mentioned [[radio]], which is currently kept in the Astan Quds Razavi Museum<ref>Dai, Ali (2007). Violation of the rights of Iranian prisoners of war and the international responsibility of the Iraqi government. Tehran: [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam Azadegan].</ref>.

2. One of the other events of the musel camp 4 was the arrival of Sheikh Ali Tehrani at this camp. He came to this camp at the beginning of July 1984 and persuaded the prisoners to seek refuge in Iraq with a speech, but the prisoners booed him and chanted slogans against him; In the end, he was forced to leave the camp speechless and downcast<ref>Kamvar Bakshaish, Javad (2014). Musel prison Tehran: Surah Mehr.</ref>.

3. In 1984, Iraq did not allow the representatives of the Red Cross to visit the camp in retaliation for Iran's action of not allowing them to visit. In this way, prisoners were subjected to harder times because the food ration was halved, the monthly allowance was not paid, and some other restrictions. The prisoners' decision to decline food rations finally forced the Ba'athists to distribute the whole ration<ref>Hashemi, Ali Akbar (1398). Interview. Dated 13 September 2018.</ref>.

4. After the acceptance of Resolution 598 and the establishment of a ceasefire, the Ba'athist leaders decided to send Iranian prisoners to visit the Holy Shrines for their propagandizing manouvers. To thwart this plan of Iraqis, prisoners of the musel camp 4 announced: We are going on the pilgrimage on the condition that there will be no political propaganda along the way, and they were so persistent on this issue that the Iraqi commander of the camp had to write an affidavit letter. When the prisoners got on the buses and saw Saddam's picture on the window of one of the buses, they tore it off, and the torn picture made the prisoners laugh. During the pilgrimage, some incidents happened, and consequently, an Iraqi officer from Baghdad came to the camp to investigate the issues. When the camp commander refused to give the pledge to the prisoners, they showed the affidavit letter to the Iraqi officer<ref name=":0" />.

5. In 1984, following the complaints of Iran and Iraq to the United Nations regarding the maltreatment of their prisoners, a group of experts from this organization visited the camps of Iran and Iraq to make out a report. When this news reached the musel camp 4 , those of the captives skilled in writing and with a good knowledge of foreign languages, got to work and wrote a detailed report on the situation of the anonymous Iranian prisoners in Iraq. This report had Farsi, English, Arabic and French versions and was more than a hundred pages long. During the visitation of the UN delegation, they handed it over to the senior official heading the delegation.

. How this report was made out, is a detailed story recounted in the diaries of prisoners, particularly in the diary of Mohammad Baqer Alii. The access of the UN representatives to the materials prepared by the prisoners of the musel camp 4 had a great impact on the condemnation of Iraq regarding the care and responsibility for the Iranian prisoners<ref name=":0" />.

== See also ==

* [[musel camp 1]]
* [[musel camp 2]]
* [[musel camp 3]]

== Bibliography ==
<references />

== To read more ==
Ashrafi, Morteza (2014). War, prisoners of humanitarian law, Geneva Convention, peace, political science. Tehran: [http://rbo.ir/default.aspx Bagheral Uloom] Research Institute (AS), paper.

Zikriai, Maryam Sadat (1390). LCs ` memories at the turn of the year. Mazandaran: [https://ketab.ir/book/3fd86860-bd94-478c-9ca8-3eced0d369b3 Editing and Publishing Committee of the Congress of Generals and Ten Thousand Martyrs of Mazandaran Province.]

Rahmanian, Abdul Majid (2011). Protocol of purity and service. Tehran: [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam Azadegan.]

https://www.tasnimnews.com

http://dehnamaki.com

https://musel.ir

== Author ==
Maryam Sadat Zekriyayee
[[fa:اردوگاه موصل 4]]

Martyrdom Calendar of Tir(=from 22nd of June to 22nd of July)

2026-09-01T10:34:30Z

Marjan-khanlari:

July 1st, 1987, Martyrdom of Eshagh Pūriyānī, an unknown martyr of captivity, Mazandaran Province;

July 3rd, 1984, Martyrdom of Shokr-pardā (Pardāng), an unknown martyr of captivity, Kermanshāh Province;

July 3rd, 1985, Martyrdom of Abdol Majid Sharifzadeh, an unknown martyr of captivity; unknown province

July 4th, 1986, Martyrdom of Shāpūr (Mahdī) Sadeghy, an unknown martyr of captivity, Khuzestān Province;

July 4th, 1988, Martyrdom of Kāẓem Ghahremany, an unknown martyr of captivity, Khuzestān Province;

July 4th, 1988, Martyrdom of Abū al-Fażl Khādemī, an unknown martyr of captivity, Tehran Province;

July 5th, 1988, Martyrdom of Eskandar Jaʿfarī, an unknown martyr of captivity, Bushehr Province;

July 5th, 1982, Martyrdom of Mohammad Rahnamā, an unknown martyr of captivity, Fārs Province;

July 5th, 1988, Martyrdom of Anush Alizadeh, an unknown martyr of captivity, Gīlān Province;

July 5th, 1989, Martyrdom of ʿAzīz Moẓahhebī, an unknown martyr of captivity, Ardabil Province;

July 6th, 1990, Martyrdom of Mohammad Reżā Mandpūr Kermānī, a liberated captive with 70% disability, Razavi Khorasan Province;

July 9th, 2012, Martyrdom of Ghodratollah Dadgar Chahargood, a liberated captive with 70% disability, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad Province;

July 10th, 2012, Martyrdom of Hassan Dehnooei, a veteran with 70% disability, Razavi Khorasan Province;

July 10th, 1982, Martyrdom of Ali Asghar Moradi, an unknown martyr of captivity, Ghom Province;

July 11th, 1989, Martyrdom of Alishah Avarideh, an unknown martyr of captivity, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad Province;

July 11th, 1988, Martyrdom of Ahmad Shakerynasab, an unknown martyr of captivity, Khuzestan Province;

July 11th, 1984, Martyrdom of Hossein Kazeminezhad Khatibi, an unknown martyr of captivity, East Azerbaijan Province;

July 11th, 2020, Martyrdom of Esmaeil Jushani, a liberated captive with 70% disability, Mazandaran Province;

July 13th, 1988, Martyrdom of Hassan Chupankareh, an unknown martyr of captivity, Razavi Khorasan Province;

July 14th, 1988, Martyrdom of Naser Tavakkoly Garmase, an unknown martyr of captivity, Isfahan Province;

July 14th, 1988, Martyrdom of Shahram Sedigh Behzad, an unknown martyr of captivity, Tehran Province;

July 16th, 1988, Martyrdom of Mohammad Nabi (Mohammad) Baghery, an unknown martyr of captivity, unknown Province;

July 16th, 1988, Martyrdom of Asghar Rahmatvand, an unknown martyr of captivity, Isfahan Province;

July 16th, 2005, Martyrdom of Seyyed Ghasem Samieh Zargar, a liberated captive with 70% disability, Yazd Province;

July 17th, 1984, Martyrdom of a liberated teacher Mohammad Farkhi Rad, an unknown martyr of captivity, Khuzestan Province;

July 17th, 1989, Martyrdom of Mohammad Khaled Khalediyan, an unknown martyr of captivity, Kurdistan Province;

July 20th, 1985, Martyrdom of Sadeh Mirsalimi, an unknown martyr of captivity, 70 years old, Kermanshah Province;

July 20th, 1989, Martyrdom of Amir Agha Khodabakhsh Samani, an unknown martyr of captivity, Mazandaran Province;

July 20th, 1985, Martyrdom of Sadeh Mirsalimi, approximately seventy years old, an unknown martyr of captivity, Kermanshah Province;

July 21st, 1989, Martyrdom of Mohammad Farangi, an unknown martyr of captivity, Isfahan Province;

July 21st, 1989, Martyrdom of Hassan Azizi, an unknown martyr of captivity, Central Province;

July 21st, 1987, Martyrdom of Mohammad Reza Ghavidel, an unknown martyr of captivity, Gilan Province;

July 21st, 1982, Martyrdom of Hamid Kazemi, an unknown martyr of captivity, Kermanshah Province;

July 21st, 1987, Martyrdom of Hamid Reza Moradi Rudposhti, an unknown martyr of captivity, Mazandaran Province;

July 21st, 1987, Martyrdom of Azim Mardanian Molati, an unknown martyr of captivity, Gilan Province;

July 23rd, 1984, Martyrdom of Kakabrar Rahimi, an unknown martyr of captivity, Kermanshah Province;

July 23rd, 1988, Martyrdom of Sajali Khoyshvand, an unknown martyr of captivity, Hamedan Province;

July 23rd, 1988, Martyrdom of Mohammad Hossein torabi, an unknown martyr of captivity, Hamedan Province;

July 23rd,1988, Martyrdom of Behrouz Jalal Yanghiyeh Balaghy, an unknown martyr of captivity, West Azerbaijan Province;

July 23rd, 1982, Martyrdom of Ali Aliabadi, an unknown martyr of captivity, Tehran Province;

July 23rd, 1988, Martyrdom of Hashemollah Pulady, an unknown martyr of captivity, unknown Province;

July 23rd, 1988, Martyrdom of Ali Mashmool, an unknown martyr of captivity, unknown Province;

July 23rd, 1988, Martyrdom of Ghobalali Taghipour, an unknown martyr of captivity, West Azerbaijan Province;

July 24th, 1988, Martyrdom of Abdollah Heidari Ghazalahmad, an unknown martyr of captivity, Tehran Province;

July 24th, 1988, Martyrdom of Baratali Rashidi Moosaabad, an unknown martyr of captivity, Razavi Khorasan Province;

July 24th, 1988, Martyrdom of Ferman Rezapor, an unknown martyr of captivity, West Azerbaijan Province;

July 24th, 1987, Martyrdom of Hossein Ali Ebrahimi Shoorabi, an unknown martyr of captivity, South Khorasan Province;

July 24th, 1988, Martyrdom of Sheikh Ali Abdoly, an unknown martyr of captivity, Kerman Province;

July 24th, 1988, Martyrdom of Hematollah Taee, an unknown martyr of captivity, Isfahan Province;

July 24th, 1988, Martyrdom of Ali Abdoly Behnoee, an unknown martyr of captivity, Kerman Province;

July 24th, 1988, Martyrdom of Gholamreza Farokhi Balajadeh, an unknown martyr of captivity, Golestan Province

July 25th, 1982, Martyrdom of Alireza Sharifi, an unknown martyr of captivity, Tehran Province;

July 25th, 1988, Martyrdom of Abdolali Safarlooi, an unknown martyr of captivity, West Azerbaijan Province;

July 25th, 1989, Martyrdom of Mohammad Mousavi Haji-loo, an unknown martyr of captivity, Hamadan Province;

July 25th, 1990, Martyrdom of Hassan Hedavand Mirzayi, an unknown martyr of captivity, Tehran Province;

July 26th, 2003, Martyrdom of Rajabali Amanollahi Darcheh, a liberated captive with 70% disability, Isfahan Province;

July 26th, 1990, Martyrdom of Mahmoud Amjadiyan, an unknown martyr of captivity, Kermanshah Province;

July 27th, 1990, Martyrdom of Faramarez Afshari, an unknown martyr of captivity, Zanjan Province;

July 27th, 1988, Martyrdom of Mansour Faghih Anjou Bari, an unknown martyr of captivity, Mazandaran Province;

July 27th, 1988, Martyrdom of Sadegh Karimi, an unknown martyr of captivity, Fars Province;

July 27th, 1988, Martyrdom of Ali Mokhtari Habashi, an unknown martyr of captivity, West Azerbaijan Province;

July 28th, 1990, Martyrdom of Mohammad Saberi, an unknown martyr of captivity, Abadan Province;

July 28th, 1983, Martyrdom of Habibollah Azizi, an unknown martyr of captivity, Kermanshah Province;

July 28th, 1983, Martyrdom of Samad Allah Talebi, an unknown martyr of captivity, Isfahan Province;

July 28th, 2000, Martyrdom of Seyyed Akbar Elm-ol-Hoda Sheikh-Eslami, a liberated captive with 70% disability, Tehran Province;

July 29th, 1989, Martyrdom of Suleiman Alavi, an unknown martyr of captivity, Golestan Province;

July 29th, 1988, Martyrdom of Mohammad Esmaeil Gholami, an unknown martyr of captivity, Kurdistan Province;

July 29th, 1982, Martyrdom of Mohammad Darvishi, an unknown martyr of captivity, Hamadan Province;

July 30th, 1982, Martyrdom of the Pilot Abbas Dorran, a liberated captive and an unknown martyr of captivity, Fars Province;

July 30th, 1989, Martyrdom of Khalil Moradi Siahaafshari, an unknown martyr of captivity, Isfahan Province;

July 30th, 1985, Martyrdom of Mirza Ali Masrur, an unknown martyr of captivity, Fars Province;

July 30th, 1984, Martyrdom of Mohammad Farrokhyrad, an unknown martyr of captivity, Khuzestan Province;

July 31st, 1986, Martyrdom of Ali Azatur, an unknown martyr of captivity, Alborz Province;

July 31st, 1988, Martyrdom of Mehran Ali Bakhshi, an unknown martyr of captivity, Hamedan Province;

July 31st, 1988, Martyrdom of Seyfollah Karimi Sonookin, an unknown martyr of captivity, Gilan Province;

July 31st, 1988, Martyrdom of Jalil Moradian, an unknown martyr of captivity, Mazandaran Province;

July 31st, 1988, Martyrdom of Morteza Nazarzadeh Ghassaby, an unknown martyr of captivity, Ardabil Province;

July 31st, 1988, Martyrdom of Ali Asghar Rezaei, an unknown martyr of captivity, Golestan Province;

July 31st, 1988, Martyrdom of Momen Ali Nimruzy, an unknown martyr of captivity, Razavi Khorasan Province;

July 31st,1995, Martyrdom of Alireza Fazl Karimi, a liberated captive with 70% disability, Mazandaran Province.

Books on the Lord of Captives

2026-09-01T10:33:23Z

Marjan-khanlari: /* The Star in the Firmament of Infatuation */

During the years since the liberated captives ( LCs) have returned to the country, many books have been written dealing with the memories and behavior of Haj [[Abu Torabifard, Seyyed Aliakbar|Abu Torabi Fard]], and the narratives of his inmates in the Iraqi camps, and another part is about his life before captivity. Also, in the diaries of many LCs based on their captivity memories, one can immediately trace , the footprints of Haj [[Abu Torabifard, Seyyed Aliakbar|Abu Torabi Fard]] everywhere.

Below, we introduce some books published on Haj [[Abu Torabifard, Seyyed Aliakbar|Ali Akbar Abu Torabi Fard]].

== From Karbala`s soil ==
The first published book by Haj [[Abu Torabifard, Seyyed Aliakbar|Abu Torabi Fard]] dates back to 1996. It is entitled "From Karbala`s Soil", and includes a collection of speeches delivered by Haj [[Abu Torabifard, Seyyed Aliakbar|Abu Torabi Fard]] addressing the LCs. Naturally the sessions in question were held secretly in the camps. This book was published by the Department of Literature and the Art of [[Resistance]].

== The Deranged Mystic ==
The Deranged Mystic is the title of another book written by the departed Hojjat –ol-Eslam [[Abu Torabifard, Seyyed Aliakbar|Abu Torabi Fard]] containing 28 brief memories. These memories involve some figures such as Imam Khomeini and some members of Fadayeeyan-e-Eslam in different positions ;people whose intellectual developments resulted from their extreme faith had been witnessed by the narrator himself.

== Breeze from Paradise ==
Another book published concerning Haj [[Abu Torabifard, Seyyed Aliakbar|Abu Torabi]] is entitled "Breeze from Paradise" bearing the form of a travelogue, which narrates Haj [[Abu Torabifard, Seyyed Aliakbar|Abu Torab]]<nowiki/>i`s journey from the shrine of Imam Khomeini to the shrine of Imam Reza (RIP). The collection in question comprises the pleasant and intriguing memories of those LCs who accompanied the Late Abu Torabi Fard who proposed some of the captivity issues while recollecting its memories along the above-mentioned route. The book is the outcome of efforts spent by Safar Abdolmaleky and published by Omid-e- Azadegan Publishing House.

== Earthly Angels ==
"Heavenly Guest" and "Earthly Angels" are the titles of 2 books for children containing the memories of Haj [[Abu Torabifard, Seyyed Aliakbar|Abu Torabi]]. These 2 books have been published by [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam Azadegan] cultural and artistic institute.

== The Star in the Firmament of Infatuation ==
It is the title of a book containing Ghasem Jafary`s articles and writings on the character of Haj Abu torabi. It also includes essays written by Abu Toprabi`s friends and inmates regarding that highly distinguished figure. This book was written based on researches carried out by Ghasem Jafary and published by [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam Azadegan] cultural and artistic institute.

== That Heavenly Chap ==
Hojjat-ol-Eslam [[Abu Torabifard, Seyyed Aliakbar|Ali Akbar Abu Torabi]] and Ali Andarzgu were two tireless fighters in the Pahlavi period who, in the most difficult conditions, stood up for jihad for God`s sake with a profound thought and wholeheartedly, and dedicated their entire lives to serving Islam and the people and promoting spirituality and fighting against the Pahlavi regime. Financial support, logistics and armaments and establishing communication and liaison between the secret revolutionary forces and Seyyed Ali Andarzgu was a difficult and tough task that [[Abu Torabifard, Seyyed Aliakbar|Ali Akbar Abu Torabi]] managed well and continued to fight alongside his close friend. A part of the life and memories of Seyyed Ali Andarzgu, as narrated by [[Abu Torabifard, Seyyed Aliakbar|Ali Akbar Abu Torabi]], has been published in a book entitled"That Heavenly Chap" by [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam Azadegan] Cultural and Artistic Institute.

== Untold epics ==
"Untold Epics" is a brief account narrated by martyr [[Abu Torabifard, Seyyed Aliakbar|Seyyed Ali Akbar Abu Torabi Fard]] compiled by Abdul Majid Rahmanian, and published by [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam Azadegan] Publishing House.

Pasyad ,the Son of the Earth

The book "Pasyad the Son of the Earth" deals with the life and struggles of the late [[Abu Torabifard, Seyyed Aliakbar|Seyyed Ali Akbar Abu Torabi Fard]] in 2 parts, each in three chapters. The first part includes topics before the revolution and [[family]] background, birth, childhood and adolescence, classical and seminary [[education]], presence and activity in political arenas in Qom, Najaf and Tehran and cooperation with Seyyed Ali Andarzgu. The second part deals with issues post- Islamic revolution issues, the most important parts include the late Abu torabi's presence in the Irregular Wars headquarters, 10 years of captivity, the representation of the Supreme Leader and the period of representation in the Islamic Council. This book has been published by Syrian Mehr publication.

== The Biography of [[Abu Torabifard, Seyyed Aliakbar|Abu Torabi Fard]] ==
This book in 2 volumes contains the captivity memories of Haj [[Abu Torabifard, Seyyed Aliakbar|Abu Torabi]], and it was published by the order and participation of the Martyr Foundation of Qazvin Province. It deals with the biography and behavior of the Lord of Captives during the captivity and teaches great lessons of self-sacrifice and unselfishness to the readers.

== He was Solomon ==
‘ He was Solomon’ is the title of a book containing memories involving the Lord of Captives, which was compiled by former captive teacher "Mohammed Shaghaghi" . The book actually holds some nice and at the same time, educational points and remarks made by [[Abu Torabifard, Seyyed Aliakbar|Abu Torabi Fard]] as his inmates recall his memories. Twenty-three memories are narrated in this collection, among which one can mention the wise man, military training, proud officer, blade and dates,donkey`s dung, old men and Ali Pharaoh, etc. This book has been published by [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam Azadegan] Publishing House <ref>Ghale ghavand, Farzaneh; Kayani, Tahereh; Shahrukhabadi, Fahima and Godarzi, Afsana (2019). Azadegan bibliography. Tehran: [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam Azadegan] Publishing House.</ref>.

== See also ==

* [[Abu Torabifard, Seyyed Aliakbar|Seyyed Ali Akbar Abu Torabi Fard]]
* Bibliography of the Lord of captives
* Payam Azadegan Cultural and Artistic Institute

== Bibliography ==
<references />

== External link ==

* Mashreq News. Books named "[[Abu Torabifard, Seyyed Aliakbar|Abu Torabi]]". Retrievable from https://www.mashreghnews.ir/news/861478/
* Holy Defense news coverage. A glance at published works about the life of Hojjatt-ol-Eslam [[Abu Torabifard, Seyyed Aliakbar|Seyyed Ali Akbar Abu Torabi]]. Retrievable from https://defapress.ir/fa/news/20662/
[[fa:کتاب های درباره سید آزادگان]]

Prevention of Religious Observances

2026-09-01T10:24:15Z

Marjan-khanlari:

Among the various methods of humiliation and psychological torture inflicted upon prisoners of war (POWs) during captivity, one of the harshest was the prevention of collective religious ceremonies.

In the detention camps, all group activities were forbidden without the permission of the Iraqi guards, religious observances included. And despite the absence of any explicit ban on religious practices, any prisoner who insisted on performing communal rites, such as congregational prayer, would, if spotted by Iraqi guards, subject those taking part to severe punishment.

That said, the Iraqis did not interfere with individual prayer or fasting; their crackdown was aimed chiefly at collective worship<ref>Scientific Council of the Azadegan Encyclopedia. (2020). Azadegan Encyclopedia: Released Iranian Prisoners of Iraq’s War against Iran. Tehran: Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies; [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam-e Azadegan].</ref>.

== See also ==

* [[Punishment and torture|Punishment and Torture]]
* [[Ps|Psychological Punishment and Torture]]
* [[Pu|Punishment in Captivity]]
* [[Tor|Torture in Captivity]]

== Bibliography ==
<references />

== Author ==
Morad Shafiee
[[Category:Punishment and Torture]]
[[fa:ممانعت از انجام فرایض دینی]]
[[ar:عقاب منع الشعائر الدينية]]

Prevention of Religious Observances

2026-09-01T10:22:18Z

Marjan-khanlari:

Prevention of Religious Observances

2026-09-01T10:21:57Z

Marjan-khanlari: /* See also */

Prevention of Religious Observances

2026-09-01T10:19:52Z

Marjan-khanlari: Created page with "Among the various methods of humiliation and psychological torture inflicted upon prisoners of war (POWs) during captivity, one of the harshest was the prevention of collective religious ceremonies. In the detention camps, all group activities were forbidden without the permission of the Iraqi guards, religious observances included. And despite the absence of any explicit ban on religious practices, any prisoner who insisted on performing communal rites, such as congreg..."

Captivity an overview

2026-09-01T10:05:47Z

Marjan-khanlari:

Every war entails death, injury, captivity, destruction, and numerous consequences, of which, undoubtedly, captivity is one of the most formidable ones. And certainly, one of the unavoidable aspects of all wars in the world is captivity.

Captivity can be called one of the most anxious events during wartime. "Does war involve a moment more harrowing than when soldiers are taken into captivity?"<ref>Ghal'eghavand, Farzaneh (2019). Time Stood Still, Tehran: [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam Azadeghan], p.19.</ref>. The psychological shock of the moment of captivity is so debilitating that it is enough to destroy the spirit and body of a prisoner of war for a lifetime; however, according to the liberated prisoners, all the deprivations, shortages, various forms of torture during captivity, and the resulted damages never equate to the moment of being captured.

World War I and II, the wars of France, Japan, Germany, Russia, and others, none were without the presence of prisoners of war. One of the most important aspects that distinguishes and glorifies the title of captivity is captivity in the Battle of Karbala. By looking at the event of Karbala, we see how the captives of Karbala were able to attain immortality in Mankind`s history by shouting for justice and demanding rights and creating a lasting wave. In the eight-year war between Iraq and Iran, according to statements by individuals from the International Red Cross, Iranian prisoners were the most unique ones in the world; prisoners who, with their faithful [[resistance]], had subdued captivity itself.

In Iran, the abrupt war broke out when the revolutionary homeland was still immersed in the joy of the collapse of the 2,500-year-old monarchy. The sweetness of victory gave very quickly way to the bitterness of war.

War has an ugly face, but the unequal war of Iraq against Iran was a defensive war for us; a sacred and beautiful defense. In this defense, young and old, men and women, rose up and fought with all their resources to protect religion and homeland. Guarding religion and homeland and not losing an inch of soil was not easy, and heavy tolls had to be paid, because a united world had joined forces to overthrow the system and defeat the revolutionary forces, who were not yet prepared for this pre-planned invasion.

In this path, some died martyrs or became disabled; some were also taken captive and spent the best years of their lives in the dreaded camps of the Ba'athist regime.

There are many reasons behind how and why some 40000 Iranians were taken into captivity; however, the role of the fifth column[1], the unfamiliarity of the fighters with military techniques, individual mistakes and surprise, staff and executive errors, insufficient equipment, lack of access to modern military facilities, etc., can never be ignored in specific failures.<ref>Ghal'eghavand, Farzaneh (2019). Time Stood Still. Tehran: [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam Azadeghan], p.11.</ref>

The story of captivity has many hidden layers and untold details. Among the prisoners of war, various individuals were seen, from border residents and families to the Islamic militia members, army personnel, IRGC members, clerics, artists, and aid workers. However, what is certain is that a large number of prisoners of war was captured due to unequal circumstances, but they were set free after showing a great deal of courage and strong moral fiber during their captivity.

Iranian prisoners, like our saint Zeynab (Peace be upon her soul), who had the mission of conveying the message of the Husseini movement and the Shia school of thought, were able to play a significant role in conveying the message of the Islamic Revolution to the world, in addition to self-discovery and self-improvement, through patience and steadfastness, reflection on hadiths and narratives, and under correct and continuous management and leadership, which eventually led to their liberation.

Captivity historical periods since the establishment of the Islamic Republic system

=== Captivity after the victory of the Islamic Revolution and before the start of the imposed Iraq-Iran war ===
"After the signing of the 1975 Algiers Agreement, the Iraqi government, in order to increase its power against the then Iranian government and to realize its claim of sovereignty over the River Arvand Rud, put the strengthening of its combat capabilities and fortifications and the expansion of its army structure on its agenda<ref>Rashid, Mohsen (2010). Atlas of Iran-Iraq War, Second Edition, Tehran: Documentation and Research Center of Sacred Defense of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (War Studies and Research Center), p.20.

</ref>. The imposed Iraq-Iran war officially began on September 22nd, 1980, but after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, i.e., from the winter of 1978 to the first half of 1980, there were also movements, and before the official start of the war, a number of people was taken captive. According to [[statistics]] from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq violated Iran's land, sea, and air borders 397 times from April 2nd, 1979, to the end of August 1980."<ref>Alamati, Gholamreza, Manouchehri, Ali (2019). Documents of Prisoner Exchange (Imposed War of Iraq Against Iran (1980-1988)). Tehran: Foundation for Preservation of Works and Values of Sacred Defense in cooperation with the Publication Institute of Imam Hossein Comprehensive University.

</ref>

'''Number of prisoners before the official start of the war<ref name=":0">Archive of Documents and Information of [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam Azadeghan] Institute.</ref>'''
{| class="wikitable"
|‪Row
|‪Year of Captivity
|‪Number of prisoners
|-
|1
|1979
|86
|-
|2
|First half of 1980 (March 21 - September 22)
|2506
|-
|Total
| colspan="2" |2592 people

|}

==== Captivity from the beginning of Iraq's imposed war on Iran until the acceptance of the resolution. ====
When the shadow of war spread across Iran, border residents and military forces spontaneously defended and resisted, and many of our compatriots, caught off guard, were taken captive. In the second half of 1980, the Islamic Republic of Iran conducted only 4 military operations, and a number of people was captured in these operations, which were usually unsuccessful. Based on the statistics of prisoners at this time, most of them were border residents. Seyyed Hossein Hashemi, one of the captives during the first week of the war, recounts:<blockquote>"To prepare a report on the situation of Iran's western borders, I went to Kermanshah and from there to Ghasr-e Shirin. My main job was to produce cultural and artistic documented programs. When we arrived in Kermanshah, the situation was worse than we had imagined. Iraq had positioned a complete and well-equipped army behind our gates. They, with many soldiers and equipment, had coiled like a snake, ready to attack. Only a few people remained in the city; and that too, without organization or order. The situation in Ghasr-e Shirin was bitter. Artillery shells shook the city like an earthquake, turning people's belongings upside down. Some residents, one way or another had managed to run away from the city. Others had taken refuge in basements<ref>Ghal'eghavand, Farzaneh (2019). Time Stood Still, Tehran: [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam Azadeghan], p.271.</ref>.</blockquote>Hamid Aminifar, another prisoner from the early days of the 1980 war, recounts how he was captured:

"When Iraq attacked, we resisted for approximately 24 to 32 hours with a small number of people at the Khan-Einlu outpost. That was the only place they hadn't been able to enter, and if they had, they would have bypassed Gilan-Gharb as well. The outpost was located above the area. There was also a large river flowing there, over which a bridge had been built, and on the other side, there was a sloping surface leading upwards. A small number of our forces was there. The Iraqis came with infantry. Our commander ordered us to act independently; those 7 or 8 people were to decide for themselves what to do. The commander of that section beckoned us to wait until the Iraqis came onto the bridge. They came onto the bridge. From the top of the hill, as I looked, God is my witness, they were like armies of ants, with 3000 or 4000 forces, and perhaps 200 or 250 tanks; compared to us, who had 6 or 7 tanks and 40 or 50 people, our capture was inevitable."<ref name=":0" />

'''Prisoners of the war imposed by Iraq on Iran until the acceptance of Resolution'''<ref name=":0" />
{| class="wikitable"
|‪Row
|‪Year of captivity
|‪Number of prisoners
|-
|1
|From September 22nd to the end of March 1981
|2341
|-
|2
|1981
|780
|-
|3
|1982
|4232
|-
|4
|1983
|2764
|-
|5
|1984
|632
|-
|6
|1985
|834
|-
|7
|1986
|3495
|-
|8
|1987
|1051
|-
|9
|1988 (From March 21st to July 17th)
|12423
|-
|Total
| colspan="2" |‪28,552 captives
|}

==== Captivity after the acceptance of the UN Security Council Resolution 598 ====
After the acceptance of the UN Resolution 598, the Ba'athist regime of Iraq showed disregard for its commitment to its obligations and the provisions of the resolution, in order to take more prisoners and achieve balance in prisoner exchange, launching widespread attacks on Iranian soil, which led to the captivity of a significant number of Iranians. Five defensive operations and one offensive operation, named Operation Mersad, were carried out in the years following the acceptance of the Resolution 598, which resulted in the martyrdom and captivity of a number of our compatriots.

'''Operations after the acceptance of Resolution 598'''
{| class="wikitable"
|‪Row
|‪Operation Name
|
|‪Notes
|-
|1
|Tamarchin
|
|In the final days of the war, exactly 48 hours after Iran announced its acceptance and agreement to the UN Security Council Resolution 598 on July 20th, 1988, four brigades of Iraqi units stationed in the general area of Tamarchin and the Se Kaniyan heights attacked Iranian positions in order to gain control of the sensitive heights of the region. After 5 days of intense fighting, they were forced to retreat without achieving success...<ref>Jafari, Mojtaba (2014). Atlas of Enduring Battles. Tehran: Soureh Sabz Publications, p. 156.</ref>.
|-
|2
|The Vanguard Kushk Defense
|
|‪Iraq, feeling that Iran was in absolute military impotence and not even imagining the continuation of attacks from the other side by relying on the acceptance of the resolution, launched an unfair attack, perhaps to achieve the unfulfilled goals of the past eight years of widespread invasion...<ref>Jafari, Mojtaba (2014). Atlas of Enduring Battles. Tehran: Soureh Sabz Publications, p.157.</ref>.
|-
|3
|Ghasr-e Shirin Defense
|
|The Iraqis, who mostly intended to take a larger number of prisoners and create balance in prisoner exchanges, after inflicting their blows and taking a significant number of Iranian forces into captivity, prepared the region to send the Mojahedin-e Khalq into Iran's borders in order to create internal conflict and strike at the corpus of the Islamic Republic of Iran...<ref>Jafari, Mojtaba (2014). Atlas of Enduring Battles. Tehran: Soureh Sabz Publications, p.158.

</ref>.
|-
|4
|North Mehran Defense
|
|‪In the continuation of the enemy's offensive operations, which were carried out with heavy artillery fire, air support, and relentless chemical bombing, Iraqi units in the Meimakh and Mehran regions also launched their attack seeking to capture Salehabad and cutting off the communication road to the western region<ref>Jafari, Mojtaba (2014). Atlas of Enduring Battles. Tehran: Soureh Sabz Publications, p.159.</ref>.
|-
|5
|Mersad Offensive Operation
|
|The acceptance of the Resolution 598 "had strengthened the Iraqis' belief that the situation had changed in favor of forces opposed to the Islamic Republic of Iran, and therefore, by undertaking military and political actions, a change in the regime in Iran could be pursued. Accordingly, extensive military actions were carried out in the southern, western, and Shatt ol-Arab [Arvandrud] regions... Therefore, Iran had previously evacuated the Ghasr-e Shirin region with preparations made in advance and, with air and artillery support, dispatched the deceived followers of the Monafeghin in a paramilitary column towards Iranian territory...<ref>Jafari, Mojtaba (2014). Atlas of Enduring Battles. Tehran: Soureh Sabz Publications, p.160.

</ref>
|-
|6
|Sharhani Defense Operation
|
|‪In this operation, with the ingenuity of the Iranian commander who had been captured by the enemy, by contacting friendly forces via [[radio]] and issuing the necessary message, approximately 1800 Iranian troops crossed the Dueirige River and took up defensive positions on the east bank, an that led to a reduction in the number of prisoners. Apart from the capture of Iranian forces, there were no casualties or damage in this operation<ref>Jafari, Mojtaba (2014). Atlas of Enduring Battles. Tehran: Soureh Sabz Publications, p.161.</ref>.
|}
Mohammad Soleimanzadeh, an unregistered liberated captive of the [[Takrit camp 16|Takrit Camp 16]], who was captured on August 23rd, 1988, recounts:<blockquote>"The acceptance of the Resolution 598 had just occurred, but the Ba'athist enemy could not be trusted. The headquarters of the 77th Khorasan Division's Engineering Battalion was at Fakkah Junction. Before the official implementation, it was decided that ceasefire procedures would be applied at the borders. We were carrying out this mission, of course with UNIMOG forces around [2]. It was the morning of August 23rd, 1988... I strapped a radio to my back, and Mohammad Farnaghi [3] and I went up a hill. Mohammad was carefully monitoring everything with binoculars... It wasn't long before Mohammad frantically reported the presence of armored and tank forces. Enemy forces, disregarding the ceasefire, had poured into the area. I immediately transmitted the news via radio. The order was clear: even if the Iraqis come and run over you with tanks, stay put; because we are not supposed to violate the ceasefire... We had no choice but to wait there until high-ranking officers arrived. When the order to retreat came, we moved... We were supposed to go back and take some of the new recruits, who were unfamiliar with the area, to the rear with us. Major Golmakani [4] and I got into a dump truck and left... The Ba'athists had deployed forces up to eight kilometers. It was two in the afternoon, and the day of Ashura. They blocked our way with two tanks and four armored personnel carriers, and swarmed around us like ants and locusts from all sides... The Shurhani operational area was our end. We did not want to violate the ceasefire; that's all!"<ref>Ghal'eghavand, Farzaneh (2019). Time Stood Still, Tehran: [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam Azadeghan], p.140.</ref></blockquote>

==== Statistics of liberated prisoners after the acceptance of the Resolution 598 until August 13th, 1990<ref name=":0" /> ====
{| class="wikitable"
|‪Row
|‪Year of Captivity
|‪Number of prisoners
|-
|1
|From July 18th, 1988, until the end of the year
|12790
|-
|2
|1989
|45
|-
|3
|August 13th, 1990
|63
|-
|Total
| colspan="2" |‪12,898 people
|}

==== Statistics of liberated prisoners after the major release of POWs from the imposed war<ref name=":0" /> ====
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |‪Number of prisoners
|‪Year of captivity
|‪Row
|-
| colspan="2" |33
|1991
|1
|-
| colspan="2" |25
|1992
|2
|-
| colspan="2" |14
|1993
|3
|-
| colspan="2" |13
|1994
|4
|-
| colspan="2" |6
|1995
|5
|-
| colspan="2" |4
|1996
|6
|-
| colspan="2" |16
|1997
|7
|-
| colspan="2" |3
|1998
|8
|-
| colspan="2" |2
|1999
|9
|-
| colspan="2" |1
|2000
|10
|-
| colspan="2" |3
|2001
|11
|-
| colspan="2" |2
|2002
|12
|-
| colspan="2" |1
|2003
|13
|-
| colspan="2" |1
|2004
|14
|-
|
| colspan="2" |124 people
|Total
|-
|
|
|
|
|}

==== Disaggregated and final statistics of the missing and liberated prisoners<ref name=":0" />[5] ====
{| class="wikitable"
|‪Row
|‪Camp
|‪Final statistics of prisoners of war
|-
|1
|Takrit 11
|2667
|-
|2
|Takrit 12
|2914
|-
|3
|Takrit 14
|1695
|-
|4
|Takrit 15
|2334
|-
|5
|Takrit 16
|3225
|-
|6
|Takrit 18 (Baqubah)
|5155
|-
|7
|Takrit 19
|391
|-
|8
|Takrit 20
|1297
|-
|Total
| colspan="2" |‪19,678 people
|}
Here are some examples of memories from the moment of captivity:

'''Example 1'''

'''Colonel Mohammad Ali Salajegheh'''

'''Unregistered veteran and liberated prisoner of war (missing in action)'''

'''Operation: Mersad'''

'''Location of residence: [[Takrit Camp 19]]'''<blockquote>Operation Mersad had begun. I was the deputy brigade commander. Iraqi forces had started shelling us from land and air [inside Iranian territory in Salehabad, Ilam], but we resisted. They had made no penetration into the positions of my brigade, which was the 1st Brigade of the 58th Zolfaghar Division. One or two of our battalion commanders had been martyred, and we had appointed replacements for them. We resisted until five or five-thirty in the afternoon. Then I contacted the division commander. The division commander had previously told me to defend our positions until they gave us new orders. Our communication with the commander was then cut off, but at the same time, the forces to our left had retreated and changed their positions, but they gave us no orders. We remained until seven-thirty or nine at night. By then, the enemy's fire had also ceased, and our positions were calm. Our communication with the division was still cut off. No matter how hard we tried to contact the division, we failed [7]. [Since the 106 radios had long range], I managed to contact the Ground Forces Headquarters in Tehran. The Ground Forces Headquarters initially told me that the units on the left and right and the Western Headquarters had all retreated seventy kilometers. I said I had provisions, [[water]], and some ammunition, and I could resist for a while. They said we could do nothing for you. You should use the cover of night, abandon your positions, and entrust yourselves to God. So, that night, we gave the order to our unit to abandon positions. We were surrounded on all sides. The enemy was seventy kilometers behind us. During the night, until morning, we destroyed our vehicles and weapons as much as we could. Some managed to escape, and some were captured. Approximately one of the brigades of the Iraqi 17th Armored Division had attacked us. When I reached our engineering battalion's headquarters, I saw that the Iraqis had arrived and established themselves. And I was captured by the enemy at 10 a.m.<ref name=":0" /></blockquote>'''Sample 2'''

'''Seyyed Hassan Mirsayyed'''

'''Registered veteran and liberated POW'''

'''Operation: Second phase of Beit ol-Moghaddas'''

'''Location of imprisonment: Romadi 8 camps (Alanbar, also known as Anbar) and Takrit 5'''<blockquote>At 9 pm on May 6th, 1982, coinciding with the 13th of Rajab, the eve of the birth of Imam Ali (peace be upon him), the second phase of the operation began with the code "Ya Ali ibn Abi Talib." The military column, in a single file, passed under the Holy Quran as a light rain was falling. We were stationed in the Martyr Beheshti Battalion, part of the Mohammad Rasoulollah Brigade. At that time, the division had not yet been formed. Due to the cloudy and rainy weather that night, a terrifying darkness enveloped the entire axis. As we approached the enemy, the roar of artillery, the continuous barrage of bullets tearing through the air, and the flares that illuminated the night's darkness like day, intensified. The sound of tanks and armored personnel carriers moving shattered the tranquility of the night. A shadow of terror hung everywhere. Under the horrific sound of mortars constantly exploding around us, my comrades, calm and confident, softly whispered ‘God’ and uttered names of saints and Holy Men as they headed towards the frontline where we were bound to be slaughtered. Upon reaching the enemy's first embankment and firing RPGs at their tanks, simultaneously with the "Allahu Akbar" shouts of the fighters, the Iraqis chose to flee rather than stand their ground, leaving behind burning tanks. But this was not the end. According to the commanders' orders, the advance towards Shalamcheh continued. Along the way, we encountered two Iraqis who had raised their hands in fear, shouting "Dakhil Khomeini" (We seek refuge in Khomeini). By virtue of our religious duty, we refrained from killing them. We tied their hands and took them prisoner. Now we had to share the water and food we had with them. They were very large and burly, and no matter how much they ate, they were not satisfied. In any case, the prisoners were with us throughout the night as we moved. The further we went, the less we saw of Iraqi forces. They had retreated for miles. We crossed a vast plain where half-burned tanks and some concrete and strong bunkers, indicative of command posts, were seen, and among them, obscene pictures and bottles of alcohol could be seen. We were on the move all night. As it got lighter, we performed tayammum and prayed on our way. As the sun rose and the sky brightened, the Iraqi trench line gradually became visible. There was approximately a 100-meter distance between the Iraqi trench and us. Looking left and right across the plain, we could see high trenches and tank barrels, all aimed at us. The area we were in was Shalamcheh, the point of encounter with the Iraqis. After fleeing from the Ahvaz-Khorramshahr road, they had fortified their positions here. It was as if they were waiting for us to arrive so that they could surround and cut us off. Having taken up positions behind the trenches, we awaited orders from the sector commander. It was around 8 am when the troops were informed that we were surrounded and anyone who could save themselves from the encirclement and return to the rear should do so. This was while the Iraqis were heavily attacking us from three sides with tanks, mortars, and direct fire. Our situation was growing more intense by the moment. The shelling continued. The number of martyrs and wounded was increasing. Only a few fighters were able to escape the encirclement and return to the rear. The timed mortars exploding above our heads were unbearable. As shrapnel hit my left hand, I failed to hold on to the Kalashnikov I had taken as spoils of war from the Iraqis themselves, and it fell to the ground. After being hit by shrapnel in three parts of my body, I fell into the furrows in that desert. One of the Islamic militia members quickly came towards me and bandaged my wounds in an attempt to staunch the bleeding. I don't know how many hours had passed since I took shelter in a den when suddenly I heard the sound of "Allahu Akbar." Hearing this sound gave me new life. I thought our own forces had come to our aid to rescue us from the encirclement. With difficulty, I half-stood on my knees to see what was going on. But instead of our own forces, I found the Iraqis, shouting "Allahu Akbar" like , clearing the area in a horseshoe formation and advancing thick and fast. They were trying to trick our boys into coming out of the dens they had fallen into, to see who was alive.. They came over us, and we had no choice but to surrender. There were almost 20 of us<ref name=":0" />.</blockquote>'''Sample 3'''

'''Seyyed Fazel Mousavi'''

'''Unregistered (Missing in Action) Veteran and Liberated POW'''

'''Operation: - (Captured after the acceptance of the Resolution.)'''

'''Location: Nahravan and [[Takrit Camp 20]]'''

The story began the moment Martyr Mehrabian( who had not died a martyr till then) and I left our respective units and went in his car towards Karbala Headquarters (an area in Ahwaz called Golf). We went to the city and I was concerned about the forces there. After traveling a distance that normally took twenty-five minutes, which we covered in two hours, I saw things there that are simply beyond description. I got out of the car twice. That day I happened to be carrying my rifle cocked and ready to shoot. Mehrabian pleaded with me, "Seyyed, for God's sake, stop." The situation that day was like the day of Ashura some 1400 years ago. When a shell hit our car, one side of poor Mehrabyian`s face was destroyed and he said to me, "Seyyed, I am in a lot of pain." I kicked out the car's front windshield, got out of the car, and pulled him out. I was still holding my rifle in one hand, and parts of my clothes were drenched in blood. The dust floating in the air had also settled on my clothes. In this state, I was moving towards the Iraqis, but they were retreating. So I stopped and moved backward, and now they advanced. They were afraid that the forces on the front line might be hiding to ambush them. At last, I shouted that I had to get this injured person to a doctor. They said, "Throw down your weapon so we can save him." I had no time to decide. It only took me ten seconds to figure what to do. If I didn't do this, Mehrabian would die, and I would escape with my weapon, not knowing if I would survive or not, but if I surrendered to the Iraqis, at least I would have done my best to save Mehrabian's life. Finally, I dropped the weapon. Before the weapon even hit the ground, they had surrounded me. One of them was a Turk and spoke Arabic. He asked, "What's the news about your forces?" I said, "The forces are ready, and the tanks are moving this way!" Then they helped us and took us behind the embankment. Our car was destroyed, so they took us away in another car<ref name=":0" />.

'''Sample 4'''

'''Mehdi Toutounchian'''

'''Registered veteran and liberated prisoner of war'''

'''Operation:No particular operation'''

'''Place of residence: Romadi Camp 10 and Takrit Camp 17'''<blockquote>When the Fav operation began, there was an unusual enthusiasm in the IRGC for the young men to go to the front. Since our own region, Kurdistan, was an operational zone, the officials wouldn't let us go because it was a dangerous area, even though it had been cleared. We made great efforts to go. Finally, the official in charge of cultural affairs told me to take charge of the propaganda for the entire brigade before deployment and go there as the propaganda officer. I accepted. When the deployment began, we went with the deployed brigade to the operational area and gathered a number of people as a battalion. We formed a cohesive battalion, which the division officials in the southern operational area had prepared, and became part of that battalion. Within the battalion, tasks were divided, and I was appointed as the deputy company commander. We had prepared ourselves for the operation. One or two days before our operation, we, a group of 9 people, were taken to the salt factory area in the operational zone to familiarize ourselves with the area. The next night, we set out to execute the regional operation. During the operation, my comrades and I crossed the water. They had previously announced that the water level was low and shallow, but it was not. During the operation, the water was right up to our heads because there were many blast holes. We were stuck in a terrible quagmire. Despite everything, our forces stood their ground and moved in a column. The column was reaching the other side when the Iraqis noticed us, and shooting began. Our forces, most of whom were in the water, reached the coastline under enemy fire with great difficulty. It was such a terrible situation! We could neither retreat nor defend ourselves. Yet, we formed a defensive line in the water and reached the shore with heavy casualties. I was the last one because I was bringing up the rear to ensure they were not stuck and left behind in the water. We had to gather everyone together. We reached the shore. On the shore, the martyrs were identified, and we determined the path for the uninjured forces to achieve our main objective. Our main objective was to link up a 90-degree line with our 90-degree left flank to connect these two battalions and take the control of the operational line from the Iraqis. We started it with a group of thirty to forty people. We entered the Iraqi bunkers with the initial group. As I was the keeper of the operation's code, I had to reach the left-flank battalion to announce the operation code and the link-up code so that the battalions and lines could be connected, and the entire axis would fall into our hands. I went from bunker to bunker alone until I reached the line we needed to reach. I entered an open bunker. There was a Iraqi there appearing to be dead; I sat on his body. This Iraqi on whose stomach I was sitting, was only shamming dead as it transpired a bit later. I was looking at my map with the flares the Iraqis had thrown into the air to see how much was left until I reached the target area. At that moment, one of the Islamic militia members, Sergeant Esmaeili, who was from Miandoab, arrived. . We sat back to back, and now I felt more at ease that no one would surprise us from behind. A few moments passed, and Sergeant Esmaeili said, "The Iraqi is alive," because he was sitting closer to the Iraqi's head, and I was on his belly. When he saw the Iraqi's eye and eyelid movement, he said, "Haji, he's alive." I said, "Don't be afraid, I've been here a long time. If he were alive, he could have at least dealt me with a knife." A few moments passed, and apparently, this Iraqi had understood our conversation and tried to get up. We saved ourselves with great difficulty and finished him off with a bullet. Then we both moved to that 90-degree angle. Later, one of the radio operator's assistants also arrived. Now there were three of us and we reached the desired angle, but there was no code at that point. It turned out the battalion hadn't connected there, and we didn't know. And it hadn't been announced to us by radio that that battalion hadn't occupied that spot. Now, as it was dark and we could not see and identify the shooters we got the impression that our own guys were shooting, we wanted to tell them the code, but they turned around and saw us, and we waited for a reply that wasn't announced. We sat smelling a rat we suddenly found ourselves surrounded by the Iraqis, and a flare blasted above our heads, illuminated us. We were about 2 to 3 meters away from the Iraqi soldiers, and there was no bunker; we were sitting next to the embankment. In this situation, up to that moment, we had succeeded in taking the line and linking up, but there and then we were captured by Ba'athist forces. At that moment, one of my comrades said, "Haji, should we surrender or keep fighting?" The decision was very difficult. The responsibility was mine. If I had ordered them to shoot, they would have done so, and their martyrdom would have been a sure thing. We had to preserve our forces for ourselves, our society, our religion, and our future generations. Reluctantly, I ordered, "Don't shoot." It was a very difficult decision; I made the decision with great difficulty in a few seconds, and the Iraqis were shouting, "Get up, get up..." Finally, the three of us were captured and taken to their rear bunker. It was 3:30 – 4 am when we were captured, and in the morning, they put us in a jeep with 2 or 3 other prisoners who had been stationed at that corner of the axis. From there, some of our own battalion members were also put in the jeep, and they took us to their rear base<ref name=":0" />.</blockquote>'''Sample 5'''

'''Mohammad Reza Sedighi'''

'''Registered Veteran and Liberated Prisoner of War'''

'''Operation: Badr'''<blockquote>Location of captivity: Romadi Camp 3 (Camp 9), Camp 8 (Al Anbar, known as Anbar), and Takrit 17 The twenty-third of Esfand arrived. On a road that stretched along the edge of the marsh, hundreds of tanks, like herds of elephants, each approximately ten meters apart, were rapidly advancing to quickly reach the battlefield or in a manner of speaking the slaughterhouse. From six to eight in the morning, we were continuously trapped under heavy fire. A hell had broken loose. Mortars, artillery, caliber rounds, and machine gun fire hit the ground inch by inch, and constantly the shouts of "Ya Mahdi, Ya Fatemeh, and Ya Hussein" from my comrades could be heard and then faded. Dust and smoke had covered everything. In every corner, someone had fallen and was groaning. There was no way out. One meter from us there was water, and inside it was full of barbed wire and all sorts of obstacles. Nothing could be done. The fire was so heavy that we could do nothing but take cover in foxholes. The sound of tank treads grew louder every moment. There was still no sign of fresh forces. We neither had ammunition nor supplies. All the water-bottles were empty, and the enemy had adopted a specific array since last night until morning, as if they had made up their mind to finish the job before noon. The Iraqis had attacked with full force. Bullets rained down on us from land and air. At eight in the morning, the war horn blew again, and the banks of Hur-ol-azim Marsh were filled with the torn bodies of Islamic militia members. Small and large pools of blood punctuated the edges of the marsh waters. It was 8:30 am, and I was constantly requesting reinforcements from Ahramian. Shabanali Sadeghian [8] picked up his machine gun and poised to provide suppressive fire on the left flank. Just as he was about to jump over the embankment to easily fire, a tank caliber round from the tanks opposite hit him, throwing him in front of my bunker. He was saying his prayers when several direct shots also hit his body. His mumbling ceased. I watched him like that and thought to myself that Shabanali, too, had been martyred. Amin came right after him and was also martyred. I don't know how it was, everyone came and got martyred except for unfortunate me, who was at the very front. Mohammad Ali Dashti was also martyred. I was ashamed to give orders to anyone anymore. I had to do something. I couldn't just stand by and watch my comrade`s martyrdom. I took Habibollah Hasanabadi, Hossein Rezapour, Bagher Heydari, and a few other guys, and somehow we managed to jumped over the embankment. We started firing our RPGs, Kalashnikovs, and 60mm mortars at the Iraqis who were positioned on this side of the embankment. Sadegh Pishdad, one of the younger guys, found one of the commando 60mm mortars and a box of ammunition and ran towards us. I volunteered to fire the mortar. After this, I was surprised to notice that the Iraqis seemed to be scared by our sudden fire and retreated a bit, but then they came forward again. I stood up and aimed the RPG at the tank. The rocket hit the body of the tank and shattered, but the tank did not explode! It was a T-72 tank, and the RPG-7 was no match for it! A tank caliber round passed right under my hand and hit Bagher Heydari's [9] face and jaw, turning his jaw upside down. It was a heartbreaking scene. The flesh of his face was protruding, and nothing of his face was recognizable. From his lip to his ear, it was torn. Two of the Imam Ali battalion's men stood up and gathered the flesh, put it back on his face, and secured it with Ergals. Bagher Heydari was lying on the ground, writhing in pain, but he couldn't scream. Bagher Heydari had helped me in every way he could, both firing and loading rockets, and giving them to me to shoot or shooting them himself.I resumed shooting and fired an RPG. My ears were hurting for having fired so many RPGs. Helicopters and planes were firing from above, and T-72 tanks were firing from the front. The al-Ghadir fighters, who had made a pact with their Imam and refused to retreat over the bodies of their comrades, continued to resist. The voice of Martyr Jafarzadeh echoed in my ears, "Resist, the culture-loving forces are on the way!" But after a day had passed, there was still no news of any forces! I dragged Bagher Heydari and Hossein Akhoondzadeh [10], who had been shot below the heart, to a corner where they wouldn't be in the Iraqis' line of fire. Hossein Rezapour, one of the fighters from Naimabad, changed his magazine and stood up to open fire on the Iraqis when a caliber bullet hit him directly in the eye. His eyeball was hanging out. It was a truly ghastly scene that cannot be described! Agha Mashallah Heydari showed great courage and stood up to fire several RPGs. He was a Seyyed. I don't know what prayers he said while firing the RPGs that they all hit the targets. The Iraqis retreated about 300 meters again. Our radio communication was cut off. We were still engaged when Ali Arabi came next to me and said: - Brother Sedighi, fire is coming from this side too! I looked in that direction and said: - You're mistaken, man! Where? I don`t see a thing. They would fire a volley and then fall silent again. They wanted to take a triangular corner and establish themselves so that they could then easily open fire and capture us. On one side, we were pursuing the enemy, and on the other, they were pursuing us. The Iraqis started firing another volley. Many of our fighters were martyred right there.From a distance, my eyes fell upon the pilgrims; suddenly a bullet hit the leg of a pilgrim and he fell to the ground. I thought to myself that the pilgrim that is a civilian had also been martyred. I was the only survivor of the battalion. The firing temporarily ceased. The Iraqis we were chasing returned. Bullets were being fired at us from all sides. Tanks slowly advanced. The T-72 tank's caliber never stopped firing for a moment. We were completely surrounded. Meanwhile, a caliber bullet hit my right arm. Suddenly I was on fire. It felt as if my arm had been severed. A paramedic arrived and tightly bandaged it with a roll of gauze. Although I was in pain, I had no choice but to fight and find a way to escape the encirclement. The least I could do was to try saving the lives of my remaining comrades. We had Iraqis on three sides and a swamp on one side. Nothing could be done. We were badly stranded on all sides. Some of my comrades got mixed up with the Iraqis. What a situation it became. Everyone was shooting in every direction. Imam Hussein's division had completely retreated, and some of our men had managed to retreat with them. Imam Hussein's division left only one battalion there to resist so that the others could withdraw. But retreating was impossible now. There was no way out. We had no hope of salvation either. I put my trust in God. Our comrades almost started hand-to-hand combat, although most were wounded and nothing could be done, and they were being captured one by one. I didn't want to be captured. I had two armed forces orders from the IRGC and an operations calque with me.The compass was still attached to my waist. I couldn't bring myself to part with these things. Agha Mashallah Heidari came beside me and reached out to detach the compass from me. He pulled the compass off and threw it into the swamp on the right, but the compass pouch was entangled in the tongue of my belt and wouldn't get detached. I took out my wallet, which contained pictures of my children and my IRGC ID, and threw them into the swamps. There was no time to see the pictures of my daughter and son one last time.The Iraqis gathered around us. They motioned for us to drop our weapons. A personnel carrier quickly pulled up beside us. One of the Iraqis, who had probably seen me firing an RPG, came over and said something to the Iraqi officer, pointing at me. Suddenly, one of them drew his weapon to kill me. The Iraqi officer stopped him but then came forward himself and slapped me hard across the face. They wanted us to get into the personnel carrier. We were still standing there. The pain in my arm was getting worse by the moment. Agha Mashallah Heidari still had his rifle without ammunition in his hand. The Iraqi soldier forcibly ''took his weapon. Aqamasallah, who had anticipated that they might execute me at any moment,'' quickly pushed me towards the open door of the Iraqi personnel carrier. He then hopped in behind me. They came into the personnel carrier and tied our hands. My arm was pulled, and pain shot through me<ref>Yazdani, Karamat (2022). Royal Senior. Tehran: [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam Azadeghan], p. 194-201.</ref>.</blockquote>'''Sample 6'''

'''Mohammad Khatibi'''

'''Unregistered Veteran and Liberated POW (Missing in Action)'''

'''Operation: Karbala-7'''

'''Detention Camp: Takrit camps 11 and 18'''<blockquote>Our last deployment was on February 10th, 1987, with the Mahdi (Peace Be Upon His Soul) Corps. After being divided, we entered Khuzestan on February 11th or 12th. We went to the Malek Ashtar Battalion in the 25th Karbala Division. Of course, this was Malek Ashtar Battalion 2, because the previous battalion had been destroyed in Operation Karbala 4. I was both the prayer leader and an RPG bearer. Two days before the operation, several people were selected from the company to go to Kashan to take part in the memorial service of one of the commanders. I was one of those chosen. We got in the car, and I asked, "Well, since we're going to Kashan, will we make it back for the operation or not?" They said the operation might happen sooner. I changed my mind about going to Kashan and got out of the car. That night, March 3rd, 1987, we carried out the operation. During the operation, before reaching the target area, we got stuck in a minefield. Our personnel carriers were destroyed there. There were many anti-personnel mines. Unfortunately, we had lost our way to our operation site, and from 10 PM when we started the operation, until nearly dawn, instead of heading towards Iran, we were going towards Iraq. In the morning, we saw that we were between the first and second Iraqi lines. The interesting point is that on that very night, after a heavy rain, we had entered the Iraqi trenches. After the rain had subsided and we had moved further, we saw a few tanks there. Our comrades had gone and taken cover under the tanks. When it became light in the morning, we realized that they were inside the Iraqi tanks. They had held their tongues lest we should get frightened, and of course, our comrades hadn't gone inside the tanks; they had just taken cover outside, under the tanks. We thought the tanks were empty and just lying there, and we suspected it might belong to our own side. It was almost dark. The guys had lost their way and didn't know where they were going. Near dawn, when the sky brightened, we realized we were surrounded by Iraqis on all sides. our comrades started to defend themselves, and some who knew the escape routes fled. Apparently, only Ali Mahdian, a seminary student from Mazandaran, managed to escape from our group.

We wandered there until morning. In the morning, once the Iraqis succeeded in identifying us as enemy soldiers, they started shooting at us most precisely with sniper rifles as we moved in a column. A bullet hit the company commander's neck, and he was martyred. Another bullet hit me directly, but I was wearing a helmet. Another bullet hit the right side of my head, and my ear began to bleed heavily. I fell into a corner and started reciting "La ilaha illallah(there is no God but Allah)," thinking I was going to be martyred, but martyrdom didn`t come. We had moved forward again. I sat on top of a hill. The second bullet came towards my right side and hit my right ear. It had missed my neck by an inch. I had fallen to the ground. While I was in this state, one of my friends from Amol, who had joined us in Haft Tappeh, said, "Haj Agha, it seems our friends have found a way, let's go." I said, "I am wounded, and bleeding like hell; I cannot go. You go, and I'll see what happens; I'll try to follow you little by little." I limped after them, but there was no way out, and instead, Iraqi soldiers surrounded us. The Iraqis were searching my comrades with many weapons. As soon as their eyes fell on me, they came and searched my pockets. In my right pocket was a Quran, which was a little blood-stained. He took out the Quran and kissed it. He wanted to take it. I said, "I need this Quran." The soldier kissed the Quran and said, "Blood is impure and should not be here." Then he took the Quran and put it in my left pocket. They had gathered our friends there; those who were less heavily injured had their hands and eyes tied. They brought an armored personnel carrier and put us inside.

When we got on the armored personnel carrier, I looked into my pocket and around me. I saw a book of Ziyarat Ashura and a letter I had received from Feyziyeh, along with a picture of myself in clerical attire. I thought, "If these fall into the hands of the Iraqis, it will cause trouble." Right there, I crumpled them up and put them under the seat. Out of an 80-person company, about 30-40 of us were captured, and the rest had been martyred in the same clashes. It was March 3rd, 1987<ref name=":0" />.</blockquote>'''Sample 7'''

'''Abbas Shahriari'''

'''Registered veteran and liberated prisoner of war'''

'''Operation: Kheybar'''

'''Place of residence: Musel Camp 2 (The inhabitants of Kheybar)'''<blockquote>Ali and I were in the same bunker. Ali read out Surah Al-Rahman and Ziyarat Ashura and told me: "If I am martyred and you return, deliver my personal belongings to my family, and when my daughter grows up (she was six months old at the time), tell her that her dad loved her very much." It was almost nine in the morning when the battalion commander issued an order to confront the enemy. Ali and I were responsible for hunting tanks and firing mortars. Our ammunition was limited due to the insecurity of the island road, and we were very careful in using it, but there was no choice; we had to use it should the need arise. The mortar shells ran out. We started hitting tanks with RPG-7s. We hit one or two enemy tanks. They began to retreat. We tried harder to inflict casualties on them. The "Allahu Akbar(God is great)" chants of the boys mingled with the results of these efforts. Not an hour had passed before the enemy advanced again. We realized that in that way, they wanted us to waste our ammunition. The enemy's advance had reached within two hundred meters of us. The boys defended their positions tooth and nail. Ali and I continued hunting tanks . After hitting a tank, as soon as we wanted to change our position so that the enemy wouldn't shoot at us, Ali sighed and slowly fell backward onto the ground. I looked; a caliber bullet had hit Ali's head from behind and exited through his forehead. I quickly called the battalion paramedics and pressed my hand firmly on his forehead. My hand was drenched with blood up to my wrist. The paramedic arrived and bandaged his head. I was on the verge of blacking out. All the memories of that night we were in his bunker flashed through my mind. I didn't want to believe it, but God, it seemed to be happening! The reminder of that promise and vow from that night crushed me. This time, with more zeal and earnestness, I aimed at the Iraqi tanks. It wasn't long before a sound drew my attention to Ali. I turned back; his belt had torn from the pressure of his death throes. I quickly pulled him facing the Qibla(towards Mecca). So that the island's soil wouldn't coat his body, I covered his pure body with the thick plastics we used to spread in the bunker, to return him to the rear in due course. Ali and his timely jokes were still with me. My heart was bleeding, but war was no laughing matter. There was no time for mourning; I had to continue. All-out war with the enemy continued. It was noon. Under enemy fire, , we took turns praying in a sitting position and rapidly. That day, there was no news of lunch. No one thought about hunger. There was no time for delay; we had to move. The only thought and concern of the boys was to push back the enemy; but unfortunately, with the enemy's capabilities, the siege tightened moment by moment to the point where they began using tank shells to destroy the bunkers. After our complete encirclement (ground and air), the Iraqi commander ordered his forces to dismount from the armored personnel carriers. Like ants and locusts, they dismounted from the APCs with their equipment, and with a hand signal from the commander, they threw grenades into the bunkers to eradicate them. I told the person next to me: "These are the final moments; they are wiping out the bunkers. If they throw a grenade into our bunker, we have 30 seconds to throw it out." Davoud Ghasemi came towards our embankment through the dust raised by enemy artillery fire. He was defending another part of the line under the commander's orders and came to our aid due to a shortage of RPG operators. I told Davoud: Ali was martyred. Moments later, while firing an RPG, a direct enemy artillery shell tore him too into four pieces. Each piece was thrown several meters into the air. The memory of last night kept haunting me. Of the three allies, two were martyred! I remained with the smell of the bunker, the remaining scent of those fallen stars, and shimmering of light in the middle of the night! The enemy continued to press on and inflict casualties on us. Gradually, the Iraqi air force also entered the fray. From the sky, they rained bullets on the boys. The battalion commander tried his best to contact the rear and request reinforcements, but the connection was not established. I heard on the radio myself that Imam Khomeini (Peace Be Upon His Soul ) had insisted on the preservation of the Majnoon islands by any means necessary. No one even thought of retreating. The boys' slogan was victory or martyrdom.

As the number of wounded increased, the hope of help from the rear became less and less, and finally ceased. The battalion commander said that any wounded who could return should do so while there was still a little time. Those who were able to move crawled back. It wasn't long before the enemy fired on them. It seemed that each one was shot at least ten to twenty times. The wounded died innocently in the middle of the road. No one else, not even the unscathed ones, were able to retreat. On the other hand, our ammunition was running out. The battalion commander announced face to face that everyone should do whatever they could; from now on, everyone was their own commander and should not wait for his orders. The enemy realized that we no longer had the means to defend ourselves. The tanks moved forward, and reached within a hundred meters of us, and saw no reaction from our side. Gradually, they closed the distance to fifty meters. The three of us were in a trench. We took turns firing the few bullets we had in our magazines at the enemy. It was the turn of an old man, a worker from the Chit-Ray factory. As soon as he stood up to shoot at the enemy, he was hit in the head and martyred. Our encirclement grew ever tighter.

A few minutes later, a grenade was thrown into our trench and landed under the feet of the person next to me. It took more than 30 seconds for him to find the grenade, and it exploded. It was as if two three-phase electrical wires had short-circuited, creating such a flash and an explosive wave that I didn't realize anything. I was unconscious for some time. When I slowly regained consciousness and opened my eyes, I saw that the person next to me had been martyred, and all his organs were scattered. I was also wounded in my left hand, side, and left cheek and was shell-shocked. I lifted my head slightly to assess the situation and saw a tank standing a few meters from me. As soon as they saw I was alive, they started shooting at me. One of the bullets hit my helmet and pierced it. The tank's firing stopped; a few minutes later, Iraqi soldiers from behind put the muzzle of their weapons on my chest, and one of them pulled the keffiyeh from around my neck and dragged me towards the tank that was standing a few meters away. At first, I thought they intended to run the tank over my body, but they didn't do that. Instead, they grabbed my hands and feet and threw me onto the tank. The tank was very hot, and enduring it was very difficult and exhausting. The tank returned towards the enemy front and, after traveling a few hundred meters, got stuck in the mud and stopped moving.

The Iraqis transferred me from the tank to the back of a Toyota pickup truck. I looked around and saw some of my battalion mates inside the vehicle. Only two of them were unharmed<ref>Shahriyari, Abbas (2018). Me, Davood, Ali. Tehran: [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam Azadeghan], p.31-36.

</ref>.</blockquote>'''Sample 8'''

'''Seyed Ahmad Gheshmi'''

'''Registered veteran and freed prisoner of war'''

'''Captivity region: Tilehkuh'''

'''Place of residence: Mosul camps 3 and 4, and Ramadi 6'''<blockquote>Small and large news was heard from the western borders. Iraq had attacked parts of Khosravi and Sarpol-e Zahab border areas. It was planned that some of the IRGC members would go towards the western borders. Our main mission was to visit and evaluate the border areas. We wanted to monitor the situation in Qasr-e Shirin and also the intermediate outposts, such as Pataq and Tilehkuh. The mission of the Hamadan IRGC members was to be stationed in the Tilehkuh and Gerdnou outposts in Sarpol-e Zahab. Out of twenty of us, thirteen moved towards Qasr-e Shirin. When we arrived, we went to the Tilehkuh outpost and settled there. Tilehkuh, in the Sarpol-e Zahab region, was an old, dilapidated, and abandoned outpost. This area was only about two to three hundred meters away from the Iraqi border barbed wire. After us, a company from the Sarpol-e Zahab 3rd Armored Brigade, with four tanks, came there. The company and their tanks were stationed behind the earthworks that had been prepared beforehand. We wanted to return after evaluating the area; Iraq's full-scale attack did not allow it. Iraq had attacked by land and air with several regular divisions and the best military equipment and advanced weapons... . The Tilehkuh outpost was very worn out and dilapidated. Hajj Hamid Norouzi [10] had ordered us to build a collective foxhole [11]. We had been there for three days. No one knew what Iraq had in store for us. It was the last night of Shahrivar. The sound of Iraqi military vehicles coming and going could be heard until morning. We thought they were night patrol forces; we did not know that during the night, four armored divisions with all their equipment and military formation had been stationed in the valley between us. The dilapidated Tila-Kuh outpost was already in a sorry state. There was no need for mortars; the outpost itself was on the verge of collapse. With successive mortar shellings, the last vestiges of the outpost's strength were lost. The best course of action was to evacuate the outpost and save the meager military equipment we had! We moved the equipment to the foxhole bunker. A few of the guys were guarding behind the outpost's earthworks. Until the morning of the first of Mehr (September 23rd), the sound of mortar fire didn't cease for a single moment. The four pillars of the outpost trembled from the sound of the mortar barrage. War was an uninvited guest. How could we have known it would turn out like this? In that vicinity, no safe shelter could be found for the guys. Our only shelter was that foxhole bunker. Sleeplessness and the continuous sound of mortars had drained the guys' strength and energy.

The September sun still had its summer warmth and was hesitant to leave. In contrast to the Iraqi vehicles that stood fully equipped in the Tila-Kuh plain, our outpost was devoid of military equipment and our own forces. It was eleven in the morning when the Iraqi attack began. Bullets raced each other. The sky of Tila-Kuh was no longer blue. The roar of Iraqi tanks filled everywhere. The chest of the plain had no safe spot from the intensity of the enemy's shelling. Tila-Kuh was filled with hundreds of tanks, armored personnel carriers, direct-fire artillery, and dozens of other types of armored vehicles. Four Iraqi divisions were arrayed from end to end, facing thirteen IRGC members and one army company.

We only had a few useless Ghasseh weapons and three or four working rifles. Hajj Hamid Norouzi also had a Kalashnikov. Other than that, the most important weapon we had was an RPG, in the hands of Martyr Morteza Olaj [12]; because he was the only one who knew how to use it well. After the Iraqi attack, even our few bullets and ammunition ran out; only Martyr Olaj still had a few RPG rounds. While we fired sparingly and calculatedly, the Iraqis' extravagance was boundless. If we were in their shoes, perhaps we would have done the same. We were pinned down. The enemy's cavalry and infantry had taken our breath away. Tileh Kooh outpost, with its small number of personnel, was surrounded. All night, until the outpost was completely surrounded, we had fired our last bullet. There were no more bullets left. Each of us only had one weapon and an empty magazine. We reluctantly took cover in the foxhole. Along the region, infantry forces stood step by step. This small number, against four armed divisions, had no opportunity or possibility for any resistance. The enemy's forces and ammunition outweighed ours<ref>Ghal'eghavand, Farzaneh (2019). Time Stood Still. Tehran: [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam Azadeghan], p. 197.</ref>.</blockquote>

== Footnote ==
[1]. A fifth column refers to a group of people within the main society who secretly collaborate with enemies or undermine the larger group to which they are ostensibly loyal. This term has been common in military and political discourse since the Spanish Civil War. The term "fifth column" is virtually synonymous with [[espionage]] in meaning and concept; however, the difference is that a spy works to the detriment and harm of a foreigner, and does not disregard the benefit and interest of their own nation and country, even at the cost of their life; whereas a fifth column does not convey this meaning, but rather its members, knowingly or unknowingly, work to the detriment and harm of their own people and to the benefit of foreigners<ref>Taken from Persian Wikipedia. Available at <nowiki>https://fa.wikipedia.org/wiki/</nowiki>
</ref>. During the imposed war, the enemy's fifth column referred to mercenary traitors and internal eclectic and deviant leftist and rightist parties and groups who acted as infiltrating forces for the enemy and... The prime examples of the enemy's fifth column were political groups hostile to the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization, the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, Komalah, and monarchists. These groups, in addition to gathering information for the enemy, also carried out military actions in Kurdistan and Kermanshah<ref>Andisheh Qom Website, Center for Studies and Answering Doubts of Qom Seminary.</ref>.

[2]. United Nations Peacekeeping Forces

[3]. The unknown martyr of captivity, Mohammad Farnaghi, was from a village in Khomein. We were together in the engineering battalion of the 77th Victorious Khorasan Division and were captured together. In 1989, when infectious diseases spread among the children of Camp Tikrit 16, he became severely ill. Due to the negligence of the Iraqis and the delay in sending him to the hospital, Mohammad's body became so weak that he eventually passed away.

[4]. The late freed prisoner, Davood Golmakani, was the commander of the engineering battalion and a senior force from Khorasan who passed away in 2011.

[5]. In a hidden part of Tikrit 5 camp, as well as the short-term Nahrawan camp, there were missing prisoners of war who were transferred to other camps before their release and the presence of Red Cross representatives.

[6]. Later, we realized that the division headquarters had been completely surrounded by the Iraqis, and there was no possibility of contact with them; in fact, the commanders of the brigades and battalions were acting independently.

[7]. Sha'banali Sadeghian was captured while suffering from a severed spinal cord.

[8]. Baqer Heidari, a veteran and freed prisoner of war, was captured in the same operation while wounded.

[9]. Martyr Hossein Akhundzadeh was martyred after his release due to the same injury.

[10]. The then-commander of the IRGC in Hamadan

[11]. This type of trench has an entrance and exit from both sides.

[12]. Martyr Morteza Olanj, the first trench guard, the first scout, and the first martyr of the Hamadan IRGC, fought with only an RPG until the last moment and until the last bullet he had in his quiver. After firing all his bullets, he threw himself into the heart of the enemy and continued fighting until he finally achieved the exalted status of martyrdom. No trace of this esteemed martyr has been found. During ten years of captivity, we repeatedly wrote to his [[family]] about his martyrdom through various methods, but they did not believe it and continued to wait with anticipation.

== See also ==

* [[Captive martyrs|Captivity and captives]]
* [[Prisoners of War Administration Commission|Prisoners of war]]
* Camp

== References ==
<references />

== External links ==
Moment of capture recoverable from https://www.aparat.com/v/i758o30

Moment of capture of Operation Valfajr 6 fighters recoverable from https://www.aparat.com/v/jlr7567

== Article Author ==
Farzaneh Ghaleh Ghavand
[[fa:اسارت در یک نما]]

Captivity an overview

2026-09-01T10:04:22Z

Marjan-khanlari:

Captivity an overview

2026-09-01T09:53:23Z

Marjan-khanlari: Created page with "Every war entails death, injury, captivity, destruction, and numerous consequences, of which, undoubtedly, captivity is one of the most formidable ones. And certainly, one of the unavoidable aspects of all wars in the world is captivity. Captivity can be called one of the most anxious events during wartime. "Does war involve a moment more harrowing than when soldiers are taken into captivity?"<ref>Ghal'eghavand, Farzaneh (2019). Time Stood Still, Tehran: [https://www.mf..."

Every war entails death, injury, captivity, destruction, and numerous consequences, of which, undoubtedly, captivity is one of the most formidable ones. And certainly, one of the unavoidable aspects of all wars in the world is captivity.

Captivity can be called one of the most anxious events during wartime. "Does war involve a moment more harrowing than when soldiers are taken into captivity?"<ref>Ghal'eghavand, Farzaneh (2019). Time Stood Still, Tehran: [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam Azadeghan], p.19.</ref>. The psychological shock of the moment of captivity is so debilitating that it is enough to destroy the spirit and body of a prisoner of war for a lifetime; however, according to the liberated prisoners, all the deprivations, shortages, various forms of torture during captivity, and the resulted damages never equate to the moment of being captured.

World War I and II, the wars of France, Japan, Germany, Russia, and others, none were without the presence of prisoners of war. One of the most important aspects that distinguishes and glorifies the title of captivity is captivity in the Battle of Karbala. By looking at the event of Karbala, we see how the captives of Karbala were able to attain immortality in Mankind`s history by shouting for justice and demanding rights and creating a lasting wave. In the eight-year war between Iraq and Iran, according to statements by individuals from the International Red Cross, Iranian prisoners were the most unique ones in the world; prisoners who, with their faithful [[resistance]], had subdued captivity itself.

In Iran, the abrupt war broke out when the revolutionary homeland was still immersed in the joy of the collapse of the 2,500-year-old monarchy. The sweetness of victory gave very quickly way to the bitterness of war.

War has an ugly face, but the unequal war of Iraq against Iran was a defensive war for us; a sacred and beautiful defense. In this defense, young and old, men and women, rose up and fought with all their resources to protect religion and homeland. Guarding religion and homeland and not losing an inch of soil was not easy, and heavy tolls had to be paid, because a united world had joined forces to overthrow the system and defeat the revolutionary forces, who were not yet prepared for this pre-planned invasion.

In this path, some died martyrs or became disabled; some were also taken captive and spent the best years of their lives in the dreaded camps of the Ba'athist regime.

There are many reasons behind how and why some 40000 Iranians were taken into captivity; however, the role of the fifth column[1], the unfamiliarity of the fighters with military techniques, individual mistakes and surprise, staff and executive errors, insufficient equipment, lack of access to modern military facilities, etc., can never be ignored in specific failures.<ref>Ghal'eghavand, Farzaneh (2019). Time Stood Still. Tehran: [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam Azadeghan], p.11.</ref>

The story of captivity has many hidden layers and untold details. Among the prisoners of war, various individuals were seen, from border residents and families to the Islamic militia members, army personnel, IRGC members, clerics, artists, and aid workers. However, what is certain is that a large number of prisoners of war was captured due to unequal circumstances, but they were set free after showing a great deal of courage and strong moral fiber during their captivity.

Iranian prisoners, like our saint Zeynab (Peace be upon her soul), who had the mission of conveying the message of the Husseini movement and the Shia school of thought, were able to play a significant role in conveying the message of the Islamic Revolution to the world, in addition to self-discovery and self-improvement, through patience and steadfastness, reflection on hadiths and narratives, and under correct and continuous management and leadership, which eventually led to their liberation.

Captivity historical periods since the establishment of the Islamic Republic system

=== Captivity after the victory of the Islamic Revolution and before the start of the imposed Iraq-Iran war ===
"After the signing of the 1975 Algiers Agreement, the Iraqi government, in order to increase its power against the then Iranian government and to realize its claim of sovereignty over the River Arvand Rud, put the strengthening of its combat capabilities and fortifications and the expansion of its army structure on its agenda<ref>Rashid, Mohsen (2010). Atlas of Iran-Iraq War, Second Edition, Tehran: Documentation and Research Center of Sacred Defense of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (War Studies and Research Center), p.20.

</ref>. The imposed Iraq-Iran war officially began on September 22nd, 1980, but after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, i.e., from the winter of 1978 to the first half of 1980, there were also movements, and before the official start of the war, a number of people was taken captive. According to [[statistics]] from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq violated Iran's land, sea, and air borders 397 times from April 2nd, 1979, to the end of August 1980."<ref>Alamati, Gholamreza, Manouchehri, Ali (2019). Documents of Prisoner Exchange (Imposed War of Iraq Against Iran (1980-1988)). Tehran: Foundation for Preservation of Works and Values of Sacred Defense in cooperation with the Publication Institute of Imam Hossein Comprehensive University.

</ref>

'''Number of prisoners before the official start of the war<ref name=":0">Archive of Documents and Information of [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam Azadeghan] Institute.</ref>'''
{| class="wikitable"
|‪Row
|‪Year of Captivity
|‪Number of prisoners
|-
|1
|1979
|86
|-
|2
|First half of 1980 (March 21 - September 22)
|2506
|-
|Total
| colspan="2" |2592 people

|}

==== Captivity from the beginning of Iraq's imposed war on Iran until the acceptance of the resolution. ====
When the shadow of war spread across Iran, border residents and military forces spontaneously defended and resisted, and many of our compatriots, caught off guard, were taken captive. In the second half of 1980, the Islamic Republic of Iran conducted only 4 military operations, and a number of people was captured in these operations, which were usually unsuccessful. Based on the statistics of prisoners at this time, most of them were border residents. Seyyed Hossein Hashemi, one of the captives during the first week of the war, recounts:<blockquote>"To prepare a report on the situation of Iran's western borders, I went to Kermanshah and from there to Ghasr-e Shirin. My main job was to produce cultural and artistic documented programs. When we arrived in Kermanshah, the situation was worse than we had imagined. Iraq had positioned a complete and well-equipped army behind our gates. They, with many soldiers and equipment, had coiled like a snake, ready to attack. Only a few people remained in the city; and that too, without organization or order. The situation in Ghasr-e Shirin was bitter. Artillery shells shook the city like an earthquake, turning people's belongings upside down. Some residents, one way or another had managed to run away from the city. Others had taken refuge in basements<ref>Ghal'eghavand, Farzaneh (2019). Time Stood Still, Tehran: [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam Azadeghan], p.271.</ref>.</blockquote>Hamid Aminifar, another prisoner from the early days of the 1980 war, recounts how he was captured:

"When Iraq attacked, we resisted for approximately 24 to 32 hours with a small number of people at the Khan-Einlu outpost. That was the only place they hadn't been able to enter, and if they had, they would have bypassed Gilan-Gharb as well. The outpost was located above the area. There was also a large river flowing there, over which a bridge had been built, and on the other side, there was a sloping surface leading upwards. A small number of our forces was there. The Iraqis came with infantry. Our commander ordered us to act independently; those 7 or 8 people were to decide for themselves what to do. The commander of that section beckoned us to wait until the Iraqis came onto the bridge. They came onto the bridge. From the top of the hill, as I looked, God is my witness, they were like armies of ants, with 3000 or 4000 forces, and perhaps 200 or 250 tanks; compared to us, who had 6 or 7 tanks and 40 or 50 people, our capture was inevitable."<ref name=":0" />

'''Prisoners of the war imposed by Iraq on Iran until the acceptance of Resolution'''<ref name=":0" />
{| class="wikitable"
|‪Row
|‪Year of captivity
|‪Number of prisoners
|-
|1
|From September 22nd to the end of March 1981
|2341
|-
|2
|1981
|780
|-
|3
|1982
|4232
|-
|4
|1983
|2764
|-
|5
|1984
|632
|-
|6
|1985
|834
|-
|7
|1986
|3495
|-
|8
|1987
|1051
|-
|9
|1988 (From March 21st to July 17th)
|12423
|-
|Total
| colspan="2" |‪28,552 captives
|}

==== Captivity after the acceptance of the UN Security Council Resolution 598 ====
After the acceptance of the UN Resolution 598, the Ba'athist regime of Iraq showed disregard for its commitment to its obligations and the provisions of the resolution, in order to take more prisoners and achieve balance in prisoner exchange, launching widespread attacks on Iranian soil, which led to the captivity of a significant number of Iranians. Five defensive operations and one offensive operation, named Operation Mersad, were carried out in the years following the acceptance of the Resolution 598, which resulted in the martyrdom and captivity of a number of our compatriots.

'''Operations after the acceptance of Resolution 598'''
{| class="wikitable"
|‪Row
|‪Operation Name
|
|‪Notes
|-
|1
|Tamarchin
|
|In the final days of the war, exactly 48 hours after Iran announced its acceptance and agreement to the UN Security Council Resolution 598 on July 20th, 1988, four brigades of Iraqi units stationed in the general area of Tamarchin and the Se Kaniyan heights attacked Iranian positions in order to gain control of the sensitive heights of the region. After 5 days of intense fighting, they were forced to retreat without achieving success...<ref>Jafari, Mojtaba (2014). Atlas of Enduring Battles. Tehran: Soureh Sabz Publications, p. 156.</ref>.
|-
|2
|The Vanguard Kushk Defense
|
|‪Iraq, feeling that Iran was in absolute military impotence and not even imagining the continuation of attacks from the other side by relying on the acceptance of the resolution, launched an unfair attack, perhaps to achieve the unfulfilled goals of the past eight years of widespread invasion...<ref>Jafari, Mojtaba (2014). Atlas of Enduring Battles. Tehran: Soureh Sabz Publications, p.157.</ref>.
|-
|3
|Ghasr-e Shirin Defense
|
|The Iraqis, who mostly intended to take a larger number of prisoners and create balance in prisoner exchanges, after inflicting their blows and taking a significant number of Iranian forces into captivity, prepared the region to send the Mojahedin-e Khalq into Iran's borders in order to create internal conflict and strike at the corpus of the Islamic Republic of Iran...<ref>Jafari, Mojtaba (2014). Atlas of Enduring Battles. Tehran: Soureh Sabz Publications, p.158.

</ref>.
|-
|4
|North Mehran Defense
|
|‪In the continuation of the enemy's offensive operations, which were carried out with heavy artillery fire, air support, and relentless chemical bombing, Iraqi units in the Meimakh and Mehran regions also launched their attack seeking to capture Salehabad and cutting off the communication road to the western region<ref>Jafari, Mojtaba (2014). Atlas of Enduring Battles. Tehran: Soureh Sabz Publications, p.159.</ref>.
|-
|5
|Mersad Offensive Operation
|
|The acceptance of the Resolution 598 "had strengthened the Iraqis' belief that the situation had changed in favor of forces opposed to the Islamic Republic of Iran, and therefore, by undertaking military and political actions, a change in the regime in Iran could be pursued. Accordingly, extensive military actions were carried out in the southern, western, and Shatt ol-Arab [Arvandrud] regions... Therefore, Iran had previously evacuated the Ghasr-e Shirin region with preparations made in advance and, with air and artillery support, dispatched the deceived followers of the Monafeghin in a paramilitary column towards Iranian territory...<ref>Jafari, Mojtaba (2014). Atlas of Enduring Battles. Tehran: Soureh Sabz Publications, p.160.

</ref>
|-
|6
|Sharhani Defense Operation
|
|‪In this operation, with the ingenuity of the Iranian commander who had been captured by the enemy, by contacting friendly forces via [[radio]] and issuing the necessary message, approximately 1800 Iranian troops crossed the Dueirige River and took up defensive positions on the east bank, an that led to a reduction in the number of prisoners. Apart from the capture of Iranian forces, there were no casualties or damage in this operation<ref>Jafari, Mojtaba (2014). Atlas of Enduring Battles. Tehran: Soureh Sabz Publications, p.161.</ref>.
|}
Mohammad Soleimanzadeh, an unregistered liberated captive of the Takrit Camp 16, who was captured on August 23rd, 1988, recounts:<blockquote>"The acceptance of the Resolution 598 had just occurred, but the Ba'athist enemy could not be trusted. The headquarters of the 77th Khorasan Division's Engineering Battalion was at Fakkah Junction. Before the official implementation, it was decided that ceasefire procedures would be applied at the borders. We were carrying out this mission, of course with UNIMOG forces around [2]. It was the morning of August 23rd, 1988... I strapped a radio to my back, and Mohammad Farnaghi [3] and I went up a hill. Mohammad was carefully monitoring everything with binoculars... It wasn't long before Mohammad frantically reported the presence of armored and tank forces. Enemy forces, disregarding the ceasefire, had poured into the area. I immediately transmitted the news via radio. The order was clear: even if the Iraqis come and run over you with tanks, stay put; because we are not supposed to violate the ceasefire... We had no choice but to wait there until high-ranking officers arrived. When the order to retreat came, we moved... We were supposed to go back and take some of the new recruits, who were unfamiliar with the area, to the rear with us. Major Golmakani [4] and I got into a dump truck and left... The Ba'athists had deployed forces up to eight kilometers. It was two in the afternoon, and the day of Ashura. They blocked our way with two tanks and four armored personnel carriers, and swarmed around us like ants and locusts from all sides... The Shurhani operational area was our end. We did not want to violate the ceasefire; that's all!"<ref>Ghal'eghavand, Farzaneh (2019). Time Stood Still, Tehran: [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam Azadeghan], p.140.</ref></blockquote>

==== Statistics of liberated prisoners after the acceptance of the Resolution 598 until August 13th, 1990<ref name=":0" /> ====
{| class="wikitable"
|‪Row
|‪Year of Captivity
|‪Number of prisoners
|-
|1
|From July 18th, 1988, until the end of the year
|12790
|-
|2
|1989
|45
|-
|3
|August 13th, 1990
|63
|-
|Total
| colspan="2" |‪12,898 people
|}

==== Statistics of liberated prisoners after the major release of POWs from the imposed war<ref name=":0" /> ====
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |‪Number of prisoners
|‪Year of captivity
|‪Row
|-
| colspan="2" |33
|1991
|1
|-
| colspan="2" |25
|1992
|2
|-
| colspan="2" |14
|1993
|3
|-
| colspan="2" |13
|1994
|4
|-
| colspan="2" |6
|1995
|5
|-
| colspan="2" |4
|1996
|6
|-
| colspan="2" |16
|1997
|7
|-
| colspan="2" |3
|1998
|8
|-
| colspan="2" |2
|1999
|9
|-
| colspan="2" |1
|2000
|10
|-
| colspan="2" |3
|2001
|11
|-
| colspan="2" |2
|2002
|12
|-
| colspan="2" |1
|2003
|13
|-
| colspan="2" |1
|2004
|14
|-
|
| colspan="2" |124 people
|Total
|-
|
|
|
|
|}

==== Disaggregated and final statistics of the missing and liberated prisoners<ref name=":0" />[5] ====
{| class="wikitable"
|‪Row
|‪Camp
|‪Final statistics of prisoners of war
|-
|1
|Takrit 11
|2667
|-
|2
|Takrit 12
|2914
|-
|3
|Takrit 14
|1695
|-
|4
|Takrit 15
|2334
|-
|5
|Takrit 16
|3225
|-
|6
|Takrit 18 (Baqubah)
|5155
|-
|7
|Takrit 19
|391
|-
|8
|Takrit 20
|1297
|-
|Total
| colspan="2" |‪19,678 people
|}
Here are some examples of memories from the moment of captivity:

'''Example 1'''

'''Colonel Mohammad Ali Salajegheh'''

'''Unregistered veteran and liberated prisoner of war (missing in action)'''

'''Operation: Mersad'''

'''Location of residence: [[Takrit Camp 19]]'''<blockquote>Operation Mersad had begun. I was the deputy brigade commander. Iraqi forces had started shelling us from land and air [inside Iranian territory in Salehabad, Ilam], but we resisted. They had made no penetration into the positions of my brigade, which was the 1st Brigade of the 58th Zolfaghar Division. One or two of our battalion commanders had been martyred, and we had appointed replacements for them. We resisted until five or five-thirty in the afternoon. Then I contacted the division commander. The division commander had previously told me to defend our positions until they gave us new orders. Our communication with the commander was then cut off, but at the same time, the forces to our left had retreated and changed their positions, but they gave us no orders. We remained until seven-thirty or nine at night. By then, the enemy's fire had also ceased, and our positions were calm. Our communication with the division was still cut off. No matter how hard we tried to contact the division, we failed [7]. [Since the 106 radios had long range], I managed to contact the Ground Forces Headquarters in Tehran. The Ground Forces Headquarters initially told me that the units on the left and right and the Western Headquarters had all retreated seventy kilometers. I said I had provisions, [[water]], and some ammunition, and I could resist for a while. They said we could do nothing for you. You should use the cover of night, abandon your positions, and entrust yourselves to God. So, that night, we gave the order to our unit to abandon positions. We were surrounded on all sides. The enemy was seventy kilometers behind us. During the night, until morning, we destroyed our vehicles and weapons as much as we could. Some managed to escape, and some were captured. Approximately one of the brigades of the Iraqi 17th Armored Division had attacked us. When I reached our engineering battalion's headquarters, I saw that the Iraqis had arrived and established themselves. And I was captured by the enemy at 10 a.m.<ref name=":0" /></blockquote>'''Sample 2'''

'''Seyyed Hassan Mirsayyed'''

'''Registered veteran and liberated POW'''

'''Operation: Second phase of Beit ol-Moghaddas'''

'''Location of imprisonment: Romadi 8 camps (Alanbar, also known as Anbar) and Takrit 5'''<blockquote>At 9 pm on May 6th, 1982, coinciding with the 13th of Rajab, the eve of the birth of Imam Ali (peace be upon him), the second phase of the operation began with the code "Ya Ali ibn Abi Talib." The military column, in a single file, passed under the Holy Quran as a light rain was falling. We were stationed in the Martyr Beheshti Battalion, part of the Mohammad Rasoulollah Brigade. At that time, the division had not yet been formed. Due to the cloudy and rainy weather that night, a terrifying darkness enveloped the entire axis. As we approached the enemy, the roar of artillery, the continuous barrage of bullets tearing through the air, and the flares that illuminated the night's darkness like day, intensified. The sound of tanks and armored personnel carriers moving shattered the tranquility of the night. A shadow of terror hung everywhere. Under the horrific sound of mortars constantly exploding around us, my comrades, calm and confident, softly whispered ‘God’ and uttered names of saints and Holy Men as they headed towards the frontline where we were bound to be slaughtered. Upon reaching the enemy's first embankment and firing RPGs at their tanks, simultaneously with the "Allahu Akbar" shouts of the fighters, the Iraqis chose to flee rather than stand their ground, leaving behind burning tanks. But this was not the end. According to the commanders' orders, the advance towards Shalamcheh continued. Along the way, we encountered two Iraqis who had raised their hands in fear, shouting "Dakhil Khomeini" (We seek refuge in Khomeini). By virtue of our religious duty, we refrained from killing them. We tied their hands and took them prisoner. Now we had to share the water and food we had with them. They were very large and burly, and no matter how much they ate, they were not satisfied. In any case, the prisoners were with us throughout the night as we moved. The further we went, the less we saw of Iraqi forces. They had retreated for miles. We crossed a vast plain where half-burned tanks and some concrete and strong bunkers, indicative of command posts, were seen, and among them, obscene pictures and bottles of alcohol could be seen. We were on the move all night. As it got lighter, we performed tayammum and prayed on our way. As the sun rose and the sky brightened, the Iraqi trench line gradually became visible. There was approximately a 100-meter distance between the Iraqi trench and us. Looking left and right across the plain, we could see high trenches and tank barrels, all aimed at us. The area we were in was Shalamcheh, the point of encounter with the Iraqis. After fleeing from the Ahvaz-Khorramshahr road, they had fortified their positions here. It was as if they were waiting for us to arrive so that they could surround and cut us off. Having taken up positions behind the trenches, we awaited orders from the sector commander. It was around 8 am when the troops were informed that we were surrounded and anyone who could save themselves from the encirclement and return to the rear should do so. This was while the Iraqis were heavily attacking us from three sides with tanks, mortars, and direct fire. Our situation was growing more intense by the moment. The shelling continued. The number of martyrs and wounded was increasing. Only a few fighters were able to escape the encirclement and return to the rear. The timed mortars exploding above our heads were unbearable. As shrapnel hit my left hand, I failed to hold on to the Kalashnikov I had taken as spoils of war from the Iraqis themselves, and it fell to the ground. After being hit by shrapnel in three parts of my body, I fell into the furrows in that desert. One of the Islamic militia members quickly came towards me and bandaged my wounds in an attempt to staunch the bleeding. I don't know how many hours had passed since I took shelter in a den when suddenly I heard the sound of "Allahu Akbar." Hearing this sound gave me new life. I thought our own forces had come to our aid to rescue us from the encirclement. With difficulty, I half-stood on my knees to see what was going on. But instead of our own forces, I found the Iraqis, shouting "Allahu Akbar" like , clearing the area in a horseshoe formation and advancing thick and fast. They were trying to trick our boys into coming out of the dens they had fallen into, to see who was alive.. They came over us, and we had no choice but to surrender. There were almost 20 of us<ref name=":0" />.</blockquote>'''Sample 3'''

'''Seyyed Fazel Mousavi'''

'''Unregistered (Missing in Action) Veteran and Liberated POW'''

'''Operation: - (Captured after the acceptance of the Resolution.)'''

'''Location: Nahravan and [[Takrit Camp 20]]'''

The story began the moment Martyr Mehrabian( who had not died a martyr till then) and I left our respective units and went in his car towards Karbala Headquarters (an area in Ahwaz called Golf). We went to the city and I was concerned about the forces there. After traveling a distance that normally took twenty-five minutes, which we covered in two hours, I saw things there that are simply beyond description. I got out of the car twice. That day I happened to be carrying my rifle cocked and ready to shoot. Mehrabian pleaded with me, "Seyyed, for God's sake, stop." The situation that day was like the day of Ashura some 1400 years ago. When a shell hit our car, one side of poor Mehrabyian`s face was destroyed and he said to me, "Seyyed, I am in a lot of pain." I kicked out the car's front windshield, got out of the car, and pulled him out. I was still holding my rifle in one hand, and parts of my clothes were drenched in blood. The dust floating in the air had also settled on my clothes. In this state, I was moving towards the Iraqis, but they were retreating. So I stopped and moved backward, and now they advanced. They were afraid that the forces on the front line might be hiding to ambush them. At last, I shouted that I had to get this injured person to a doctor. They said, "Throw down your weapon so we can save him." I had no time to decide. It only took me ten seconds to figure what to do. If I didn't do this, Mehrabian would die, and I would escape with my weapon, not knowing if I would survive or not, but if I surrendered to the Iraqis, at least I would have done my best to save Mehrabian's life. Finally, I dropped the weapon. Before the weapon even hit the ground, they had surrounded me. One of them was a Turk and spoke Arabic. He asked, "What's the news about your forces?" I said, "The forces are ready, and the tanks are moving this way!" Then they helped us and took us behind the embankment. Our car was destroyed, so they took us away in another car<ref name=":0" />.

'''Sample 4'''

'''Mehdi Toutounchian'''

'''Registered veteran and liberated prisoner of war'''

'''Operation:No particular operation'''

'''Place of residence: Romadi Camp 10 and Takrit Camp 17'''<blockquote>When the Fav operation began, there was an unusual enthusiasm in the IRGC for the young men to go to the front. Since our own region, Kurdistan, was an operational zone, the officials wouldn't let us go because it was a dangerous area, even though it had been cleared. We made great efforts to go. Finally, the official in charge of cultural affairs told me to take charge of the propaganda for the entire brigade before deployment and go there as the propaganda officer. I accepted. When the deployment began, we went with the deployed brigade to the operational area and gathered a number of people as a battalion. We formed a cohesive battalion, which the division officials in the southern operational area had prepared, and became part of that battalion. Within the battalion, tasks were divided, and I was appointed as the deputy company commander. We had prepared ourselves for the operation. One or two days before our operation, we, a group of 9 people, were taken to the salt factory area in the operational zone to familiarize ourselves with the area. The next night, we set out to execute the regional operation. During the operation, my comrades and I crossed the water. They had previously announced that the water level was low and shallow, but it was not. During the operation, the water was right up to our heads because there were many blast holes. We were stuck in a terrible quagmire. Despite everything, our forces stood their ground and moved in a column. The column was reaching the other side when the Iraqis noticed us, and shooting began. Our forces, most of whom were in the water, reached the coastline under enemy fire with great difficulty. It was such a terrible situation! We could neither retreat nor defend ourselves. Yet, we formed a defensive line in the water and reached the shore with heavy casualties. I was the last one because I was bringing up the rear to ensure they were not stuck and left behind in the water. We had to gather everyone together. We reached the shore. On the shore, the martyrs were identified, and we determined the path for the uninjured forces to achieve our main objective. Our main objective was to link up a 90-degree line with our 90-degree left flank to connect these two battalions and take the control of the operational line from the Iraqis. We started it with a group of thirty to forty people. We entered the Iraqi bunkers with the initial group. As I was the keeper of the operation's code, I had to reach the left-flank battalion to announce the operation code and the link-up code so that the battalions and lines could be connected, and the entire axis would fall into our hands. I went from bunker to bunker alone until I reached the line we needed to reach. I entered an open bunker. There was a Iraqi there appearing to be dead; I sat on his body. This Iraqi on whose stomach I was sitting, was only shamming dead as it transpired a bit later. I was looking at my map with the flares the Iraqis had thrown into the air to see how much was left until I reached the target area. At that moment, one of the Islamic militia members, Sergeant Esmaeili, who was from Miandoab, arrived. . We sat back to back, and now I felt more at ease that no one would surprise us from behind. A few moments passed, and Sergeant Esmaeili said, "The Iraqi is alive," because he was sitting closer to the Iraqi's head, and I was on his belly. When he saw the Iraqi's eye and eyelid movement, he said, "Haji, he's alive." I said, "Don't be afraid, I've been here a long time. If he were alive, he could have at least dealt me with a knife." A few moments passed, and apparently, this Iraqi had understood our conversation and tried to get up. We saved ourselves with great difficulty and finished him off with a bullet. Then we both moved to that 90-degree angle. Later, one of the radio operator's assistants also arrived. Now there were three of us and we reached the desired angle, but there was no code at that point. It turned out the battalion hadn't connected there, and we didn't know. And it hadn't been announced to us by radio that that battalion hadn't occupied that spot. Now, as it was dark and we could not see and identify the shooters we got the impression that our own guys were shooting, we wanted to tell them the code, but they turned around and saw us, and we waited for a reply that wasn't announced. We sat smelling a rat we suddenly found ourselves surrounded by the Iraqis, and a flare blasted above our heads, illuminated us. We were about 2 to 3 meters away from the Iraqi soldiers, and there was no bunker; we were sitting next to the embankment. In this situation, up to that moment, we had succeeded in taking the line and linking up, but there and then we were captured by Ba'athist forces. At that moment, one of my comrades said, "Haji, should we surrender or keep fighting?" The decision was very difficult. The responsibility was mine. If I had ordered them to shoot, they would have done so, and their martyrdom would have been a sure thing. We had to preserve our forces for ourselves, our society, our religion, and our future generations. Reluctantly, I ordered, "Don't shoot." It was a very difficult decision; I made the decision with great difficulty in a few seconds, and the Iraqis were shouting, "Get up, get up..." Finally, the three of us were captured and taken to their rear bunker. It was 3:30 – 4 am when we were captured, and in the morning, they put us in a jeep with 2 or 3 other prisoners who had been stationed at that corner of the axis. From there, some of our own battalion members were also put in the jeep, and they took us to their rear base<ref name=":0" />.</blockquote>'''Sample 5'''

'''Mohammad Reza Sedighi'''

'''Registered Veteran and Liberated Prisoner of War'''

'''Operation: Badr'''<blockquote>Location of captivity: Romadi Camp 3 (Camp 9), Camp 8 (Al Anbar, known as Anbar), and Takrit 17 The twenty-third of Esfand arrived. On a road that stretched along the edge of the marsh, hundreds of tanks, like herds of elephants, each approximately ten meters apart, were rapidly advancing to quickly reach the battlefield or in a manner of speaking the slaughterhouse. From six to eight in the morning, we were continuously trapped under heavy fire. A hell had broken loose. Mortars, artillery, caliber rounds, and machine gun fire hit the ground inch by inch, and constantly the shouts of "Ya Mahdi, Ya Fatemeh, and Ya Hussein" from my comrades could be heard and then faded. Dust and smoke had covered everything. In every corner, someone had fallen and was groaning. There was no way out. One meter from us there was water, and inside it was full of barbed wire and all sorts of obstacles. Nothing could be done. The fire was so heavy that we could do nothing but take cover in foxholes. The sound of tank treads grew louder every moment. There was still no sign of fresh forces. We neither had ammunition nor supplies. All the water-bottles were empty, and the enemy had adopted a specific array since last night until morning, as if they had made up their mind to finish the job before noon. The Iraqis had attacked with full force. Bullets rained down on us from land and air. At eight in the morning, the war horn blew again, and the banks of Hur-ol-azim Marsh were filled with the torn bodies of Islamic militia members. Small and large pools of blood punctuated the edges of the marsh waters. It was 8:30 am, and I was constantly requesting reinforcements from Ahramian. Shabanali Sadeghian [8] picked up his machine gun and poised to provide suppressive fire on the left flank. Just as he was about to jump over the embankment to easily fire, a tank caliber round from the tanks opposite hit him, throwing him in front of my bunker. He was saying his prayers when several direct shots also hit his body. His mumbling ceased. I watched him like that and thought to myself that Shabanali, too, had been martyred. Amin came right after him and was also martyred. I don't know how it was, everyone came and got martyred except for unfortunate me, who was at the very front. Mohammad Ali Dashti was also martyred. I was ashamed to give orders to anyone anymore. I had to do something. I couldn't just stand by and watch my comrade`s martyrdom. I took Habibollah Hasanabadi, Hossein Rezapour, Bagher Heydari, and a few other guys, and somehow we managed to jumped over the embankment. We started firing our RPGs, Kalashnikovs, and 60mm mortars at the Iraqis who were positioned on this side of the embankment. Sadegh Pishdad, one of the younger guys, found one of the commando 60mm mortars and a box of ammunition and ran towards us. I volunteered to fire the mortar. After this, I was surprised to notice that the Iraqis seemed to be scared by our sudden fire and retreated a bit, but then they came forward again. I stood up and aimed the RPG at the tank. The rocket hit the body of the tank and shattered, but the tank did not explode! It was a T-72 tank, and the RPG-7 was no match for it! A tank caliber round passed right under my hand and hit Bagher Heydari's [9] face and jaw, turning his jaw upside down. It was a heartbreaking scene. The flesh of his face was protruding, and nothing of his face was recognizable. From his lip to his ear, it was torn. Two of the Imam Ali battalion's men stood up and gathered the flesh, put it back on his face, and secured it with Ergals. Bagher Heydari was lying on the ground, writhing in pain, but he couldn't scream. Bagher Heydari had helped me in every way he could, both firing and loading rockets, and giving them to me to shoot or shooting them himself.I resumed shooting and fired an RPG. My ears were hurting for having fired so many RPGs. Helicopters and planes were firing from above, and T-72 tanks were firing from the front. The al-Ghadir fighters, who had made a pact with their Imam and refused to retreat over the bodies of their comrades, continued to resist. The voice of Martyr Jafarzadeh echoed in my ears, "Resist, the culture-loving forces are on the way!" But after a day had passed, there was still no news of any forces! I dragged Bagher Heydari and Hossein Akhoondzadeh [10], who had been shot below the heart, to a corner where they wouldn't be in the Iraqis' line of fire. Hossein Rezapour, one of the fighters from Naimabad, changed his magazine and stood up to open fire on the Iraqis when a caliber bullet hit him directly in the eye. His eyeball was hanging out. It was a truly ghastly scene that cannot be described! Agha Mashallah Heydari showed great courage and stood up to fire several RPGs. He was a Seyyed. I don't know what prayers he said while firing the RPGs that they all hit the targets. The Iraqis retreated about 300 meters again. Our radio communication was cut off. We were still engaged when Ali Arabi came next to me and said: - Brother Sedighi, fire is coming from this side too! I looked in that direction and said: - You're mistaken, man! Where? I don`t see a thing. They would fire a volley and then fall silent again. They wanted to take a triangular corner and establish themselves so that they could then easily open fire and capture us. On one side, we were pursuing the enemy, and on the other, they were pursuing us. The Iraqis started firing another volley. Many of our fighters were martyred right there.From a distance, my eyes fell upon the pilgrims; suddenly a bullet hit the leg of a pilgrim and he fell to the ground. I thought to myself that the pilgrim that is a civilian had also been martyred. I was the only survivor of the battalion. The firing temporarily ceased. The Iraqis we were chasing returned. Bullets were being fired at us from all sides. Tanks slowly advanced. The T-72 tank's caliber never stopped firing for a moment. We were completely surrounded. Meanwhile, a caliber bullet hit my right arm. Suddenly I was on fire. It felt as if my arm had been severed. A paramedic arrived and tightly bandaged it with a roll of gauze. Although I was in pain, I had no choice but to fight and find a way to escape the encirclement. The least I could do was to try saving the lives of my remaining comrades. We had Iraqis on three sides and a swamp on one side. Nothing could be done. We were badly stranded on all sides. Some of my comrades got mixed up with the Iraqis. What a situation it became. Everyone was shooting in every direction. Imam Hussein's division had completely retreated, and some of our men had managed to retreat with them. Imam Hussein's division left only one battalion there to resist so that the others could withdraw. But retreating was impossible now. There was no way out. We had no hope of salvation either. I put my trust in God. Our comrades almost started hand-to-hand combat, although most were wounded and nothing could be done, and they were being captured one by one. I didn't want to be captured. I had two armed forces orders from the IRGC and an operations calque with me.The compass was still attached to my waist. I couldn't bring myself to part with these things. Agha Mashallah Heidari came beside me and reached out to detach the compass from me. He pulled the compass off and threw it into the swamp on the right, but the compass pouch was entangled in the tongue of my belt and wouldn't get detached. I took out my wallet, which contained pictures of my children and my IRGC ID, and threw them into the swamps. There was no time to see the pictures of my daughter and son one last time.The Iraqis gathered around us. They motioned for us to drop our weapons. A personnel carrier quickly pulled up beside us. One of the Iraqis, who had probably seen me firing an RPG, came over and said something to the Iraqi officer, pointing at me. Suddenly, one of them drew his weapon to kill me. The Iraqi officer stopped him but then came forward himself and slapped me hard across the face. They wanted us to get into the personnel carrier. We were still standing there. The pain in my arm was getting worse by the moment. Agha Mashallah Heidari still had his rifle without ammunition in his hand. The Iraqi soldier forcibly ''took his weapon. Aqamasallah, who had anticipated that they might execute me at any moment,'' quickly pushed me towards the open door of the Iraqi personnel carrier. He then hopped in behind me. They came into the personnel carrier and tied our hands. My arm was pulled, and pain shot through me<ref>Yazdani, Karamat (2022). Royal Senior. Tehran: [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam Azadeghan], p. 194-201.</ref>.</blockquote>'''Sample 6'''

'''Mohammad Khatibi'''

'''Unregistered Veteran and Liberated POW (Missing in Action)'''

'''Operation: Karbala-7'''

'''Detention Camp: Takrit camps 11 and 18'''<blockquote>Our last deployment was on February 10th, 1987, with the Mahdi (Peace Be Upon His Soul) Corps. After being divided, we entered Khuzestan on February 11th or 12th. We went to the Malek Ashtar Battalion in the 25th Karbala Division. Of course, this was Malek Ashtar Battalion 2, because the previous battalion had been destroyed in Operation Karbala 4. I was both the prayer leader and an RPG bearer. Two days before the operation, several people were selected from the company to go to Kashan to take part in the memorial service of one of the commanders. I was one of those chosen. We got in the car, and I asked, "Well, since we're going to Kashan, will we make it back for the operation or not?" They said the operation might happen sooner. I changed my mind about going to Kashan and got out of the car. That night, March 3rd, 1987, we carried out the operation. During the operation, before reaching the target area, we got stuck in a minefield. Our personnel carriers were destroyed there. There were many anti-personnel mines. Unfortunately, we had lost our way to our operation site, and from 10 PM when we started the operation, until nearly dawn, instead of heading towards Iran, we were going towards Iraq. In the morning, we saw that we were between the first and second Iraqi lines. The interesting point is that on that very night, after a heavy rain, we had entered the Iraqi trenches. After the rain had subsided and we had moved further, we saw a few tanks there. Our comrades had gone and taken cover under the tanks. When it became light in the morning, we realized that they were inside the Iraqi tanks. They had held their tongues lest we should get frightened, and of course, our comrades hadn't gone inside the tanks; they had just taken cover outside, under the tanks. We thought the tanks were empty and just lying there, and we suspected it might belong to our own side. It was almost dark. The guys had lost their way and didn't know where they were going. Near dawn, when the sky brightened, we realized we were surrounded by Iraqis on all sides. our comrades started to defend themselves, and some who knew the escape routes fled. Apparently, only Ali Mahdian, a seminary student from Mazandaran, managed to escape from our group.

We wandered there until morning. In the morning, once the Iraqis succeeded in identifying us as enemy soldiers, they started shooting at us most precisely with sniper rifles as we moved in a column. A bullet hit the company commander's neck, and he was martyred. Another bullet hit me directly, but I was wearing a helmet. Another bullet hit the right side of my head, and my ear began to bleed heavily. I fell into a corner and started reciting "La ilaha illallah(there is no God but Allah)," thinking I was going to be martyred, but martyrdom didn`t come. We had moved forward again. I sat on top of a hill. The second bullet came towards my right side and hit my right ear. It had missed my neck by an inch. I had fallen to the ground. While I was in this state, one of my friends from Amol, who had joined us in Haft Tappeh, said, "Haj Agha, it seems our friends have found a way, let's go." I said, "I am wounded, and bleeding like hell; I cannot go. You go, and I'll see what happens; I'll try to follow you little by little." I limped after them, but there was no way out, and instead, Iraqi soldiers surrounded us. The Iraqis were searching my comrades with many weapons. As soon as their eyes fell on me, they came and searched my pockets. In my right pocket was a Quran, which was a little blood-stained. He took out the Quran and kissed it. He wanted to take it. I said, "I need this Quran." The soldier kissed the Quran and said, "Blood is impure and should not be here." Then he took the Quran and put it in my left pocket. They had gathered our friends there; those who were less heavily injured had their hands and eyes tied. They brought an armored personnel carrier and put us inside.

When we got on the armored personnel carrier, I looked into my pocket and around me. I saw a book of Ziyarat Ashura and a letter I had received from Feyziyeh, along with a picture of myself in clerical attire. I thought, "If these fall into the hands of the Iraqis, it will cause trouble." Right there, I crumpled them up and put them under the seat. Out of an 80-person company, about 30-40 of us were captured, and the rest had been martyred in the same clashes. It was March 3rd, 1987<ref name=":0" />.</blockquote>'''Sample 7'''

'''Abbas Shahriari'''

'''Registered veteran and liberated prisoner of war'''

'''Operation: Kheybar'''

'''Place of residence: Musel Camp 2 (The inhabitants of Kheybar)'''<blockquote>Ali and I were in the same bunker. Ali read out Surah Al-Rahman and Ziyarat Ashura and told me: "If I am martyred and you return, deliver my personal belongings to my family, and when my daughter grows up (she was six months old at the time), tell her that her dad loved her very much." It was almost nine in the morning when the battalion commander issued an order to confront the enemy. Ali and I were responsible for hunting tanks and firing mortars. Our ammunition was limited due to the insecurity of the island road, and we were very careful in using it, but there was no choice; we had to use it should the need arise. The mortar shells ran out. We started hitting tanks with RPG-7s. We hit one or two enemy tanks. They began to retreat. We tried harder to inflict casualties on them. The "Allahu Akbar(God is great)" chants of the boys mingled with the results of these efforts. Not an hour had passed before the enemy advanced again. We realized that in that way, they wanted us to waste our ammunition. The enemy's advance had reached within two hundred meters of us. The boys defended their positions tooth and nail. Ali and I continued hunting tanks . After hitting a tank, as soon as we wanted to change our position so that the enemy wouldn't shoot at us, Ali sighed and slowly fell backward onto the ground. I looked; a caliber bullet had hit Ali's head from behind and exited through his forehead. I quickly called the battalion paramedics and pressed my hand firmly on his forehead. My hand was drenched with blood up to my wrist. The paramedic arrived and bandaged his head. I was on the verge of blacking out. All the memories of that night we were in his bunker flashed through my mind. I didn't want to believe it, but God, it seemed to be happening! The reminder of that promise and vow from that night crushed me. This time, with more zeal and earnestness, I aimed at the Iraqi tanks. It wasn't long before a sound drew my attention to Ali. I turned back; his belt had torn from the pressure of his death throes. I quickly pulled him facing the Qibla(towards Mecca). So that the island's soil wouldn't coat his body, I covered his pure body with the thick plastics we used to spread in the bunker, to return him to the rear in due course. Ali and his timely jokes were still with me. My heart was bleeding, but war was no laughing matter. There was no time for mourning; I had to continue. All-out war with the enemy continued. It was noon. Under enemy fire, , we took turns praying in a sitting position and rapidly. That day, there was no news of lunch. No one thought about hunger. There was no time for delay; we had to move. The only thought and concern of the boys was to push back the enemy; but unfortunately, with the enemy's capabilities, the siege tightened moment by moment to the point where they began using tank shells to destroy the bunkers. After our complete encirclement (ground and air), the Iraqi commander ordered his forces to dismount from the armored personnel carriers. Like ants and locusts, they dismounted from the APCs with their equipment, and with a hand signal from the commander, they threw grenades into the bunkers to eradicate them. I told the person next to me: "These are the final moments; they are wiping out the bunkers. If they throw a grenade into our bunker, we have 30 seconds to throw it out." Davoud Ghasemi came towards our embankment through the dust raised by enemy artillery fire. He was defending another part of the line under the commander's orders and came to our aid due to a shortage of RPG operators. I told Davoud: Ali was martyred. Moments later, while firing an RPG, a direct enemy artillery shell tore him too into four pieces. Each piece was thrown several meters into the air. The memory of last night kept haunting me. Of the three allies, two were martyred! I remained with the smell of the bunker, the remaining scent of those fallen stars, and shimmering of light in the middle of the night! The enemy continued to press on and inflict casualties on us. Gradually, the Iraqi air force also entered the fray. From the sky, they rained bullets on the boys. The battalion commander tried his best to contact the rear and request reinforcements, but the connection was not established. I heard on the radio myself that Imam Khomeini (Peace Be Upon His Soul ) had insisted on the preservation of the Majnoon islands by any means necessary. No one even thought of retreating. The boys' slogan was victory or martyrdom.

As the number of wounded increased, the hope of help from the rear became less and less, and finally ceased. The battalion commander said that any wounded who could return should do so while there was still a little time. Those who were able to move crawled back. It wasn't long before the enemy fired on them. It seemed that each one was shot at least ten to twenty times. The wounded died innocently in the middle of the road. No one else, not even the unscathed ones, were able to retreat. On the other hand, our ammunition was running out. The battalion commander announced face to face that everyone should do whatever they could; from now on, everyone was their own commander and should not wait for his orders. The enemy realized that we no longer had the means to defend ourselves. The tanks moved forward, and reached within a hundred meters of us, and saw no reaction from our side. Gradually, they closed the distance to fifty meters. The three of us were in a trench. We took turns firing the few bullets we had in our magazines at the enemy. It was the turn of an old man, a worker from the Chit-Ray factory. As soon as he stood up to shoot at the enemy, he was hit in the head and martyred. Our encirclement grew ever tighter.

A few minutes later, a grenade was thrown into our trench and landed under the feet of the person next to me. It took more than 30 seconds for him to find the grenade, and it exploded. It was as if two three-phase electrical wires had short-circuited, creating such a flash and an explosive wave that I didn't realize anything. I was unconscious for some time. When I slowly regained consciousness and opened my eyes, I saw that the person next to me had been martyred, and all his organs were scattered. I was also wounded in my left hand, side, and left cheek and was shell-shocked. I lifted my head slightly to assess the situation and saw a tank standing a few meters from me. As soon as they saw I was alive, they started shooting at me. One of the bullets hit my helmet and pierced it. The tank's firing stopped; a few minutes later, Iraqi soldiers from behind put the muzzle of their weapons on my chest, and one of them pulled the keffiyeh from around my neck and dragged me towards the tank that was standing a few meters away. At first, I thought they intended to run the tank over my body, but they didn't do that. Instead, they grabbed my hands and feet and threw me onto the tank. The tank was very hot, and enduring it was very difficult and exhausting. The tank returned towards the enemy front and, after traveling a few hundred meters, got stuck in the mud and stopped moving.

The Iraqis transferred me from the tank to the back of a Toyota pickup truck. I looked around and saw some of my battalion mates inside the vehicle. Only two of them were unharmed<ref>Shahriyari, Abbas (2018). Me, Davood, Ali. Tehran: [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam Azadeghan], p.31-36.

</ref>.</blockquote>'''Sample 8'''

'''Seyed Ahmad Gheshmi'''

'''Registered veteran and freed prisoner of war'''

'''Captivity region: Tilehkuh'''

'''Place of residence: Mosul camps 3 and 4, and Ramadi 6'''<blockquote>Small and large news was heard from the western borders. Iraq had attacked parts of Khosravi and Sarpol-e Zahab border areas. It was planned that some of the IRGC members would go towards the western borders. Our main mission was to visit and evaluate the border areas. We wanted to monitor the situation in Qasr-e Shirin and also the intermediate outposts, such as Pataq and Tilehkuh. The mission of the Hamadan IRGC members was to be stationed in the Tilehkuh and Gerdnou outposts in Sarpol-e Zahab. Out of twenty of us, thirteen moved towards Qasr-e Shirin. When we arrived, we went to the Tilehkuh outpost and settled there. Tilehkuh, in the Sarpol-e Zahab region, was an old, dilapidated, and abandoned outpost. This area was only about two to three hundred meters away from the Iraqi border barbed wire. After us, a company from the Sarpol-e Zahab 3rd Armored Brigade, with four tanks, came there. The company and their tanks were stationed behind the earthworks that had been prepared beforehand. We wanted to return after evaluating the area; Iraq's full-scale attack did not allow it. Iraq had attacked by land and air with several regular divisions and the best military equipment and advanced weapons... . The Tilehkuh outpost was very worn out and dilapidated. Hajj Hamid Norouzi [10] had ordered us to build a collective foxhole [11]. We had been there for three days. No one knew what Iraq had in store for us. It was the last night of Shahrivar. The sound of Iraqi military vehicles coming and going could be heard until morning. We thought they were night patrol forces; we did not know that during the night, four armored divisions with all their equipment and military formation had been stationed in the valley between us. The dilapidated Tila-Kuh outpost was already in a sorry state. There was no need for mortars; the outpost itself was on the verge of collapse. With successive mortar shellings, the last vestiges of the outpost's strength were lost. The best course of action was to evacuate the outpost and save the meager military equipment we had! We moved the equipment to the foxhole bunker. A few of the guys were guarding behind the outpost's earthworks. Until the morning of the first of Mehr (September 23rd), the sound of mortar fire didn't cease for a single moment. The four pillars of the outpost trembled from the sound of the mortar barrage. War was an uninvited guest. How could we have known it would turn out like this? In that vicinity, no safe shelter could be found for the guys. Our only shelter was that foxhole bunker. Sleeplessness and the continuous sound of mortars had drained the guys' strength and energy.

The September sun still had its summer warmth and was hesitant to leave. In contrast to the Iraqi vehicles that stood fully equipped in the Tila-Kuh plain, our outpost was devoid of military equipment and our own forces. It was eleven in the morning when the Iraqi attack began. Bullets raced each other. The sky of Tila-Kuh was no longer blue. The roar of Iraqi tanks filled everywhere. The chest of the plain had no safe spot from the intensity of the enemy's shelling. Tila-Kuh was filled with hundreds of tanks, armored personnel carriers, direct-fire artillery, and dozens of other types of armored vehicles. Four Iraqi divisions were arrayed from end to end, facing thirteen IRGC members and one army company.

We only had a few useless Ghasseh weapons and three or four working rifles. Hajj Hamid Norouzi also had a Kalashnikov. Other than that, the most important weapon we had was an RPG, in the hands of Martyr Morteza Olaj [12]; because he was the only one who knew how to use it well. After the Iraqi attack, even our few bullets and ammunition ran out; only Martyr Olaj still had a few RPG rounds. While we fired sparingly and calculatedly, the Iraqis' extravagance was boundless. If we were in their shoes, perhaps we would have done the same. We were pinned down. The enemy's cavalry and infantry had taken our breath away. Tileh Kooh outpost, with its small number of personnel, was surrounded. All night, until the outpost was completely surrounded, we had fired our last bullet. There were no more bullets left. Each of us only had one weapon and an empty magazine. We reluctantly took cover in the foxhole. Along the region, infantry forces stood step by step. This small number, against four armed divisions, had no opportunity or possibility for any resistance. The enemy's forces and ammunition outweighed ours<ref>Ghal'eghavand, Farzaneh (2019). Time Stood Still. Tehran: [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam Azadeghan], p. 197.</ref>.</blockquote>

== Footnote ==
[1]. A fifth column refers to a group of people within the main society who secretly collaborate with enemies or undermine the larger group to which they are ostensibly loyal. This term has been common in military and political discourse since the Spanish Civil War. The term "fifth column" is virtually synonymous with [[espionage]] in meaning and concept; however, the difference is that a spy works to the detriment and harm of a foreigner, and does not disregard the benefit and interest of their own nation and country, even at the cost of their life; whereas a fifth column does not convey this meaning, but rather its members, knowingly or unknowingly, work to the detriment and harm of their own people and to the benefit of foreigners<ref>Taken from Persian Wikipedia. Available at <nowiki>https://fa.wikipedia.org/wiki/</nowiki>

</ref>. During the imposed war, the enemy's fifth column referred to mercenary traitors and internal eclectic and deviant leftist and rightist parties and groups who acted as infiltrating forces for the enemy and... The prime examples of the enemy's fifth column were political groups hostile to the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization, the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, Komalah, and monarchists. These groups, in addition to gathering information for the enemy, also carried out military actions in Kurdistan and Kermanshah<ref>Andisheh Qom Website, Center for Studies and Answering Doubts of Qom Seminary.</ref>.

[2]. United Nations Peacekeeping Forces

[3]. The unknown martyr of captivity, Mohammad Farnaghi, was from a village in Khomein. We were together in the engineering battalion of the 77th Victorious Khorasan Division and were captured together. In 1989, when infectious diseases spread among the children of Camp Tikrit 16, he became severely ill. Due to the negligence of the Iraqis and the delay in sending him to the hospital, Mohammad's body became so weak that he eventually passed away.

[4]. The late freed prisoner, Davood Golmakani, was the commander of the engineering battalion and a senior force from Khorasan who passed away in 2011.

[5]. In a hidden part of Tikrit 5 camp, as well as the short-term Nahrawan camp, there were missing prisoners of war who were transferred to other camps before their release and the presence of Red Cross representatives.

[6]. Later, we realized that the division headquarters had been completely surrounded by the Iraqis, and there was no possibility of contact with them; in fact, the commanders of the brigades and battalions were acting independently.

[7]. Sha'banali Sadeghian was captured while suffering from a severed spinal cord.

[8]. Baqer Heidari, a veteran and freed prisoner of war, was captured in the same operation while wounded.

[9]. Martyr Hossein Akhundzadeh was martyred after his release due to the same injury.

[10]. The then-commander of the IRGC in Hamadan

[11]. This type of trench has an entrance and exit from both sides.

[12]. Martyr Morteza Olanj, the first trench guard, the first scout, and the first martyr of the Hamadan IRGC, fought with only an RPG until the last moment and until the last bullet he had in his quiver. After firing all his bullets, he threw himself into the heart of the enemy and continued fighting until he finally achieved the exalted status of martyrdom. No trace of this esteemed martyr has been found. During ten years of captivity, we repeatedly wrote to his [[family]] about his martyrdom through various methods, but they did not believe it and continued to wait with anticipation.

== See also ==
• Captivity and captives

• Prisoners of war

• Camp

== References ==

Captivity, Prisoners of War, and Liberated Prisoners of War in the Press

2026-09-01T08:46:08Z

Marjan-khanlari:

'''Reflection of news and reports related to prisoners of war and liberated prisoners of war in domestic newspapers and publications.'''
[[File:Liberated prisoners of War in Keyhan.png|thumb|Liberated prisoners of War in Keyhan]]

== From the beginning of the imposed war until the acceptance of the resolution ==
[[File:Liberated Prisoners of War in the Press .png|thumb|Liberated Prisoners of War in the Press ]]
On September 22, 1980 (Shahrivar 31, 1359), Iraq launched an attack on the Islamic Republic of Iran from three fronts, with the strategy of "heavy initial assault" followed by negotiations based on "new conditions," imposing the longest conventional war of the 20th century on our country. Utilizing the element of surprise, the Iraqi army occupied over 20,000 square kilometers of Iranian territory during the initial days of the attack, including many cities and villages (Mohammad Daroudian's website, war history researcher, quoting Brigadier General Mehrabi, Deputy Intelligence Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces), and with the aim of gaining superiority in future negotiations, took defenders and ordinary people in border cities and villages into captivity<ref>Habiban, Mohammad Hasan and Asgari, Shadab (2014). Iraqi Prisoners or Guests. 2nd ed. Tehran: Organization for the Preservation of the Values of the Sacred Defense of AJA, p. 41.

</ref>.

The Iraqi army, despite claiming to be engaged in an unavoidable and defensive war, took the disabled, sick, and elderly residents of cities and villages as prisoners of war, mistreated them, and refused to register many of them with the International Red Cross<ref>Alaei, Hossein (2012). The Trend of the Iran-Iraq War. Vol. 1. Tehran: Marzoboom, pp. 218 and 230.</ref><ref name=":0">Aghaei, Abbas and Rostami, Fatemeh (2014). Side by Side with . Memoirs of the Liberated Brigadier General Abdollah Najafi, 2nd ed. Tehran: Islamic Revolution Document Center, p. 97.

</ref>. Domestic media, spearheaded by the three widely circulated newspapers of the capital (Keyhan, Ettela'at, and Jomhouri Eslami), along with other publications, showed sensitivity to the issue of Iranian prisoners of war from the beginning of the imposed war over a 22-year period. Through responsible follow-up and timely and favorable coverage of news and reports related to them, they provided moral support for humanitarian actions that led to the determination of their status, facilitation of their living conditions, and their release. In times of necessity, they also confronted the propaganda machine of the Ba'athist enemy and its allies (at that time, the newspapers Enghelab Eslami, Bamdad, Azadeghan, Mizan, and Abrar also covered this issue and echoed the three leading newspapers in defending the human rights of prisoners, just as this trend continued later with the publication of newspapers such as Salam, Resalat, Hamshahri, Iran, and others). The media's objective in this regard was to expose the brutal behavior of the Iraqi government towards Iranian prisoners, compel Baghdad's rulers to comply with international conventions to recognize the rights of prisoners of war, to explain the social status of prisoners to public opinion, and to create a suitable environment for their earlier and easier release. In this context, the media, taking the initiative within the framework of the war propaganda management system's discretion, produced and reflected diverse news and reports, forming a front to counter the enemy's propaganda front and its supporters.

== The first news to reach publications ==
In the months leading up to the imposed war, when the Iraqi army was causing insecurity in some border areas and cities with its provocative actions, even in the early days of the imposed war, due to the prevailing conditions in the country's public sphere, news with local and sometimes unreliable sources found its way into the pages of the press. The continuation of this trend could have had negative consequences and ultimately led to the weakening of the national defense morale. Such news, by forming a bleak picture, pushed society into inactivity and caused an atmosphere of fear and despair. However, with the vigilance of officials and the cooperation of all stakeholders and media professionals, the continuation of this trend was stopped very quickly, and news related to the war was published after being confirmed by official sources. Thus, the first news on the subject of captivity, as a hegemonic strategy and as the first propaganda axis in the framework of comprehensive confrontation with enemy aggression, was published thirteen days after the start of the war. This axis was first propounded by the highest executive official of the country, the then Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali Rajai, in a speech from the podium of the United Nations, addressing the Security Council. In this speech, he states: "The Iraqi regime has abducted civilians and ordinary citizens living in border towns and villages and is taking them as prisoners, torturing and killing them along with prisoners of war.

In the continuation of his speech, Mohammad-Ali Rajai calls for an investigation into the war crimes of the Iraqi ruling regime and effective action by international bodies to prevent such inhumane acts<ref name=":1">Archives of the newspapers Jomhouri Eslami, Keyhan, Ettela'at, Abrar, Salam, etc., and the magazines Saf, Azadegan, and Pasdar-e Eslam.

</ref>. Excerpts from the then-head of government's remarks were reflected in mass media, including widely circulated newspapers, and for several days became the subject of columnists and news for domestic media.

Two weeks later, the news of the capture of Mohammad Javad Tondguyan, the Minister of Oil of the Islamic Republic of Iran, along with several companions, including one of his deputies, Seyyed Mohsen Yahyavi, created a new responsibility for the country's press. For several consecutive days, it occupied one of the top half-page headlines of most daily newspapers; also, dozens of news pieces, reports, and interviews were produced and sent to print, with the central theme of most published materials being the responsibility of the Ba'athist regime of Iraq and relevant international bodies for the lives of the hostages<ref name=":1" />.

After the news wave of the oil minister's capture subsided, on March 30th, 1981, a short news item was published in Keyhan newspaper about efforts to exchange wounded and disabled Iranian and Iraqi prisoners. On June 17th and August 27th of the same year, news of the release and exchange of a number of disabled and sick Iranian prisoners of war with a group of Iraqi prisoners was published on two occasions. Following the release of these liberated prisoners, a morning newspaper, Jomhuri-e Eslami, and an evening newspaper, Ettela'at, began to publish their memoirs in serial form. At this stage, the weekly magazines Soroush and Shahed, and the monthly magazines Saf and Pasdar-e Islam, also joined in and exposed the inhumane treatment of Iranian prisoners by the Iraqi Ba'athist regime. During this period, the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross was invited to Iran by the head of the Red Crescent to hear the statements of the released Iranian prisoners, at least one-third of whom were ordinary citizens of border towns and villages. Coinciding with his presence in Tehran, the press published documented reports of mistreatment of Iranian prisoners and coordinately printed images of an elderly woman who had been taken captive by the Iraqi army and was among the exchanged prisoners<ref name=":1" />.

The head of the International Committee of the Red Cross, despite hearing the statements of newly released Iranian prisoners and observing numerous pieces of concrete evidence confirming the violation of international conventions regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, refused to take even the slightest stance on the inhumane treatment of Iranian prisoners by the Iraqi government. This significant silence, in practice, provided a great opportunity for the Baghdad regime to continue with its crimes, and also led to pessimism among the country's officials and elites regarding the integrity and impartiality of international institutions. Naturally, this perception also found its way into the country's propaganda system, including domestic media, and consequently, from this point on, Iran's relations with international institutions, including the global Red Cross, soured and entered a new phase, a process consisting of many ups and downs until the end of the war. In line with this behavior, renowned global media also published very little news regarding the torture of Iranian prisoners and the blatant violation of international laws, and by their silence, effectively followed the Red Cross's practice. Following this event, the War Propaganda Headquarters, in order to break the media silence, invited a number of high-circulation Western media outlets and regional countries to visit Iran and directly understand the facts and take action to introduce the true face of the Ba'athist regime of Iraq. At the same time, the Supreme Defense Council unilaterally released a number of disabled and sick Iraqi prisoners and simultaneously created conditions for Iraqi prisoners to meet their families in their detention camps. The least impact of these measures, if adequately reflected in the global media, would have been to break the propaganda atmosphere against our country, which would have reduced Iraq's mistreatment of Iranian prisoners. However, this strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, although fully supported by domestic media and its dimensions reflected through various reports, especially visual reports, did not receive much coverage in foreign publications<ref name=":1" />.

== Confronting the Iraqi Regime's New Tactic ==
On the other hand, the Baghdad regime, in an attempt to downplay Iran's humanitarian actions, especially regarding the unilateral release of sick Iraqi prisoners, launched a new propaganda maneuver. By inviting journalists and cameramen from India, Pakistan, Greece, France, Italy, and other countries, it tried to confront them with young Iranian prisoners. Through this, it aimed to promote the narrative that Iran's basis in the war with Iraq was to expand the influence of its religious-revolutionary ideas in the region, and to achieve this goal, it even recruited underage students, thereby mobilizing public opinion against Iran. This propaganda line could position Iraq in the spotlight of Western and Arab countries as the frontline against the export of the Islamic Revolution, garnering their political and military support. However, the political-propaganda ploy of the Ba'athist Iraqi regime, launched with the motive of undermining the national and legitimate defense of the Iranian people, did not go unanswered. The War Propaganda Headquarters took retaliatory action and organized an intelligent effort to enlighten public opinion on a broad scale, with domestic media playing a significant role in this regard. Domestic newspapers, dedicating considerable effort and resources, designed and implemented various themes, among which publicizing the mistreatment of Iranian prisoners by Iraqis and emphasizing the Baghdad regime's violation of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions regarding the rights of prisoners of war were prominent<ref name=":1" />.

Another area that the domestic press designed and implemented in this regard and at this juncture was questioning the indifference of the International Red Cross towards the Iraqi government's behavior contrary to international regulations concerning Iranian prisoners of war. In this regard, ETTELA'AT newspaper, in an influential note, asked this committee to publish a report on its members' visits to Iranian POW camps in Iraq and not to support the crimes of the Iraqi regime with biased silence. In this note, Iranian prisoners were referred to as "Azadegan" (liberated ones) for the first time<ref name=":1" />.

Following the wave created by the domestic press, 500 [[family]] members of prisoners staged a sit-in in front of the International Red Cross representative office, demanding serious action from this organization in line with its inherent duties. Alongside this movement, Keyhan newspaper published a shocking report on the brutal tortures inflicted on Iranian prisoners in Iraq and revealed that during the occupation of border cities, the Iraqi army had taken the disabled and incapacitated individuals who failed to escape as prisoners of war<ref name=":1" />. In such circumstances, after a long silence, the International Red Cross officially announced that Iraq was refusing to show Iranian prisoners to Red Cross representatives and that 74 Iranian civilian prisoners were being held in only one Baghdad prison<ref name=":1" />.

At that juncture, the stance of the International Red Cross provided a suitable opportunity for the Islamic Republic of Iran to emerge from a media boycott by mainstream media, allowing the country's officials to expand their cross-border information activities. During this period, the War Propaganda Headquarters was tasked with inviting journalists from high-circulation publications in several Asian and European countries to observe the conditions of Iraqi prisoners of war in camps within Iran and compare their situation with that of Iranian prisoners held in Iraq. This initiative by Iran proved effective, and following the publication of positive reports in some foreign journals regarding the humane treatment of Iraqi prisoners by the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Iraqi government was compelled to respond. This led to an unprecedented and, at the same time, hypocritical action, where, for the first time, in an attempt to present a humanitarian image of itself, Iraq released 100 sick and disabled Iranian prisoners<ref name=":1" />.

However, in the political dimension, in response to the statements of the representative of the International Red Cross, regarding the possession of civilian prisoners and Iraq's concealment of Iranian prisoners, the Baghdad government refused to accept the representatives of the International Red Cross Committee and in effect prevented them from investigating the situation of Iranian prisoners. In an authoritarian maneuver, backed up by the major powers, they forced the Red Cross to prepare a new, and of course incomplete and one-sided, report. With the publication of the new Red Cross report, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in an official letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, demanded the correction of the Red Cross Committee's report based on facts<ref name=":1" />. At this point, the domestic press once again entered the arena and, by raising the legitimate demands of the Islamic Republic of Iran, created an effective news wave against the unilateral action of the International Red Cross. Simultaneously with these actions and in line with following up and addressing the complaints of the families of prisoners and missing persons, a committee was formed and submitted the families' complaints as legally actionable documents to international bodies. The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran also issued a statement addressed to the UN delegation to Iraq, requesting that during its mission, it obtain and provide clear information on the status of 20,000 missing persons and 7,800 Iranian prisoners<ref name=":1" />. The Iranian government did not remain content with this action, and the Deputy Minister for International Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs documented cases of the Iraqi regime's ill-treatment of Iranian prisoners and reiterated Iran's request to the UN delegation<ref name=":1" />.

The Iraqi press, in response to Iran's actions, published numerous reports on services provided to Iranian prisoners of war, including literacy [[education]] for underage prisoners of war, accompanied by sarcastic and humiliating remarks, thus engaging in a confrontation. In response to this action taken by Iraqi media, Iran's permanent representative at the United Nations, in a press conference, proposed an exchange of prisoners of war under 16 and disabled ones, and declared Iran's readiness to implement humanitarian affairs<ref name=":1" />. Although the media coverage of this meeting somewhat deprived the Iraqi side of propaganda opportunities, the Iraqi government, in a childish and stubborn act, resorted to an unethical show of force by parading Iranian prisoners captured in Operation Badr through the streets of Baghdad. The Iraqi press also extensively photographed and reported on the POW parade. With the issue of the liberated prisoners escalating, the then-President of Iran intervened and strongly criticized international organizations for not pursuing the fate of civilian prisoners held in Iraq. Following the explicit stance of the country's highest political authority, the War Propaganda Headquarters, with a view to maximizing the President's statements in global media, held a meeting attended by foreign diplomats residing in Tehran and domestic and foreign journalists, and exposed the inhumane nature of the Iraqi Ba'ath regime's treatment of Iranian prisoners<ref name=":1" />. The Iraqi Ba'ath regime, to neutralize this Iranian action, immediately released 30 disabled Iranian prisoners along with a propaganda uproar in its domestic and aligned media, and announced the arrival of 2000 letters from the families of Iranian prisoners.

In the midst of the competition between the Iranian and Iraqi press to influence global public opinion, a transnational center was established at the initiative of the then Prime Minister. This center, with the participation of families of prisoners of war and missing persons, aimed to address the humanitarian issues of prisoners of war and take necessary measures to alleviate the sufferings of Iranian prisoners. It was intended to act as a non-governmental organization to pursue the demands of their families<ref name=":1" />.

At this juncture, the Guardian's report on the camp for Iranian POWs in Iraq was among the few articles published in Western journals that, with a mild tone, addressed some of the realities concerning the camp life of Iranian POWs. At a time when most Western media outlets were influenced by the media campaigns of the Iraqi government and other enemies of Iran, this report tried to remain neutral. It is not unlikely that the unilateral release of 29 disabled and sick Iranian prisoners by Iraq, immediately after the publication of The Guardian's report<ref>The Guardian, July 24, 1985: 6

</ref>, was a reflection of it. In any case, as a result of visits by families of Iranian POWs and missing persons, requests for follow-up and attention from the International Red Cross, and parallel effective actions by the Red Crescent and the country's diplomacy, alongside the efforts of domestic media, the Red Cross Committee finally stated in a report that Iraq had violated the Geneva Convention regarding the treatment of prisoners of war<ref name=":1" />. In response to this statement, and to show goodwill, the Iranian government immediately released a group of Iraqi prisoners and simultaneously urged the International Red Cross to investigate the issue of hidden Iranian prisoners and the non-repatriation of civilian prisoners by the Iraqi side. At the same time, the Iraqi government also reciprocated by theatrically releasing 55 Iranian prisoners<ref name=":1" />. Following these developments, Iran established new relations based on goodwill and interaction with the International Red Cross, the first reflection of which was the reopening of the Red Cross office in Tehran after a period of strained and cold relations.

Dr. Dastjerdi, the then Secretary-General of the Red Crescent Society of the Islamic Republic of Iran, welcomed the new atmosphere and called for the simultaneous exchange of all disabled and elderly Iranian and Iraqi prisoners, mediated by the Red Cross. In this regard, a plan was prepared by the Secretary of the Supreme Defense Council and presented for this purpose<ref name=":1" />. The then government, in parallel with serious and continuous follow-ups on issues pertaining to Iranian prisoners within the framework of diplomatic relations, submitted a comprehensive plan to the Islamic Consultative Assembly in the autumn of 1987, providing the basis for resolving financial problems and addressing the welfare affairs of the families of liberated prisoners and missing persons, alongside other veterans, to ensure principled service delivery to this segment of the veteran community<ref name=":1" />.

== Background of the Collective Exchange of Prisoners and the Reflection of the Return of Liberated Prisoners in the Country's Press ==
Following the historic decision of Imam Khomeini (PBUHS) to end the eight-year war through a political solution instead of a military one, Iran officially accepted UN Security Council Resolution 598 on July 18th, 1988 (27th Tir 1367), one year after its adoption, and announced the news in the first news broadcast via [[radio]] and television.

Despite accepting the resolution, the Iraqi government, immediately after its approval, in response to Iran's acceptance, refused to adhere to its previous agreement, childishly mentioning Iran's military superiority at the time the resolution was issued and the moral impact of this superiority on its provisions. It hastily launched extensive military operations and resumed its attacks by land and air against our country. The Iraqi army, by expanding aerial attacks against economic targets in cities and mercantile ships in the Persian Gulf, as well as organizing a comprehensive sally from the west and south deep into our country's territory on July 22nd, 1988, sought to compensate for the humiliation of the war years and to end the war in its favor. As a result, although these attacks were met with a crushing response from Iranian fighters, in addition to inflicting significant material and moral damage, they took approximately 10,000 Iranian forces into captivity to approach an equal number of prisoners. Finally, the Iraqi Ba'athist regime, observing the widespread uprising of Iranians, in order to preserve its military capability and the futility of continuing its mischief, accepted a ceasefire one month later on August 19th, 1988, and ended its major military movements.

With the establishment of the ceasefire, various committees were formed under the United Nations to implement the provisions of the resolution, and Ataollah Mohajerani was appointed by Iran as the head of the Prisoners Committee. The first round of negotiations between Iran and Iraq, led by Jan Eliasson, the representative of the UN Secretary-General, began on August 25th, 1988, in Geneva, and from the outset, faced disputes over the priorities of each party. Iraq wanted to prioritize the dredging of the Arvand Rud (Shatt al-Arab) and the possibility of navigation in this waterway before any other action, to emerge from the naval stalemate as soon as possible and to organize its economic situation. Iran, however, emphasized the priority of the complete withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Iranian territory and the exchange of prisoners based on the order of the resolution's provisions, considering these two to be more important than the dredging of the Arvand Rud. Thus, the first round of negotiations ended in failure after two weeks, and no agreement was reached<ref>Velayati, Ali Akbar (1997). Political History of the Imposed War of Iraq on Iran. Tehran: Office of Islamic Culture Publication.</ref>. During this period, and during the Geneva negotiations, and while the ceasefire was in effect and Iranian army personnel were present in the region unarmed, the Iraqi Ba'athist army, in a surprise move contrary to all international norms, captured 600 Iranian army personnel to gain leverage in the peace negotiations.

The next round of negotiations began on October 2nd, 1988, first in New York and then continued in Geneva, lasting until early 1990, but yielded no desirable results. The Iraqi side's introduction of diversionary topics and demands for concessions, aimed at achieving political goals that it had failed to secure through war, prevented the attainment of a favorable outcome.

During this period, the global media landscape shifted somewhat in Iran's favor; at one point (October 1988), by order of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, the country's mass media, which had been among the media supporters of the Baghdad regime during the war, were prohibited from campaigning against Iran<ref>Hashemi Rafsanjani, Akbar (2013). End of Defense, Beginning of Reconstruction / Record and Memoirs of 1988. Tehran: Office of Islamic Revolution Knowledge Publication.

</ref>. Consequently, the positions of the Iranian delegation in the peace negotiations received favorable coverage in influential media outlets. In this period, the core of the Iranian delegation's strategic efforts was to establish a just and lasting peace in the region and to resolve the issues and obstacles to the return of over 100,000 Iranian and Iraqi prisoners to their families in the shortest possible time; a strategy that would be realized through the implementation of the initial clauses of the resolution and, ultimately, was welcomed and supported by global public opinion. The scope of this wave also extended to regional countries, and the 18th Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in Riyadh, held concurrently with the peace negotiations, issued a statement calling for the exchange of prisoners of war between the two countries in the shortest possible time, in accordance with the third clause of the resolution. In these circumstances, the Iraqi side, under pressure from public opinion and some political circles, suddenly demanded the exchange of all prisoners before any other action. This ploy could, while freeing the Iraqi government from human rights accusations, facilitate a way out of the difficult situation it found itself in. In this deal, Iraq would release 40,000 prisoners and receive 60,000 prisoners, thereby resolving the issue of prisoners without any pressure or cost. However, this was at a time when the Iraqi government had hidden a large number of Iranian prisoners and prevented their registration with the International Red Cross. Therefore, the Iranian peace delegation, with the aim of proving the insincerity of this Iraqi proposal, proposed the simultaneous release of all prisoners of war from both sides along with withdrawal behind internationally recognized borders, which was met with indifference by the Iraqis.

In such circumstances, despite overcoming the problems and difficulties of a decade of war and unrest, the domestic press, on the verge of the country's development and prosperity during a period of stability and peace, still considered the consequences of the imposed war one of its priorities and responsibly covered and followed up on news and topics related to it; so much so that between the acceptance of Resolution 598 (July 1988) and the arrival of the last large groups of liberated prisoners (September 1990), more than 600 pieces of news, reports, interviews, notes, and articles, solely on the subject of liberated prisoners, were published in several high-circulation publications of that period. The central content of most of these was supporting the rightful positions of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the prisoners of war<ref>Dehnamaki, Masoud (2005). Encyclopedia of Captivity 2: Captivity and Liberated Prisoners in Newspapers. Tehran: Aseman Danesh.

</ref>.

The country's press, with a view to ending the sufferings of the imprisoned captives and their families, explaining their social status, and honoring and respecting these exemplars of patience and steadfastness, produced content across several axes and, on behalf of public opinion, supported the Iranian negotiating team in Geneva. "Exposing the anti-human crimes of the Ba'athist regime of Iraq and its behavior contrary to the international Geneva Convention towards prisoners of war," "pressuring the International Red Cross to register all Iranian prisoners in captivity," "creating a news wave against the obstructionism of the Iraqi side in bilateral negotiations," "emphasizing the continuation of peace talks within the framework of the resolution and under the supervision of the UN Secretary-General," and "expediting the exchange of sick and disabled prisoners" were among the axes determined by the country's press and pursued in a coordinated and continuous manner. In this regard, the Jomhouri-e Eslami newspaper, in the winter of 1988, began publishing the memoirs of previously released prisoners in serialized form, under the title of "The Story of Captivity," which was dedicated to narrating the inhumane treatment of Iranian prisoners by the Ba'athist regime of Iraq. Also, by monitoring the statements of Iraqi officials and the news and content of Iraqi media, they tried to collect effective documents pertaining to the disregard for the human rights of Iranian prisoners by the Iraqis. In this regard, when Asem Yaqoub, the Iraqi ambassador to Kuwait, stated in a press conference that some Iranian prisoners had not been registered, it was immediately reflected in the domestic press and recorded in history as undeniable evidence, becoming the subject of columnists in the domestic press and the focus of legal discussions with experts and specialists in international law (this news and its margins were first published in domestic media on December 19th, 1989).

At this point, following continuous obstruction by the Iraqi side, negotiations stalled, and even Mikhail Gorbachev's recommendation to Saddam, then leader of the Soviet Union, failed to break the deadlock<ref name=":1" />.

At this time, Iraq was willing to continue negotiations bilaterally and without the presence of the UN Secretary-General's representative, in order to extort concessions, such as holding a part of our country's territory and thousands of unregistered Iranian prisoners. However, the position of Iran and the UN Secretary-General was the full implementation of the resolution and the continuation of negotiations with the presence of the UN representative and within the framework of the resolution<ref name=":1" />. Eventually, the Iraqi side's obstruction reached a point where Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, then UN Secretary-General, openly criticized the Iraqi government for disrupting the peace negotiations and invited the Iraqi delegation to go to New York to resume talks. But the Iraqis paid no heed and left his invitation unanswered. This led the UN Secretary-General, despite his conservatism, to criticize the Iraqi government and state: "The Security Council insists on Resolution 598 as the framework for peace negotiations between Iran and Iraq and is determined and serious in its implementation<ref name=":1" />. In such circumstances, and following Iraq's decision to attack Kuwait, a new process began regarding the fate of thousands of Iranian and Iraqi prisoners, and after six stages of correspondence between Saddam and high-ranking officials of our country, over one month, from August 17th, 1990, to September 17th of the same year, 37,532 Iranian prisoners were exchanged with 37,934 Iraqi prisoners<ref name=":0" />. A large portion of the released Iranian prisoners at this stage (about 19,000 people) were among the unregistered ones<ref name=":1" />.

The unexpected process of liberating Iranian prisoners at this juncture, who constituted over 83% of the total number of freed individuals in the country, created a wave of joy and excitement across different parts of the nation. Periodicals, especially national newspapers, daily added to this joy and enthusiasm by publishing pictures and various reports of the liberated prisoners' return to their homeland and the public's welcome; in such a way that the news and images published in the press pages of those days remained in the memory of Iranians like an album of souvenir photos, connecting all members of the nation and awakening a sense of national solidarity whenever they were revisited.

== The grueling marathon of liberating the remaining prisoners and determining the fate of the missing: ==
While it was expected that all captives would be liberated and returned to their homeland at that very time, suddenly on September 18th, 1990, Iraq announced that it held no more Iranian prisoners and ended the exchange process. This was despite the fact that at least 3,000 Iranian prisoners, many of whom had their voices, images, or names reflected in Iraqi media, had not yet had their fate determined<ref name=":0" />. In response to this behavior by the Iraqi government, domestic media, with a unified approach, prioritized the pursuit of freeing the remaining Iranian prisoners in captivity and, by guiding the news-propaganda flow, supported the bargaining diplomacy of statesmen with the Iraqi side. Following media campaigns and as a result of officials' efforts, by late 1990`s, a total of 415 more Iranian prisoners were set free in 9 stages. In one of these stages, the Iraqi government proceeded to exchange 239 Iranian prisoners who had judicial convictions and were serving their sentences in prisons outside of prisoner camps. In the winter of the same year, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, Vice Chairman of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council, came to Tehran at the head of a high-ranking delegation to unilaterally arrange for the release of all Iraqi prisoners, including 4,564 prisoners who had entered our country during America's involvement in the Iraq-Kuwait war, without any compensation. The discussions between the two sides did not yield a favorable outcome, and from this point, bilateral relations were severed and grew cold for a while.

In July 1991, on the eve of the UN Secretary-General's declaration of Iraq as the initiator of the war, an Iraqi delegation arrived in Iran under the pretext of normalizing relations, but actually with the aim of reclaiming their aircraft that had been brought to Iran during the war with Kuwait. As a gesture of goodwill, they brought five Iranian prisoners of war with them. In response to the Iraqi request, Iranian officials insisted on tripartite negotiations, demanding the resumption of the process of releasing prisoners and determining the fate of the missing, and reciprocally released 100 Iraqi prisoners.

== Return of the Body of Martyr Tondguyan ==
During the group return of liberated prisoners, everyone was awaiting the return of Mohammad Javad Tondguyan, the Minister of Petroleum in Martyr Rajai's cabinet. So much so that the possibility of Gholamreza Aghazadeh, the then Minister of Petroleum, resigning due to this expectation, was reflected in the country's press. However, with the return of the last group of liberated prisoners, hopes largely turned to despair. Even the reports from Kuwaiti prisoners released from Baghdad's POW camps, stating that Engineer Tondguyan was alive, did not raise much hope. Although the publication of these reports provided a good subject for newspaper columnists and reminded the Iraqi government of its legal responsibility for this abduction. Simultaneously, Iran's representative office at the United Nations issued a statement, requesting the release of the remaining prisoners and demanding that international circles address the issue of Mohammad Javad Tondguyan's abduction in the early days of the war. Pressures consistent with diplomatic actions prompted international circles to react to the request of our people and officials, and Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, in his first reaction to this request, stated: "I will personally try in this regard." The consequence of these remarks was that a few days later, the news of the return of the body of Martyr [[Tondguyan, Mohammad Javad|Tondguyan]] appeared on the front page of the country's newspapers, and the martyrdom of another oppressed innocent figure

was recorded in the history of the eight-year imposed war.

The return of the body of Martyr [[Tondguyan, Mohammad Javad|Tondguyan]] fostered the public belief that some of the remaining prisoners of war in Iraq might have been martyred and should not be expected to return. The press also sporadically and indirectly reinforced this belief to prepare the community, especially the waiting families, for this bitter reality. On the other hand, these circumstances made it possible for an Iranian delegation led by Mohammad Javad Zarif to travel to Baghdad and establish a commission to find and exchange the bodies of martyrs under the supervision of the International Red Cross. Following these negotiations and with the foresight of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a special committee was formed to search for the bodies of war martyrs, which continues to this day, and the bodies of many martyrs have been exhumed in Iraq and transferred to Iran. In one such instance, according to a Western journalist, the bodies of 54 Iranian martyrs were discovered in a mass grave, indicating they had been executed with their hands tied immediately after capture<ref name=":1" />. (← [[Tondguyan, Mohammad Javad|Mohammad Javad Tondguyan]])

== Iran and Iraq's Press Confrontation ==
The year 1994 can, in a sense, be called the year of media warfare between the Iranian and Iraqi press. In this year, the statesmen of both countries accused each other of irresponsibility and negligence in determining the fate of prisoners of war and missing persons. Naturally, the press of both countries served as the platform for such statements or responses to them. The Iraqi government, by politicizing a humanitarian issue, tried to gain propaganda advantage to sideline its inhumane treatment of Iranian prisoners. Iraq claimed that Iran had hidden 20,000 Iraqi prisoners and was not releasing them. However, Iran asserted that after each operation, it had allowed Red Cross officials to register all Iraqi prisoners and that there was no report of even a single Iraqi prisoner going missing. Moreover, the Iraqi side never managed to provide a complete list of the claimed number to the Red Cross. It is worth noting that out of the Iraqi prisoners, 7,634 had become refugees and, in one-on-one interviews with Red Cross officials, had expressed their desire to stay in Iran and were unwilling to return. In contrast, Iran had submitted a complete list of the names and details of 30,000 unregistered and missing Iranian prisoners, along with documentation of the presence of a large number of them in Iraq, to the Red Cross. Iran's documents were based on statements by individuals such as Sa'doun Hammadi, then Iraq's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, in an interview with Basra Radio, which explicitly referred to the presence of over 50,000 Iranian prisoners in Iraqi camps; furthermore, copies of the audio and video of 1,181 Iranian prisoners, which had been broadcast by Iraqi state radio and television or whose interviews and photos had been published in the Iraqi press, were available to the Red Cross, while the Iraqi side only accounted for 33 of them; additionally, 67 prisoners had been captured by the Iraqi army on Iranian soil after the war, and despite interviews with each of them by Red Cross representatives, the Iraqi government denied the presence of such individuals in Iraq.

At the end of 1994, despite Iran's sincere cooperation with the International Red Cross and continuous clarification of the status of Iraqi prisoners and vice versa, the Iraqi side's lack of cooperation and concealment led the UN Security Council to cite a report by the head of the Organization of Islamic Conference (prepared under the influence of Iraqi-Arab press and provided to the Council through the Red Cross), to jointly condemn Iran and Iraq for obstructing the progress of humanitarian plans and acting contrary to the resolution's objectives. The Security Council's condemnation of Iran was based on the use of the phrase "one prisoner for one prisoner" by Mohammad Ali Nazaran, the former head of the Prisoners' Commission. However, he had passed away a year earlier, and Brigadier General Abdullah Najafi had taken over as the head of the Prisoners' Commission. The Red Cross's cooperation in issuing the Security Council's statement led Iran to once again sever its ties with the Red Cross for a period and refuse to accept its representatives in Iran, preferring to pursue further negotiations bilaterally. Following this decision, a delegation led by Brigadier General Abdullah Najafi traveled to Baghdad to negotiate with the Iraqi side. As a result of these negotiations, the parties agreed to pursue talks within the framework of four independent committees: "Remaining Prisoner Affairs," "Refugees," "Search for Bodies," and "Border Issues."

== Pilot Lashkari's survival after 15 years. ==
For years, no one had any news of the pilot Hossein Lashkari, who was kept in a cell away from public view. The Ba'athist regime of Iraq kept pilot Lashkari alive with the aim of one day using him as proof that Iran started the war! After Iraq was officially declared the initiator of the war and this tactic failed, the Iraqi government, for the first time in May 1995, made public the captivity of pilot Lashkari and allowed the Red Cross to meet with him. With the news of Lashkari's survival, a new wave swept through the country's press, and every media outlet tried to gather and publish more information about the oldest prisoner of war. The Islamic Republic, in response to society's need, arranged an interview with his family and, by choosing the emotional headline "A wait that became 17 years long," alluding to the age of [[Hossein Lashgari|Lashkari]]'s only child, who had been deprived of his father's presence since the first day of his life, added to the emotional atmosphere of society. In these circumstances, a new flurry of activity regarding the release of prisoners took shape, and officials, in order to break grounds for his release, would unilaterally release a number of Iraqi prisoners from time to time. However, the Iraqi side, due to the outbreak of the Intifada in Iraq and the fact that most Iraqi prisoners were Shiites and their inclination to join the Intifada, showed signs of no intention to release them at that time. And that applied to the pilot Lashkari too..

== The second wave of propaganda warfare against Iran ==
With the help of agents from the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization, the Iraqi government launched extensive propaganda in Iraqi-Arab and even European publications against Iran, focusing on Iran's non-adherence to humanitarian principles. The central point of this propaganda was Iran's refusal to release Iraqi prisoners, even though there was no equivalent for exchange. With this propaganda tactic, Iraq had managed to mobilize a segment of active global public opinion against Iran. At this juncture, due to the Iraqi side's better access to transnational media, they had surpassed Iran in press propaganda and were considered victorious in the media war. To change the balance and overcome the propaganda atmosphere, the Islamic Republic of Iran unilaterally released 874 Iraqi prisoners on two occasions, 24 of whom were Christians. The release of Christian prisoners, which coincided with the birth of Jesus Christ (PBUH), somewhat broke the propaganda atmosphere against Iran and was reflected in media circles. In response to this action, Soma Ruga, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, met with Cyrus Nasseri, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Geneva, in a friendly atmosphere and stated:<blockquote>"What you did regarding the unilateral release of Iraqi prisoners was a very fundamental and serious action, but there is still a fundamental problem concerning Iranian prisoners."</blockquote>These remarks from the highest international official indicated the belief that there were no Iranian prisoners in Iraq, which was a cause for concern in itself. Iran's Permanent Representative in Geneva replied:<blockquote>"Officially announce your opinion and accept responsibility for it."</blockquote>Ruga refused, and Nasseri pointed out that If there were still some Iranians in Iraq`s prisons contrary to what they claimed, their lives would easily be endangered by the Iraqis. He asked Ruga to pressure the Iraqi side, out of humanitarian concern, to be accountable for the remaining Iranian prisoners. After this meeting, Michel Cagnon traveled to Iran on behalf of the Red Cross, and relations between the two sides were re-established after a long time.

== A year of change in the situation of prisoners ==
The year 1995 began with signs of change in the situation of war prisoners. The dispatch of a delegation to Baghdad, led by Ali Khorram, advisor to our country's Minister of Foreign Affairs, marked the beginning of this transformation. With this trip, negotiations were reopened, and the release of the remaining prisoners in Iraq was pursued. Determining the fate of missing persons and refugees was another issue on the agenda of this delegation. During this trip, Khorram met and discussed with the then Iraqi Foreign Minister and stated in a press conference:<blockquote>"Iran's policy is to find a fundamental and practical solution instead of debate and contention for the release of the remaining prisoners of the two countries; because the issue of prisoners is a humanitarian one."</blockquote>The outcome of these negotiations was that both sides would list and present their claimed cases. This ultimately benefited Iran; because the Iraqi side merely made claims and could not provide a true list of its remaining prisoners in Iran and was forced to reduce the astronomical number of its prisoners. This action also took away the propaganda weapon from Iraqi media and limited their propaganda topics, creating a positive environment for continuing discussions in a calm atmosphere to find a practical and fair solution. Until then, no such action had been taken, and therefore, it was considered a step towards resolving mutual issues away from propaganda and media pressures. Among the achievements of this trip was the continuation of work within the framework of four independent committees: "Prisoners," "Refugees," "Search for Bodies," and "Border Issues," which helped facilitate matters. At this juncture, the domestic press, while supporting the achievements of the Iranian delegation, patiently demonstrated another phase of interaction and tolerance within the general policies of the system to provide conditions for the release of the remaining prisoners. (For example, see Jomhouri Eslami and Salam on 1995/06/11)<ref name=":1" />.

On September 10th, 1995, an Iraqi delegation led by Saad Abdul Majid Al-Faisal,the Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister, arrived in Tehran and held talks with Iranian officials. The outcome of these negotiations was documented in a 7-article memorandum and signed by both parties. According to the memorandum, the parties agreed to exchange lists of their prisoners to serve as a basis for final action after review and verification. It was also decided that another sub-committee would thoroughly examine disputed cases regarding prisoners to facilitate the exchange of all remaining prisoners of both sides under the supervision of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Thus, for the first time, a written agreement between the two countries concerning prisoners was signed, recording the claims of both sides without exaggeration. Although this agreement was not implemented in practice, as the Iraqi side refused to exchange the lists of prisoners it claimed, it became the basis for future negotiations.

The approach of the domestic press during this period was to support the decision-makers and executive officials of the country. One of the characteristics of the press's performance during these days was the honoring of the social status of the liberated prisoners and emphasizing their importance and position in Iranian society. This approach indicated the importance of the issue and Iran's seriousness in freeing all prisoners, and reflected the attention of the country's officials to the issue of releasing captives. This stance was not hidden from experts and impartial circles. At that time, due to the Shiite intifada, the Iraqis had no desire for the return of their prisoners, who were mostly Shiite, and in practice, apart from the release of a group of officers affiliated with the Ba'ath Party, there was not much enthusiasm for the exchange of the remaining prisoners (pages of newspapers such as Salam, Kayhan, Ettela'at, and Jomhuri-e Eslami during this period attest to this fact)<ref name=":1" />.

Domestic media, following the policy of tolerance of the country's officials, also tried to maintain the level of relations with Iraq and not fuel aggression and conflict. In contrast, the Iraqi media began another phase of one-sided attacks against Iran and, through victim-playing, tried to portray Iran as the main culprit in obstructing the release of the remaining prisoners. On this score, the Iraqi government, with the aim of creating content for publications supported by Iraq, drafted and sent four letters to the UN Secretary-General, the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, and the Secretary-General of the Non-Aligned Movement, in which it introduced Iran as the obstructing party in the negotiations for the release of prisoners. Iraqi media and other aligned media, in support of Saddam's Ba'athist government's propaganda policies, paid full attention and raised a huge uproar. In these circumstances, Kamal Kharazi, Iran's permanent representative to the United Nations, in order to counter the uproar of the Iraqi media group and its Western and regional supporters, held frequent press conferences, criticizing Iraq's behavior regarding the issue of prisoner release and pointing to the obstructions and reasons for the prolonged and fruitless negotiations with the Iraqi government's involvement. The reflection of these meetings, which took place in New York, had a relatively positive impact on domestic and foreign media in shedding light on the nature of the Ba'athist regime's propaganda uproar for the world public opinion.

In mid-1996, the Iraqi government, by assigning the continuation of negotiations to the Ministry of Intelligence (Istikhbarat), effectively took the matter out of the hands of its Foreign Ministry, thus adopting a new tactic to prolong and render the negotiations fruitless. The Iraqi Minister of Intelligence immediately came to Iran and, with a false approach of trying to break the deadlock in negotiations, declared his main demand to be ignoring previous agreements. He claimed that because intelligence elements had more influence on the government, they could better accomplish their mission. During his trip to Tehran for negotiations, he went to the Ministry of Intelligence and expected to negotiate with his intelligence counterpart. However, the head of the Prisoners' Commission went to the Ministry of Intelligence for discussions. In this meeting, the issue of the release of all prisoners held in Iran and Iraq was discussed. The Iranian representative, while emphasizing previous agreements, strongly criticized the Iraqi side's wavering positions and condemned the Iraqi media's disregard for the human aspects of the prisoner issue and its use as a propaganda tool.

Iran's firm and principled positions led the Iraqi side to once again entrust the continuation of negotiations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and pursue bilateral issues through that channel.

With the aim of breaking the deadlock in negotiations, Iran unilaterally released more than 150 Iraqi prisoners on October 26th, 1996, which received positive media coverage in European countries. Following these actions, the Red Cross was encouraged to send a representative to Tehran to advance the negotiations. Subsequently, Michel Caignard, Director-General for the Middle East and North Africa, arrived in Tehran on December 3rd, 1996, and held talks with Iranian officials. During these negotiations, the necessity of the Red Cross's neutrality was raised, and an honest effort to find practical solutions for resolving prisoner-related issues and correcting the Red Cross's [[statistics]] on the number of prisoners from both sides was requested. However, the Red Cross representative, under the pretext that "we can only accept statistics based on evidence and visits," in practice supported the positions of the Iraqi side. Concurrently with the presence of the Red Cross representative, some widely circulated newspapers published articles and notes raising serious criticisms regarding the performance of the International Red Cross and reminded it of its international mission. (For example, see Keyhan, Ettela'at, and Jomhuri-e Eslami newspapers, December 1996)<ref name=":1" />.

== Continuation of Diplomatic Challenges in 1997 ==
On March 27th, 1997, following a meeting between the foreign ministers of Iran and Iraq on the sidelines of the Organization of Islamic Conference summit in Rabat, emphasis was placed on pursuing the issue of prisoners of war between the two countries through diplomatic channels, with a focus on the foreign ministries of both governments. The Iraqi foreign minister also expressed readiness to release 64 Iranian prisoners who were in held custody. In this situation, the newly emerging press, which had entered the scene after the May 23rd, 1997 elections along with the wave of modernism and community-oriented demands, in company with other media rooted in the war era, bore the main burden of news and propaganda support for peace negotiations and the release of the remaining captives.

== Another Confrontation Between Iranian and Iraqi Press ==
In September 1997, a representative of the Red Cross once again visited Iran and explicitly stated that, apart from 64 prisoners and one pilot, [[Hossein Lashgari|Hossein Lashkari]], they had no information about any other captives. This representative's stance, which was close to the Iraqi positions, meant disregarding many documents and evidence that Iranian officials had provided to the Red Cross concerning the presence of thousands of Iranian prisoners in overt and covert Iraqi POW camps. Following the Red Cross representative's (← Red Cross) statements, the head of the Prisoners Commission, in a press conference, declared the number of Iranian prisoners in Iraq announced by the Red Cross representative to be incorrect and confirmed that it was an endorsement of the Iraqi side's obstruction in definitively resolving the prisoner issue. Iraqi officials, in response, reiterated their usual accusations, and consequently, the attacks by the Iraqi press against Iran, which had subsided for a while, escalated once again.

In a televised speech, Saddam also condemned Iran for expansionism and addressed peripheral issues from the imaginary position of leadership of Arab-speaking countries. In response to Saddam's statements, Dr. Khorram, senior advisor to our country's Foreign Minister, announced in an interview with domestic media:<blockquote>"We should not be expected to react sharply to Saddam's statements. We have seen many such ups and downs from Iraq, and therefore our approach will be balanced."</blockquote>He employed a diplomatic language to belittle Saddam and tried to expose the rift between Iraq and the Arab world. Following this political stance, the Prisoners' Commission also unilaterally released 46 Iraqi prisoners in a practical move; thus, Iran's wise stance and sincere practical action on the eve of the Islamic Conference had a positive impact on the atmosphere of the conference and prevented the leaders of Islamic countries from being influenced by the propaganda of the Iraqi press. In this situation, Iran released another 500 Iraqi prisoners to reaffirm Iran's humanitarian positions. Iraq, in a passive move, released two missing Iranian prisoners, who provided much information about other prisoners, which was very effective in the continuation of negotiations.

In mid-December 1997, Saeed al-Sahhaf, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, unexpectedly arrived in Tehran to participate in the Islamic Conference and distributed copies of a letter containing repetitive content among the members, claiming that there were no Iranian prisoners in Iraq! Whereas 18092 Iraqi prisoners were still in Iran. He had asked the members of the organization to help release the Iraqi prisoners out of humanitarianism. Following this action, he held a press conference and was waiting for reporters to ask questions about the letter. However, representatives of the country's press community, without any reference to his letter, intelligently did not give him the opportunity to exploit it and simultaneously published news about a list of 9424 Iranian prisoners present in Iraq. The solidarity of the domestic press with the responsible authorities strengthened Iran's position in international circles, and finally, the status of 1267 Iranian prisoners and detainees was clarified, of whom, unfortunately, only 175 were alive and imprisoned in Iraq. This number was exchanged with 2170 Iraqi prisoners in a short period.

== Release of Pilot Hossein Lashkary ==
Following the relentless efforts of officials to determine the fate and secure the release of prisoners, in April 1998, another 319 liberated prisoners were exchanged, with 15 Iraqi prisoners for each Iranian liberated prisoner. Among those released in this phase was Pilot [[Hossein Lashgari|Hossein Lashkary]], who returned to his homeland after 18 years. At this stage, for the first time, domestic and international journalists were allowed to participate in the reception ceremony held for the released prisoners and to prepare reports and images from the ceremony to publish in their outlets.

According to numerous pieces of evidence, at least more than 474 Iranian prisoners were held by Iraq. Therefore, it was necessary to continue the follow-ups. Thus, the relevant officials began another round of efforts to release the remaining prisoners.

Three days after the release of this group of liberated prisoners, the Iraqi newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat wrote:<blockquote>"The file of Iranian prisoners will be closed by the end of the year."</blockquote>This news, which was confirmed by other Iraqi publications such as Al-Musawwar Al-Arabi, gave Iranian officials new strength and motivation to redouble their efforts in order to determine the fate of the remaining prisoners.

The first achievement of these efforts was compelling the Iraqi side to acknowledge statistics closer to reality, which was realized at the joint Iran-Iraq committee meeting on June 17th, 1998, in Baghdad. At this meeting, the Iraqis largely organized their claims and accepted the list of remaining and missing Iranian prisoners. According to this list, 3120 Iranian prisoners were in Iraq and needed to have their status determined. The minutes of the agreed-upon list were signed by both parties. Also, by determining the status of Iraqi prisoners, it became clear that another 2838 Iraqi prisoners were held by Iran. With the exchange of these lists in the presence of a representative of the International Red Cross, the Iraqis' hands were tied for negative propaganda against Iran.

It was expected that the year 1998, which saw the release of 494 Iranian prisoners, would be the year for resolving the status of all prisoners of war and missing persons. However, with the Iraqi authorities changing the designation of Iranian prisoners to "political prisoners" and repeatedly claiming that there were no Iranian prisoners in Iraq, all hopes were once again dashed. This behavior by the Iraqis even surprised Western news agencies and prompted a reaction (Agence France-Presse covered this issue in one of its April 1998 editions).

The change in the Iraqi side's stance was met with a clear and firm position from the then-President, Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani:<blockquote>"The resolution of the Tehran-Baghdad problem hinges on clarifying the status of the remaining prisoners."</blockquote>Concurrently, the head of the Prisoners of War Commission, presenting his documentation to the Red Cross, reported the presence of 3206 Iranian prisoners in Iraqi territory. In response, an Iraqi official, in an interview with the Iraqi newspaper "Sawt al-Talaba" (Voice of the Student), referred to a list of Iraqi prisoners that had been handed over to the Iranian delegation. In this vein, in July 1999, Iraqi newspapers, on the occasion of the anniversary of their victory in the war!, designated the remaining prisoners in Iran as one of their central themes and extensively wrote about it. In this regard, the newspaper "Babel," managed by Uday, Saddam's son, wrote in the main column of its front page:<blockquote>"Among the problems between the two countries there is the unresolved issue of prisoners."</blockquote>Saddam also claimed in a speech:<blockquote>"Iran is holding several thousand Iraqi prisoners and is not releasing them, and we will resort to force if necessary to free the Iraqi prisoners."</blockquote>Following these statements, the Iraqi press launched a new uproar against our country. These interactions did not escape the sharp eyes of the press, and while reflecting them favorably, they responded. In this regard, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by inviting domestic and foreign journalists to a press conference, responded to Saddam's ramblings and dismissed his claims as contrary to existing realities: "Iran's stance on prisoners and those missing during the imposed war is a humanitarian one, coupled with Islamic compassion and kindness. It is the Iraqis who have toyed with the fate of several thousand Iranian prisoners and are evading their release."

Simultaneously with launching a propaganda and media war, the Iraqi government published 24 volumes of memoirs by captured Ba'athist officers in Iran to create documentation. The Iraqi press also published excerpts from them and printed articles against Iran, and to some extent, managed to align Western and Arab media with themselves. To break the new propaganda atmosphere, the Islamic Republic of Iran unilaterally released 277 Iraqi prisoners on October 10th, 1999. Concurrently, the Iranian press focused on topics such as Iran's humanitarianism and the development of relations based on peace and friendship. In the continuation of this confrontation, Iran unilaterally released another 500 Iraqi prisoners, and again in mid-May 2000, given its effectiveness, released 480 Iraqi prisoners. Twenty days later, another 440 Iraqi prisoners were unilaterally released by Iran, and in an unprecedented move 1697 prisoners were unilaterally released within a few months. Following their release, the Red Cross invited Iran to resume negotiations again under its supervision. Our country's officials responded positively to this request, and after a long hiatus, in January 2000, an Iranian delegation traveled to Geneva to continue negotiations. During this trip, officials, in an innovative move, took several of the liberated prisoners with them to Geneva to bring the issue of the remaining Iranian prisoners in Iraq to the attention of global media. Dr. Alborzi, the plenipotentiary representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in negotiations with Kelly Berger, then head of the International Committee of the Red Cross, asked him to officially reflect Iran's actions in a statement issued by the Red Cross and to formally request the Iraqi President in a letter to remove the obstacles to the exchange of all prisoners. The Iranian delegation's goal with these actions was to reduce propaganda pressure of Western and Arab newspapers. During this trip, documents pertaining to over three thousand Iranian prisoners and missing persons were handed over to Red Cross officials.

At that time it just so happened that the biggest supporter of Iranian captives, [[Abu Torabifard, Seyyed Aliakbar|Seyed Ali-Akbar Abutorabi-Fard]], passed away on June 2nd, 2000, in a car accident, a heavy blow and loss indeed!. This incident once again brought the issue of the liberated prisoners to the pages of journals and newspapers and revitalized their memories<ref name=":1" />.

On June 29th, 2000, Iran unilaterally released 450 Iraqi prisoners once again. On August 9th and 10th of the same year, 728 more Iraqi prisoners were unilaterally released in two groups. Following their release, the Red Cross issued a statement announcing that it had interviewed Iraqi prisoners of war who had sought refuge in Iran and found that they had no intention of returning to Iraq. This statement largely reduced the intensity of the propaganda against Iran. During this period, one of the newspapers, in an innovative move, began publishing photos and details pertaining to the captivity of the remaining prisoners which was a timely and effective action in line with documenting the claims of our country's officials<ref name=":1" />.

More than two decades after the outbreak of war , the families of the remaining prisoners and the missing , whose fates had not been determined, became restless and were waiting to hear definite news and expecting the uncertainty to end at long last. In the interim, some of them had passed away or been martyred. Therefore, the Iranian delegation decided to propose another solution to the Red Cross: that both delegations become active, at least for a while, on the issue of prisoners who had died or been martyred, so that at least some families could terminate the prolonged uncertainty. In this regard, a plan was prepared and presented to the Iraqi side. Based on a clause in this plan, the two sides agreed not to publicize news of the pursuit of prisoners' freedom periodically, so that the work could proceed with more calm. However, the Iraqi officials, contrary to their commitment, after the release of 24 Iranian prisoners, 6 of whom were Iraqis, reflected the issue in the press and once again resorted to media uproar against our country.

After some time had passed since the new plan was implemented, the bodies of 570 Iranian prisoners, who had either died or been martyred during captivity, were exchanged for 1179 Iraqi bodies, among whom was the body of Martyr Abbas Doran. The arrival of the martyrs' bodies affected the country's atmosphere and gave it a spiritual aura. In such an atmosphere, the domestic press once again made an effort and brought the issue of prisoners up in the media<ref name=":1" />.

Following the emergence of a new wave in November 2002, a new round of negotiations between Iran and Iraq resumed, and the two countries agreed to release all prisoners they held. As a result, the path was paved for the release of all prisoners on both sides , and in their last meeting, the parties decided to exchange 941 Iraqi captives plus 30 Iraqi prisoners with 351 Iranian prisoners-of-war . This important event was realized in March 2003, and after that, the head of the Prisoners' Commission officially announced in the final days of 2003 that "we no longer have any prisoners in Iraq."

== See also ==
• The Imposed War of Iraq against Iran

• [[Abu Torabifard, Seyyed Aliakbar|Seyyed Ali Akbar Abutorabi Fard]]

• Red Cross

• Red Crescent

• Return of the liberated prisoners of war to the Homeland

• [[Hossein Lashgari|Hossein Lashkary]]

• [[Tondguyan, Mohammad Javad|Mohammad Javad Tondguyan]]

== Bibliography ==
<references />

== For Further Reading ==
Darvishi, Farhad (2011). Iran-Iraq War, Questions and Answers. 7th ed. Tehran: Center for War Studies and Research.

Dehnamaki, Masoud (2005). Encyclopedia of Captivity 2: Captivity and Liberated Prisoners in Newspapers. Tehran: Aseman Danesh.

Velayati, Ali Akbar (1997). Political History of the Imposed War of Iraq on Iran. Tehran: Office of Islamic Culture Publication.

Hashemi Rafsanjani, Akbar (2013). End of Defense, Beginning of Reconstruction / Record and Memoirs of 1988. Tehran: Office of Islamic Revolution Knowledge Publication.

Metz, Helen Chapin, ed. (1988), "The Soviet Union", Iraq: a Country Study, Library of Congress Country Studies

== Author ==
Ismail Alavi Yeganeh
[[Category:Prisoners]]
[[fa:اسارت، اسرا و آزادگان در مطبوعات]]
[[ar:الأسرى والأحرار في الصحافة]]

File:Liberated Prisoners of War in the Press .png

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Marjan-khanlari:

Liberated Prisoners of War in the Press

File:Liberated prisoners of War in Keyhan.png

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Marjan-khanlari:

Liberated prisoners of War in Keyhan

Captivity, Prisoners of War, and Liberated Prisoners of War in the Press

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Marjan-khanlari:

'''Reflection of news and reports related to prisoners of war and liberated prisoners of war in domestic newspapers and publications.'''

== From the beginning of the imposed war until the acceptance of the resolution ==
On September 22, 1980 (Shahrivar 31, 1359), Iraq launched an attack on the Islamic Republic of Iran from three fronts, with the strategy of "heavy initial assault" followed by negotiations based on "new conditions," imposing the longest conventional war of the 20th century on our country. Utilizing the element of surprise, the Iraqi army occupied over 20,000 square kilometers of Iranian territory during the initial days of the attack, including many cities and villages (Mohammad Daroudian's website, war history researcher, quoting Brigadier General Mehrabi, Deputy Intelligence Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces), and with the aim of gaining superiority in future negotiations, took defenders and ordinary people in border cities and villages into captivity<ref>Habiban, Mohammad Hasan and Asgari, Shadab (2014). Iraqi Prisoners or Guests. 2nd ed. Tehran: Organization for the Preservation of the Values of the Sacred Defense of AJA, p. 41.

</ref>.

The Iraqi army, despite claiming to be engaged in an unavoidable and defensive war, took the disabled, sick, and elderly residents of cities and villages as prisoners of war, mistreated them, and refused to register many of them with the International Red Cross<ref>Alaei, Hossein (2012). The Trend of the Iran-Iraq War. Vol. 1. Tehran: Marzoboom, pp. 218 and 230.</ref><ref name=":0">Aghaei, Abbas and Rostami, Fatemeh (2014). Side by Side with . Memoirs of the Liberated Brigadier General Abdollah Najafi, 2nd ed. Tehran: Islamic Revolution Document Center, p. 97.

</ref>. Domestic media, spearheaded by the three widely circulated newspapers of the capital (Keyhan, Ettela'at, and Jomhouri Eslami), along with other publications, showed sensitivity to the issue of Iranian prisoners of war from the beginning of the imposed war over a 22-year period. Through responsible follow-up and timely and favorable coverage of news and reports related to them, they provided moral support for humanitarian actions that led to the determination of their status, facilitation of their living conditions, and their release. In times of necessity, they also confronted the propaganda machine of the Ba'athist enemy and its allies (at that time, the newspapers Enghelab Eslami, Bamdad, Azadeghan, Mizan, and Abrar also covered this issue and echoed the three leading newspapers in defending the human rights of prisoners, just as this trend continued later with the publication of newspapers such as Salam, Resalat, Hamshahri, Iran, and others). The media's objective in this regard was to expose the brutal behavior of the Iraqi government towards Iranian prisoners, compel Baghdad's rulers to comply with international conventions to recognize the rights of prisoners of war, to explain the social status of prisoners to public opinion, and to create a suitable environment for their earlier and easier release. In this context, the media, taking the initiative within the framework of the war propaganda management system's discretion, produced and reflected diverse news and reports, forming a front to counter the enemy's propaganda front and its supporters.

== The first news to reach publications ==
In the months leading up to the imposed war, when the Iraqi army was causing insecurity in some border areas and cities with its provocative actions, even in the early days of the imposed war, due to the prevailing conditions in the country's public sphere, news with local and sometimes unreliable sources found its way into the pages of the press. The continuation of this trend could have had negative consequences and ultimately led to the weakening of the national defense morale. Such news, by forming a bleak picture, pushed society into inactivity and caused an atmosphere of fear and despair. However, with the vigilance of officials and the cooperation of all stakeholders and media professionals, the continuation of this trend was stopped very quickly, and news related to the war was published after being confirmed by official sources. Thus, the first news on the subject of captivity, as a hegemonic strategy and as the first propaganda axis in the framework of comprehensive confrontation with enemy aggression, was published thirteen days after the start of the war. This axis was first propounded by the highest executive official of the country, the then Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali Rajai, in a speech from the podium of the United Nations, addressing the Security Council. In this speech, he states: "The Iraqi regime has abducted civilians and ordinary citizens living in border towns and villages and is taking them as prisoners, torturing and killing them along with prisoners of war.

In the continuation of his speech, Mohammad-Ali Rajai calls for an investigation into the war crimes of the Iraqi ruling regime and effective action by international bodies to prevent such inhumane acts<ref name=":1">Archives of the newspapers Jomhouri Eslami, Keyhan, Ettela'at, Abrar, Salam, etc., and the magazines Saf, Azadegan, and Pasdar-e Eslam.

</ref>. Excerpts from the then-head of government's remarks were reflected in mass media, including widely circulated newspapers, and for several days became the subject of columnists and news for domestic media.

Two weeks later, the news of the capture of Mohammad Javad Tondguyan, the Minister of Oil of the Islamic Republic of Iran, along with several companions, including one of his deputies, Seyyed Mohsen Yahyavi, created a new responsibility for the country's press. For several consecutive days, it occupied one of the top half-page headlines of most daily newspapers; also, dozens of news pieces, reports, and interviews were produced and sent to print, with the central theme of most published materials being the responsibility of the Ba'athist regime of Iraq and relevant international bodies for the lives of the hostages<ref name=":1" />.

After the news wave of the oil minister's capture subsided, on March 30th, 1981, a short news item was published in Keyhan newspaper about efforts to exchange wounded and disabled Iranian and Iraqi prisoners. On June 17th and August 27th of the same year, news of the release and exchange of a number of disabled and sick Iranian prisoners of war with a group of Iraqi prisoners was published on two occasions. Following the release of these liberated prisoners, a morning newspaper, Jomhuri-e Eslami, and an evening newspaper, Ettela'at, began to publish their memoirs in serial form. At this stage, the weekly magazines Soroush and Shahed, and the monthly magazines Saf and Pasdar-e Islam, also joined in and exposed the inhumane treatment of Iranian prisoners by the Iraqi Ba'athist regime. During this period, the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross was invited to Iran by the head of the Red Crescent to hear the statements of the released Iranian prisoners, at least one-third of whom were ordinary citizens of border towns and villages. Coinciding with his presence in Tehran, the press published documented reports of mistreatment of Iranian prisoners and coordinately printed images of an elderly woman who had been taken captive by the Iraqi army and was among the exchanged prisoners<ref name=":1" />.

The head of the International Committee of the Red Cross, despite hearing the statements of newly released Iranian prisoners and observing numerous pieces of concrete evidence confirming the violation of international conventions regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, refused to take even the slightest stance on the inhumane treatment of Iranian prisoners by the Iraqi government. This significant silence, in practice, provided a great opportunity for the Baghdad regime to continue with its crimes, and also led to pessimism among the country's officials and elites regarding the integrity and impartiality of international institutions. Naturally, this perception also found its way into the country's propaganda system, including domestic media, and consequently, from this point on, Iran's relations with international institutions, including the global Red Cross, soured and entered a new phase, a process consisting of many ups and downs until the end of the war. In line with this behavior, renowned global media also published very little news regarding the torture of Iranian prisoners and the blatant violation of international laws, and by their silence, effectively followed the Red Cross's practice. Following this event, the War Propaganda Headquarters, in order to break the media silence, invited a number of high-circulation Western media outlets and regional countries to visit Iran and directly understand the facts and take action to introduce the true face of the Ba'athist regime of Iraq. At the same time, the Supreme Defense Council unilaterally released a number of disabled and sick Iraqi prisoners and simultaneously created conditions for Iraqi prisoners to meet their families in their detention camps. The least impact of these measures, if adequately reflected in the global media, would have been to break the propaganda atmosphere against our country, which would have reduced Iraq's mistreatment of Iranian prisoners. However, this strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, although fully supported by domestic media and its dimensions reflected through various reports, especially visual reports, did not receive much coverage in foreign publications<ref name=":1" />.

== Confronting the Iraqi Regime's New Tactic ==
On the other hand, the Baghdad regime, in an attempt to downplay Iran's humanitarian actions, especially regarding the unilateral release of sick Iraqi prisoners, launched a new propaganda maneuver. By inviting journalists and cameramen from India, Pakistan, Greece, France, Italy, and other countries, it tried to confront them with young Iranian prisoners. Through this, it aimed to promote the narrative that Iran's basis in the war with Iraq was to expand the influence of its religious-revolutionary ideas in the region, and to achieve this goal, it even recruited underage students, thereby mobilizing public opinion against Iran. This propaganda line could position Iraq in the spotlight of Western and Arab countries as the frontline against the export of the Islamic Revolution, garnering their political and military support. However, the political-propaganda ploy of the Ba'athist Iraqi regime, launched with the motive of undermining the national and legitimate defense of the Iranian people, did not go unanswered. The War Propaganda Headquarters took retaliatory action and organized an intelligent effort to enlighten public opinion on a broad scale, with domestic media playing a significant role in this regard. Domestic newspapers, dedicating considerable effort and resources, designed and implemented various themes, among which publicizing the mistreatment of Iranian prisoners by Iraqis and emphasizing the Baghdad regime's violation of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions regarding the rights of prisoners of war were prominent<ref name=":1" />.

Another area that the domestic press designed and implemented in this regard and at this juncture was questioning the indifference of the International Red Cross towards the Iraqi government's behavior contrary to international regulations concerning Iranian prisoners of war. In this regard, ETTELA'AT newspaper, in an influential note, asked this committee to publish a report on its members' visits to Iranian POW camps in Iraq and not to support the crimes of the Iraqi regime with biased silence. In this note, Iranian prisoners were referred to as "Azadegan" (liberated ones) for the first time<ref name=":1" />.

Following the wave created by the domestic press, 500 [[family]] members of prisoners staged a sit-in in front of the International Red Cross representative office, demanding serious action from this organization in line with its inherent duties. Alongside this movement, Keyhan newspaper published a shocking report on the brutal tortures inflicted on Iranian prisoners in Iraq and revealed that during the occupation of border cities, the Iraqi army had taken the disabled and incapacitated individuals who failed to escape as prisoners of war<ref name=":1" />. In such circumstances, after a long silence, the International Red Cross officially announced that Iraq was refusing to show Iranian prisoners to Red Cross representatives and that 74 Iranian civilian prisoners were being held in only one Baghdad prison<ref name=":1" />.

At that juncture, the stance of the International Red Cross provided a suitable opportunity for the Islamic Republic of Iran to emerge from a media boycott by mainstream media, allowing the country's officials to expand their cross-border information activities. During this period, the War Propaganda Headquarters was tasked with inviting journalists from high-circulation publications in several Asian and European countries to observe the conditions of Iraqi prisoners of war in camps within Iran and compare their situation with that of Iranian prisoners held in Iraq. This initiative by Iran proved effective, and following the publication of positive reports in some foreign journals regarding the humane treatment of Iraqi prisoners by the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Iraqi government was compelled to respond. This led to an unprecedented and, at the same time, hypocritical action, where, for the first time, in an attempt to present a humanitarian image of itself, Iraq released 100 sick and disabled Iranian prisoners<ref name=":1" />.

However, in the political dimension, in response to the statements of the representative of the International Red Cross, regarding the possession of civilian prisoners and Iraq's concealment of Iranian prisoners, the Baghdad government refused to accept the representatives of the International Red Cross Committee and in effect prevented them from investigating the situation of Iranian prisoners. In an authoritarian maneuver, backed up by the major powers, they forced the Red Cross to prepare a new, and of course incomplete and one-sided, report. With the publication of the new Red Cross report, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in an official letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, demanded the correction of the Red Cross Committee's report based on facts<ref name=":1" />. At this point, the domestic press once again entered the arena and, by raising the legitimate demands of the Islamic Republic of Iran, created an effective news wave against the unilateral action of the International Red Cross. Simultaneously with these actions and in line with following up and addressing the complaints of the families of prisoners and missing persons, a committee was formed and submitted the families' complaints as legally actionable documents to international bodies. The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran also issued a statement addressed to the UN delegation to Iraq, requesting that during its mission, it obtain and provide clear information on the status of 20,000 missing persons and 7,800 Iranian prisoners<ref name=":1" />. The Iranian government did not remain content with this action, and the Deputy Minister for International Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs documented cases of the Iraqi regime's ill-treatment of Iranian prisoners and reiterated Iran's request to the UN delegation<ref name=":1" />.

The Iraqi press, in response to Iran's actions, published numerous reports on services provided to Iranian prisoners of war, including literacy [[education]] for underage prisoners of war, accompanied by sarcastic and humiliating remarks, thus engaging in a confrontation. In response to this action taken by Iraqi media, Iran's permanent representative at the United Nations, in a press conference, proposed an exchange of prisoners of war under 16 and disabled ones, and declared Iran's readiness to implement humanitarian affairs<ref name=":1" />. Although the media coverage of this meeting somewhat deprived the Iraqi side of propaganda opportunities, the Iraqi government, in a childish and stubborn act, resorted to an unethical show of force by parading Iranian prisoners captured in Operation Badr through the streets of Baghdad. The Iraqi press also extensively photographed and reported on the POW parade. With the issue of the liberated prisoners escalating, the then-President of Iran intervened and strongly criticized international organizations for not pursuing the fate of civilian prisoners held in Iraq. Following the explicit stance of the country's highest political authority, the War Propaganda Headquarters, with a view to maximizing the President's statements in global media, held a meeting attended by foreign diplomats residing in Tehran and domestic and foreign journalists, and exposed the inhumane nature of the Iraqi Ba'ath regime's treatment of Iranian prisoners<ref name=":1" />. The Iraqi Ba'ath regime, to neutralize this Iranian action, immediately released 30 disabled Iranian prisoners along with a propaganda uproar in its domestic and aligned media, and announced the arrival of 2000 letters from the families of Iranian prisoners.

In the midst of the competition between the Iranian and Iraqi press to influence global public opinion, a transnational center was established at the initiative of the then Prime Minister. This center, with the participation of families of prisoners of war and missing persons, aimed to address the humanitarian issues of prisoners of war and take necessary measures to alleviate the sufferings of Iranian prisoners. It was intended to act as a non-governmental organization to pursue the demands of their families<ref name=":1" />.

At this juncture, the Guardian's report on the camp for Iranian POWs in Iraq was among the few articles published in Western journals that, with a mild tone, addressed some of the realities concerning the camp life of Iranian POWs. At a time when most Western media outlets were influenced by the media campaigns of the Iraqi government and other enemies of Iran, this report tried to remain neutral. It is not unlikely that the unilateral release of 29 disabled and sick Iranian prisoners by Iraq, immediately after the publication of The Guardian's report<ref>The Guardian, July 24, 1985: 6

</ref>, was a reflection of it. In any case, as a result of visits by families of Iranian POWs and missing persons, requests for follow-up and attention from the International Red Cross, and parallel effective actions by the Red Crescent and the country's diplomacy, alongside the efforts of domestic media, the Red Cross Committee finally stated in a report that Iraq had violated the Geneva Convention regarding the treatment of prisoners of war<ref name=":1" />. In response to this statement, and to show goodwill, the Iranian government immediately released a group of Iraqi prisoners and simultaneously urged the International Red Cross to investigate the issue of hidden Iranian prisoners and the non-repatriation of civilian prisoners by the Iraqi side. At the same time, the Iraqi government also reciprocated by theatrically releasing 55 Iranian prisoners<ref name=":1" />. Following these developments, Iran established new relations based on goodwill and interaction with the International Red Cross, the first reflection of which was the reopening of the Red Cross office in Tehran after a period of strained and cold relations.

Dr. Dastjerdi, the then Secretary-General of the Red Crescent Society of the Islamic Republic of Iran, welcomed the new atmosphere and called for the simultaneous exchange of all disabled and elderly Iranian and Iraqi prisoners, mediated by the Red Cross. In this regard, a plan was prepared by the Secretary of the Supreme Defense Council and presented for this purpose<ref name=":1" />. The then government, in parallel with serious and continuous follow-ups on issues pertaining to Iranian prisoners within the framework of diplomatic relations, submitted a comprehensive plan to the Islamic Consultative Assembly in the autumn of 1987, providing the basis for resolving financial problems and addressing the welfare affairs of the families of liberated prisoners and missing persons, alongside other veterans, to ensure principled service delivery to this segment of the veteran community<ref name=":1" />.

== Background of the Collective Exchange of Prisoners and the Reflection of the Return of Liberated Prisoners in the Country's Press ==
Following the historic decision of Imam Khomeini (PBUHS) to end the eight-year war through a political solution instead of a military one, Iran officially accepted UN Security Council Resolution 598 on July 18th, 1988 (27th Tir 1367), one year after its adoption, and announced the news in the first news broadcast via [[radio]] and television.

Despite accepting the resolution, the Iraqi government, immediately after its approval, in response to Iran's acceptance, refused to adhere to its previous agreement, childishly mentioning Iran's military superiority at the time the resolution was issued and the moral impact of this superiority on its provisions. It hastily launched extensive military operations and resumed its attacks by land and air against our country. The Iraqi army, by expanding aerial attacks against economic targets in cities and mercantile ships in the Persian Gulf, as well as organizing a comprehensive sally from the west and south deep into our country's territory on July 22nd, 1988, sought to compensate for the humiliation of the war years and to end the war in its favor. As a result, although these attacks were met with a crushing response from Iranian fighters, in addition to inflicting significant material and moral damage, they took approximately 10,000 Iranian forces into captivity to approach an equal number of prisoners. Finally, the Iraqi Ba'athist regime, observing the widespread uprising of Iranians, in order to preserve its military capability and the futility of continuing its mischief, accepted a ceasefire one month later on August 19th, 1988, and ended its major military movements.

With the establishment of the ceasefire, various committees were formed under the United Nations to implement the provisions of the resolution, and Ataollah Mohajerani was appointed by Iran as the head of the Prisoners Committee. The first round of negotiations between Iran and Iraq, led by Jan Eliasson, the representative of the UN Secretary-General, began on August 25th, 1988, in Geneva, and from the outset, faced disputes over the priorities of each party. Iraq wanted to prioritize the dredging of the Arvand Rud (Shatt al-Arab) and the possibility of navigation in this waterway before any other action, to emerge from the naval stalemate as soon as possible and to organize its economic situation. Iran, however, emphasized the priority of the complete withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Iranian territory and the exchange of prisoners based on the order of the resolution's provisions, considering these two to be more important than the dredging of the Arvand Rud. Thus, the first round of negotiations ended in failure after two weeks, and no agreement was reached<ref>Velayati, Ali Akbar (1997). Political History of the Imposed War of Iraq on Iran. Tehran: Office of Islamic Culture Publication.</ref>. During this period, and during the Geneva negotiations, and while the ceasefire was in effect and Iranian army personnel were present in the region unarmed, the Iraqi Ba'athist army, in a surprise move contrary to all international norms, captured 600 Iranian army personnel to gain leverage in the peace negotiations.

The next round of negotiations began on October 2nd, 1988, first in New York and then continued in Geneva, lasting until early 1990, but yielded no desirable results. The Iraqi side's introduction of diversionary topics and demands for concessions, aimed at achieving political goals that it had failed to secure through war, prevented the attainment of a favorable outcome.

During this period, the global media landscape shifted somewhat in Iran's favor; at one point (October 1988), by order of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, the country's mass media, which had been among the media supporters of the Baghdad regime during the war, were prohibited from campaigning against Iran<ref>Hashemi Rafsanjani, Akbar (2013). End of Defense, Beginning of Reconstruction / Record and Memoirs of 1988. Tehran: Office of Islamic Revolution Knowledge Publication.

</ref>. Consequently, the positions of the Iranian delegation in the peace negotiations received favorable coverage in influential media outlets. In this period, the core of the Iranian delegation's strategic efforts was to establish a just and lasting peace in the region and to resolve the issues and obstacles to the return of over 100,000 Iranian and Iraqi prisoners to their families in the shortest possible time; a strategy that would be realized through the implementation of the initial clauses of the resolution and, ultimately, was welcomed and supported by global public opinion. The scope of this wave also extended to regional countries, and the 18th Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in Riyadh, held concurrently with the peace negotiations, issued a statement calling for the exchange of prisoners of war between the two countries in the shortest possible time, in accordance with the third clause of the resolution. In these circumstances, the Iraqi side, under pressure from public opinion and some political circles, suddenly demanded the exchange of all prisoners before any other action. This ploy could, while freeing the Iraqi government from human rights accusations, facilitate a way out of the difficult situation it found itself in. In this deal, Iraq would release 40,000 prisoners and receive 60,000 prisoners, thereby resolving the issue of prisoners without any pressure or cost. However, this was at a time when the Iraqi government had hidden a large number of Iranian prisoners and prevented their registration with the International Red Cross. Therefore, the Iranian peace delegation, with the aim of proving the insincerity of this Iraqi proposal, proposed the simultaneous release of all prisoners of war from both sides along with withdrawal behind internationally recognized borders, which was met with indifference by the Iraqis.

In such circumstances, despite overcoming the problems and difficulties of a decade of war and unrest, the domestic press, on the verge of the country's development and prosperity during a period of stability and peace, still considered the consequences of the imposed war one of its priorities and responsibly covered and followed up on news and topics related to it; so much so that between the acceptance of Resolution 598 (July 1988) and the arrival of the last large groups of liberated prisoners (September 1990), more than 600 pieces of news, reports, interviews, notes, and articles, solely on the subject of liberated prisoners, were published in several high-circulation publications of that period. The central content of most of these was supporting the rightful positions of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the prisoners of war<ref>Dehnamaki, Masoud (2005). Encyclopedia of Captivity 2: Captivity and Liberated Prisoners in Newspapers. Tehran: Aseman Danesh.

</ref>.

The country's press, with a view to ending the sufferings of the imprisoned captives and their families, explaining their social status, and honoring and respecting these exemplars of patience and steadfastness, produced content across several axes and, on behalf of public opinion, supported the Iranian negotiating team in Geneva. "Exposing the anti-human crimes of the Ba'athist regime of Iraq and its behavior contrary to the international Geneva Convention towards prisoners of war," "pressuring the International Red Cross to register all Iranian prisoners in captivity," "creating a news wave against the obstructionism of the Iraqi side in bilateral negotiations," "emphasizing the continuation of peace talks within the framework of the resolution and under the supervision of the UN Secretary-General," and "expediting the exchange of sick and disabled prisoners" were among the axes determined by the country's press and pursued in a coordinated and continuous manner. In this regard, the Jomhouri-e Eslami newspaper, in the winter of 1988, began publishing the memoirs of previously released prisoners in serialized form, under the title of "The Story of Captivity," which was dedicated to narrating the inhumane treatment of Iranian prisoners by the Ba'athist regime of Iraq. Also, by monitoring the statements of Iraqi officials and the news and content of Iraqi media, they tried to collect effective documents pertaining to the disregard for the human rights of Iranian prisoners by the Iraqis. In this regard, when Asem Yaqoub, the Iraqi ambassador to Kuwait, stated in a press conference that some Iranian prisoners had not been registered, it was immediately reflected in the domestic press and recorded in history as undeniable evidence, becoming the subject of columnists in the domestic press and the focus of legal discussions with experts and specialists in international law (this news and its margins were first published in domestic media on December 19th, 1989).

At this point, following continuous obstruction by the Iraqi side, negotiations stalled, and even Mikhail Gorbachev's recommendation to Saddam, then leader of the Soviet Union, failed to break the deadlock<ref name=":1" />.

At this time, Iraq was willing to continue negotiations bilaterally and without the presence of the UN Secretary-General's representative, in order to extort concessions, such as holding a part of our country's territory and thousands of unregistered Iranian prisoners. However, the position of Iran and the UN Secretary-General was the full implementation of the resolution and the continuation of negotiations with the presence of the UN representative and within the framework of the resolution<ref name=":1" />. Eventually, the Iraqi side's obstruction reached a point where Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, then UN Secretary-General, openly criticized the Iraqi government for disrupting the peace negotiations and invited the Iraqi delegation to go to New York to resume talks. But the Iraqis paid no heed and left his invitation unanswered. This led the UN Secretary-General, despite his conservatism, to criticize the Iraqi government and state: "The Security Council insists on Resolution 598 as the framework for peace negotiations between Iran and Iraq and is determined and serious in its implementation<ref name=":1" />. In such circumstances, and following Iraq's decision to attack Kuwait, a new process began regarding the fate of thousands of Iranian and Iraqi prisoners, and after six stages of correspondence between Saddam and high-ranking officials of our country, over one month, from August 17th, 1990, to September 17th of the same year, 37,532 Iranian prisoners were exchanged with 37,934 Iraqi prisoners<ref name=":0" />. A large portion of the released Iranian prisoners at this stage (about 19,000 people) were among the unregistered ones<ref name=":1" />.

The unexpected process of liberating Iranian prisoners at this juncture, who constituted over 83% of the total number of freed individuals in the country, created a wave of joy and excitement across different parts of the nation. Periodicals, especially national newspapers, daily added to this joy and enthusiasm by publishing pictures and various reports of the liberated prisoners' return to their homeland and the public's welcome; in such a way that the news and images published in the press pages of those days remained in the memory of Iranians like an album of souvenir photos, connecting all members of the nation and awakening a sense of national solidarity whenever they were revisited.

== The grueling marathon of liberating the remaining prisoners and determining the fate of the missing: ==
While it was expected that all captives would be liberated and returned to their homeland at that very time, suddenly on September 18th, 1990, Iraq announced that it held no more Iranian prisoners and ended the exchange process. This was despite the fact that at least 3,000 Iranian prisoners, many of whom had their voices, images, or names reflected in Iraqi media, had not yet had their fate determined<ref name=":0" />. In response to this behavior by the Iraqi government, domestic media, with a unified approach, prioritized the pursuit of freeing the remaining Iranian prisoners in captivity and, by guiding the news-propaganda flow, supported the bargaining diplomacy of statesmen with the Iraqi side. Following media campaigns and as a result of officials' efforts, by late 1990`s, a total of 415 more Iranian prisoners were set free in 9 stages. In one of these stages, the Iraqi government proceeded to exchange 239 Iranian prisoners who had judicial convictions and were serving their sentences in prisons outside of prisoner camps. In the winter of the same year, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, Vice Chairman of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council, came to Tehran at the head of a high-ranking delegation to unilaterally arrange for the release of all Iraqi prisoners, including 4,564 prisoners who had entered our country during America's involvement in the Iraq-Kuwait war, without any compensation. The discussions between the two sides did not yield a favorable outcome, and from this point, bilateral relations were severed and grew cold for a while.

In July 1991, on the eve of the UN Secretary-General's declaration of Iraq as the initiator of the war, an Iraqi delegation arrived in Iran under the pretext of normalizing relations, but actually with the aim of reclaiming their aircraft that had been brought to Iran during the war with Kuwait. As a gesture of goodwill, they brought five Iranian prisoners of war with them. In response to the Iraqi request, Iranian officials insisted on tripartite negotiations, demanding the resumption of the process of releasing prisoners and determining the fate of the missing, and reciprocally released 100 Iraqi prisoners.

== Return of the Body of Martyr Tondguyan ==
During the group return of liberated prisoners, everyone was awaiting the return of Mohammad Javad Tondguyan, the Minister of Petroleum in Martyr Rajai's cabinet. So much so that the possibility of Gholamreza Aghazadeh, the then Minister of Petroleum, resigning due to this expectation, was reflected in the country's press. However, with the return of the last group of liberated prisoners, hopes largely turned to despair. Even the reports from Kuwaiti prisoners released from Baghdad's POW camps, stating that Engineer Tondguyan was alive, did not raise much hope. Although the publication of these reports provided a good subject for newspaper columnists and reminded the Iraqi government of its legal responsibility for this abduction. Simultaneously, Iran's representative office at the United Nations issued a statement, requesting the release of the remaining prisoners and demanding that international circles address the issue of Mohammad Javad Tondguyan's abduction in the early days of the war. Pressures consistent with diplomatic actions prompted international circles to react to the request of our people and officials, and Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, in his first reaction to this request, stated: "I will personally try in this regard." The consequence of these remarks was that a few days later, the news of the return of the body of Martyr [[Tondguyan, Mohammad Javad|Tondguyan]] appeared on the front page of the country's newspapers, and the martyrdom of another oppressed innocent figure

was recorded in the history of the eight-year imposed war.

The return of the body of Martyr [[Tondguyan, Mohammad Javad|Tondguyan]] fostered the public belief that some of the remaining prisoners of war in Iraq might have been martyred and should not be expected to return. The press also sporadically and indirectly reinforced this belief to prepare the community, especially the waiting families, for this bitter reality. On the other hand, these circumstances made it possible for an Iranian delegation led by Mohammad Javad Zarif to travel to Baghdad and establish a commission to find and exchange the bodies of martyrs under the supervision of the International Red Cross. Following these negotiations and with the foresight of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a special committee was formed to search for the bodies of war martyrs, which continues to this day, and the bodies of many martyrs have been exhumed in Iraq and transferred to Iran. In one such instance, according to a Western journalist, the bodies of 54 Iranian martyrs were discovered in a mass grave, indicating they had been executed with their hands tied immediately after capture<ref name=":1" />. (← [[Tondguyan, Mohammad Javad|Mohammad Javad Tondguyan]])

== Iran and Iraq's Press Confrontation ==
The year 1994 can, in a sense, be called the year of media warfare between the Iranian and Iraqi press. In this year, the statesmen of both countries accused each other of irresponsibility and negligence in determining the fate of prisoners of war and missing persons. Naturally, the press of both countries served as the platform for such statements or responses to them. The Iraqi government, by politicizing a humanitarian issue, tried to gain propaganda advantage to sideline its inhumane treatment of Iranian prisoners. Iraq claimed that Iran had hidden 20,000 Iraqi prisoners and was not releasing them. However, Iran asserted that after each operation, it had allowed Red Cross officials to register all Iraqi prisoners and that there was no report of even a single Iraqi prisoner going missing. Moreover, the Iraqi side never managed to provide a complete list of the claimed number to the Red Cross. It is worth noting that out of the Iraqi prisoners, 7,634 had become refugees and, in one-on-one interviews with Red Cross officials, had expressed their desire to stay in Iran and were unwilling to return. In contrast, Iran had submitted a complete list of the names and details of 30,000 unregistered and missing Iranian prisoners, along with documentation of the presence of a large number of them in Iraq, to the Red Cross. Iran's documents were based on statements by individuals such as Sa'doun Hammadi, then Iraq's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, in an interview with Basra Radio, which explicitly referred to the presence of over 50,000 Iranian prisoners in Iraqi camps; furthermore, copies of the audio and video of 1,181 Iranian prisoners, which had been broadcast by Iraqi state radio and television or whose interviews and photos had been published in the Iraqi press, were available to the Red Cross, while the Iraqi side only accounted for 33 of them; additionally, 67 prisoners had been captured by the Iraqi army on Iranian soil after the war, and despite interviews with each of them by Red Cross representatives, the Iraqi government denied the presence of such individuals in Iraq.

At the end of 1994, despite Iran's sincere cooperation with the International Red Cross and continuous clarification of the status of Iraqi prisoners and vice versa, the Iraqi side's lack of cooperation and concealment led the UN Security Council to cite a report by the head of the Organization of Islamic Conference (prepared under the influence of Iraqi-Arab press and provided to the Council through the Red Cross), to jointly condemn Iran and Iraq for obstructing the progress of humanitarian plans and acting contrary to the resolution's objectives. The Security Council's condemnation of Iran was based on the use of the phrase "one prisoner for one prisoner" by Mohammad Ali Nazaran, the former head of the Prisoners' Commission. However, he had passed away a year earlier, and Brigadier General Abdullah Najafi had taken over as the head of the Prisoners' Commission. The Red Cross's cooperation in issuing the Security Council's statement led Iran to once again sever its ties with the Red Cross for a period and refuse to accept its representatives in Iran, preferring to pursue further negotiations bilaterally. Following this decision, a delegation led by Brigadier General Abdullah Najafi traveled to Baghdad to negotiate with the Iraqi side. As a result of these negotiations, the parties agreed to pursue talks within the framework of four independent committees: "Remaining Prisoner Affairs," "Refugees," "Search for Bodies," and "Border Issues."

== Pilot Lashkari's survival after 15 years. ==
For years, no one had any news of the pilot Hossein Lashkari, who was kept in a cell away from public view. The Ba'athist regime of Iraq kept pilot Lashkari alive with the aim of one day using him as proof that Iran started the war! After Iraq was officially declared the initiator of the war and this tactic failed, the Iraqi government, for the first time in May 1995, made public the captivity of pilot Lashkari and allowed the Red Cross to meet with him. With the news of Lashkari's survival, a new wave swept through the country's press, and every media outlet tried to gather and publish more information about the oldest prisoner of war. The Islamic Republic, in response to society's need, arranged an interview with his family and, by choosing the emotional headline "A wait that became 17 years long," alluding to the age of [[Hossein Lashgari|Lashkari]]'s only child, who had been deprived of his father's presence since the first day of his life, added to the emotional atmosphere of society. In these circumstances, a new flurry of activity regarding the release of prisoners took shape, and officials, in order to break grounds for his release, would unilaterally release a number of Iraqi prisoners from time to time. However, the Iraqi side, due to the outbreak of the Intifada in Iraq and the fact that most Iraqi prisoners were Shiites and their inclination to join the Intifada, showed signs of no intention to release them at that time. And that applied to the pilot Lashkari too..

== The second wave of propaganda warfare against Iran ==
With the help of agents from the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization, the Iraqi government launched extensive propaganda in Iraqi-Arab and even European publications against Iran, focusing on Iran's non-adherence to humanitarian principles. The central point of this propaganda was Iran's refusal to release Iraqi prisoners, even though there was no equivalent for exchange. With this propaganda tactic, Iraq had managed to mobilize a segment of active global public opinion against Iran. At this juncture, due to the Iraqi side's better access to transnational media, they had surpassed Iran in press propaganda and were considered victorious in the media war. To change the balance and overcome the propaganda atmosphere, the Islamic Republic of Iran unilaterally released 874 Iraqi prisoners on two occasions, 24 of whom were Christians. The release of Christian prisoners, which coincided with the birth of Jesus Christ (PBUH), somewhat broke the propaganda atmosphere against Iran and was reflected in media circles. In response to this action, Soma Ruga, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, met with Cyrus Nasseri, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Geneva, in a friendly atmosphere and stated:<blockquote>"What you did regarding the unilateral release of Iraqi prisoners was a very fundamental and serious action, but there is still a fundamental problem concerning Iranian prisoners."</blockquote>These remarks from the highest international official indicated the belief that there were no Iranian prisoners in Iraq, which was a cause for concern in itself. Iran's Permanent Representative in Geneva replied:<blockquote>"Officially announce your opinion and accept responsibility for it."</blockquote>Ruga refused, and Nasseri pointed out that If there were still some Iranians in Iraq`s prisons contrary to what they claimed, their lives would easily be endangered by the Iraqis. He asked Ruga to pressure the Iraqi side, out of humanitarian concern, to be accountable for the remaining Iranian prisoners. After this meeting, Michel Cagnon traveled to Iran on behalf of the Red Cross, and relations between the two sides were re-established after a long time.

== A year of change in the situation of prisoners ==
The year 1995 began with signs of change in the situation of war prisoners. The dispatch of a delegation to Baghdad, led by Ali Khorram, advisor to our country's Minister of Foreign Affairs, marked the beginning of this transformation. With this trip, negotiations were reopened, and the release of the remaining prisoners in Iraq was pursued. Determining the fate of missing persons and refugees was another issue on the agenda of this delegation. During this trip, Khorram met and discussed with the then Iraqi Foreign Minister and stated in a press conference:<blockquote>"Iran's policy is to find a fundamental and practical solution instead of debate and contention for the release of the remaining prisoners of the two countries; because the issue of prisoners is a humanitarian one."</blockquote>The outcome of these negotiations was that both sides would list and present their claimed cases. This ultimately benefited Iran; because the Iraqi side merely made claims and could not provide a true list of its remaining prisoners in Iran and was forced to reduce the astronomical number of its prisoners. This action also took away the propaganda weapon from Iraqi media and limited their propaganda topics, creating a positive environment for continuing discussions in a calm atmosphere to find a practical and fair solution. Until then, no such action had been taken, and therefore, it was considered a step towards resolving mutual issues away from propaganda and media pressures. Among the achievements of this trip was the continuation of work within the framework of four independent committees: "Prisoners," "Refugees," "Search for Bodies," and "Border Issues," which helped facilitate matters. At this juncture, the domestic press, while supporting the achievements of the Iranian delegation, patiently demonstrated another phase of interaction and tolerance within the general policies of the system to provide conditions for the release of the remaining prisoners. (For example, see Jomhouri Eslami and Salam on 1995/06/11)<ref name=":1" />.

On September 10th, 1995, an Iraqi delegation led by Saad Abdul Majid Al-Faisal,the Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister, arrived in Tehran and held talks with Iranian officials. The outcome of these negotiations was documented in a 7-article memorandum and signed by both parties. According to the memorandum, the parties agreed to exchange lists of their prisoners to serve as a basis for final action after review and verification. It was also decided that another sub-committee would thoroughly examine disputed cases regarding prisoners to facilitate the exchange of all remaining prisoners of both sides under the supervision of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Thus, for the first time, a written agreement between the two countries concerning prisoners was signed, recording the claims of both sides without exaggeration. Although this agreement was not implemented in practice, as the Iraqi side refused to exchange the lists of prisoners it claimed, it became the basis for future negotiations.

The approach of the domestic press during this period was to support the decision-makers and executive officials of the country. One of the characteristics of the press's performance during these days was the honoring of the social status of the liberated prisoners and emphasizing their importance and position in Iranian society. This approach indicated the importance of the issue and Iran's seriousness in freeing all prisoners, and reflected the attention of the country's officials to the issue of releasing captives. This stance was not hidden from experts and impartial circles. At that time, due to the Shiite intifada, the Iraqis had no desire for the return of their prisoners, who were mostly Shiite, and in practice, apart from the release of a group of officers affiliated with the Ba'ath Party, there was not much enthusiasm for the exchange of the remaining prisoners (pages of newspapers such as Salam, Kayhan, Ettela'at, and Jomhuri-e Eslami during this period attest to this fact)<ref name=":1" />.

Domestic media, following the policy of tolerance of the country's officials, also tried to maintain the level of relations with Iraq and not fuel aggression and conflict. In contrast, the Iraqi media began another phase of one-sided attacks against Iran and, through victim-playing, tried to portray Iran as the main culprit in obstructing the release of the remaining prisoners. On this score, the Iraqi government, with the aim of creating content for publications supported by Iraq, drafted and sent four letters to the UN Secretary-General, the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, and the Secretary-General of the Non-Aligned Movement, in which it introduced Iran as the obstructing party in the negotiations for the release of prisoners. Iraqi media and other aligned media, in support of Saddam's Ba'athist government's propaganda policies, paid full attention and raised a huge uproar. In these circumstances, Kamal Kharazi, Iran's permanent representative to the United Nations, in order to counter the uproar of the Iraqi media group and its Western and regional supporters, held frequent press conferences, criticizing Iraq's behavior regarding the issue of prisoner release and pointing to the obstructions and reasons for the prolonged and fruitless negotiations with the Iraqi government's involvement. The reflection of these meetings, which took place in New York, had a relatively positive impact on domestic and foreign media in shedding light on the nature of the Ba'athist regime's propaganda uproar for the world public opinion.

In mid-1996, the Iraqi government, by assigning the continuation of negotiations to the Ministry of Intelligence (Istikhbarat), effectively took the matter out of the hands of its Foreign Ministry, thus adopting a new tactic to prolong and render the negotiations fruitless. The Iraqi Minister of Intelligence immediately came to Iran and, with a false approach of trying to break the deadlock in negotiations, declared his main demand to be ignoring previous agreements. He claimed that because intelligence elements had more influence on the government, they could better accomplish their mission. During his trip to Tehran for negotiations, he went to the Ministry of Intelligence and expected to negotiate with his intelligence counterpart. However, the head of the Prisoners' Commission went to the Ministry of Intelligence for discussions. In this meeting, the issue of the release of all prisoners held in Iran and Iraq was discussed. The Iranian representative, while emphasizing previous agreements, strongly criticized the Iraqi side's wavering positions and condemned the Iraqi media's disregard for the human aspects of the prisoner issue and its use as a propaganda tool.

Iran's firm and principled positions led the Iraqi side to once again entrust the continuation of negotiations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and pursue bilateral issues through that channel.

With the aim of breaking the deadlock in negotiations, Iran unilaterally released more than 150 Iraqi prisoners on October 26th, 1996, which received positive media coverage in European countries. Following these actions, the Red Cross was encouraged to send a representative to Tehran to advance the negotiations. Subsequently, Michel Caignard, Director-General for the Middle East and North Africa, arrived in Tehran on December 3rd, 1996, and held talks with Iranian officials. During these negotiations, the necessity of the Red Cross's neutrality was raised, and an honest effort to find practical solutions for resolving prisoner-related issues and correcting the Red Cross's [[statistics]] on the number of prisoners from both sides was requested. However, the Red Cross representative, under the pretext that "we can only accept statistics based on evidence and visits," in practice supported the positions of the Iraqi side. Concurrently with the presence of the Red Cross representative, some widely circulated newspapers published articles and notes raising serious criticisms regarding the performance of the International Red Cross and reminded it of its international mission. (For example, see Keyhan, Ettela'at, and Jomhuri-e Eslami newspapers, December 1996)<ref name=":1" />.

== Continuation of Diplomatic Challenges in 1997 ==
On March 27th, 1997, following a meeting between the foreign ministers of Iran and Iraq on the sidelines of the Organization of Islamic Conference summit in Rabat, emphasis was placed on pursuing the issue of prisoners of war between the two countries through diplomatic channels, with a focus on the foreign ministries of both governments. The Iraqi foreign minister also expressed readiness to release 64 Iranian prisoners who were in held custody. In this situation, the newly emerging press, which had entered the scene after the May 23rd, 1997 elections along with the wave of modernism and community-oriented demands, in company with other media rooted in the war era, bore the main burden of news and propaganda support for peace negotiations and the release of the remaining captives.

== Another Confrontation Between Iranian and Iraqi Press ==
In September 1997, a representative of the Red Cross once again visited Iran and explicitly stated that, apart from 64 prisoners and one pilot, [[Hossein Lashgari|Hossein Lashkari]], they had no information about any other captives. This representative's stance, which was close to the Iraqi positions, meant disregarding many documents and evidence that Iranian officials had provided to the Red Cross concerning the presence of thousands of Iranian prisoners in overt and covert Iraqi POW camps. Following the Red Cross representative's (← Red Cross) statements, the head of the Prisoners Commission, in a press conference, declared the number of Iranian prisoners in Iraq announced by the Red Cross representative to be incorrect and confirmed that it was an endorsement of the Iraqi side's obstruction in definitively resolving the prisoner issue. Iraqi officials, in response, reiterated their usual accusations, and consequently, the attacks by the Iraqi press against Iran, which had subsided for a while, escalated once again.

In a televised speech, Saddam also condemned Iran for expansionism and addressed peripheral issues from the imaginary position of leadership of Arab-speaking countries. In response to Saddam's statements, Dr. Khorram, senior advisor to our country's Foreign Minister, announced in an interview with domestic media:<blockquote>"We should not be expected to react sharply to Saddam's statements. We have seen many such ups and downs from Iraq, and therefore our approach will be balanced."</blockquote>He employed a diplomatic language to belittle Saddam and tried to expose the rift between Iraq and the Arab world. Following this political stance, the Prisoners' Commission also unilaterally released 46 Iraqi prisoners in a practical move; thus, Iran's wise stance and sincere practical action on the eve of the Islamic Conference had a positive impact on the atmosphere of the conference and prevented the leaders of Islamic countries from being influenced by the propaganda of the Iraqi press. In this situation, Iran released another 500 Iraqi prisoners to reaffirm Iran's humanitarian positions. Iraq, in a passive move, released two missing Iranian prisoners, who provided much information about other prisoners, which was very effective in the continuation of negotiations.

In mid-December 1997, Saeed al-Sahhaf, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, unexpectedly arrived in Tehran to participate in the Islamic Conference and distributed copies of a letter containing repetitive content among the members, claiming that there were no Iranian prisoners in Iraq! Whereas 18092 Iraqi prisoners were still in Iran. He had asked the members of the organization to help release the Iraqi prisoners out of humanitarianism. Following this action, he held a press conference and was waiting for reporters to ask questions about the letter. However, representatives of the country's press community, without any reference to his letter, intelligently did not give him the opportunity to exploit it and simultaneously published news about a list of 9424 Iranian prisoners present in Iraq. The solidarity of the domestic press with the responsible authorities strengthened Iran's position in international circles, and finally, the status of 1267 Iranian prisoners and detainees was clarified, of whom, unfortunately, only 175 were alive and imprisoned in Iraq. This number was exchanged with 2170 Iraqi prisoners in a short period.

== Release of Pilot Hossein Lashkary ==
Following the relentless efforts of officials to determine the fate and secure the release of prisoners, in April 1998, another 319 liberated prisoners were exchanged, with 15 Iraqi prisoners for each Iranian liberated prisoner. Among those released in this phase was Pilot [[Hossein Lashgari|Hossein Lashkary]], who returned to his homeland after 18 years. At this stage, for the first time, domestic and international journalists were allowed to participate in the reception ceremony held for the released prisoners and to prepare reports and images from the ceremony to publish in their outlets.

According to numerous pieces of evidence, at least more than 474 Iranian prisoners were held by Iraq. Therefore, it was necessary to continue the follow-ups. Thus, the relevant officials began another round of efforts to release the remaining prisoners.

Three days after the release of this group of liberated prisoners, the Iraqi newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat wrote:<blockquote>"The file of Iranian prisoners will be closed by the end of the year."</blockquote>This news, which was confirmed by other Iraqi publications such as Al-Musawwar Al-Arabi, gave Iranian officials new strength and motivation to redouble their efforts in order to determine the fate of the remaining prisoners.

The first achievement of these efforts was compelling the Iraqi side to acknowledge statistics closer to reality, which was realized at the joint Iran-Iraq committee meeting on June 17th, 1998, in Baghdad. At this meeting, the Iraqis largely organized their claims and accepted the list of remaining and missing Iranian prisoners. According to this list, 3120 Iranian prisoners were in Iraq and needed to have their status determined. The minutes of the agreed-upon list were signed by both parties. Also, by determining the status of Iraqi prisoners, it became clear that another 2838 Iraqi prisoners were held by Iran. With the exchange of these lists in the presence of a representative of the International Red Cross, the Iraqis' hands were tied for negative propaganda against Iran.

It was expected that the year 1998, which saw the release of 494 Iranian prisoners, would be the year for resolving the status of all prisoners of war and missing persons. However, with the Iraqi authorities changing the designation of Iranian prisoners to "political prisoners" and repeatedly claiming that there were no Iranian prisoners in Iraq, all hopes were once again dashed. This behavior by the Iraqis even surprised Western news agencies and prompted a reaction (Agence France-Presse covered this issue in one of its April 1998 editions).

The change in the Iraqi side's stance was met with a clear and firm position from the then-President, Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani:<blockquote>"The resolution of the Tehran-Baghdad problem hinges on clarifying the status of the remaining prisoners."</blockquote>Concurrently, the head of the Prisoners of War Commission, presenting his documentation to the Red Cross, reported the presence of 3206 Iranian prisoners in Iraqi territory. In response, an Iraqi official, in an interview with the Iraqi newspaper "Sawt al-Talaba" (Voice of the Student), referred to a list of Iraqi prisoners that had been handed over to the Iranian delegation. In this vein, in July 1999, Iraqi newspapers, on the occasion of the anniversary of their victory in the war!, designated the remaining prisoners in Iran as one of their central themes and extensively wrote about it. In this regard, the newspaper "Babel," managed by Uday, Saddam's son, wrote in the main column of its front page:<blockquote>"Among the problems between the two countries there is the unresolved issue of prisoners."</blockquote>Saddam also claimed in a speech:<blockquote>"Iran is holding several thousand Iraqi prisoners and is not releasing them, and we will resort to force if necessary to free the Iraqi prisoners."</blockquote>Following these statements, the Iraqi press launched a new uproar against our country. These interactions did not escape the sharp eyes of the press, and while reflecting them favorably, they responded. In this regard, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by inviting domestic and foreign journalists to a press conference, responded to Saddam's ramblings and dismissed his claims as contrary to existing realities: "Iran's stance on prisoners and those missing during the imposed war is a humanitarian one, coupled with Islamic compassion and kindness. It is the Iraqis who have toyed with the fate of several thousand Iranian prisoners and are evading their release."

Simultaneously with launching a propaganda and media war, the Iraqi government published 24 volumes of memoirs by captured Ba'athist officers in Iran to create documentation. The Iraqi press also published excerpts from them and printed articles against Iran, and to some extent, managed to align Western and Arab media with themselves. To break the new propaganda atmosphere, the Islamic Republic of Iran unilaterally released 277 Iraqi prisoners on October 10th, 1999. Concurrently, the Iranian press focused on topics such as Iran's humanitarianism and the development of relations based on peace and friendship. In the continuation of this confrontation, Iran unilaterally released another 500 Iraqi prisoners, and again in mid-May 2000, given its effectiveness, released 480 Iraqi prisoners. Twenty days later, another 440 Iraqi prisoners were unilaterally released by Iran, and in an unprecedented move 1697 prisoners were unilaterally released within a few months. Following their release, the Red Cross invited Iran to resume negotiations again under its supervision. Our country's officials responded positively to this request, and after a long hiatus, in January 2000, an Iranian delegation traveled to Geneva to continue negotiations. During this trip, officials, in an innovative move, took several of the liberated prisoners with them to Geneva to bring the issue of the remaining Iranian prisoners in Iraq to the attention of global media. Dr. Alborzi, the plenipotentiary representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in negotiations with Kelly Berger, then head of the International Committee of the Red Cross, asked him to officially reflect Iran's actions in a statement issued by the Red Cross and to formally request the Iraqi President in a letter to remove the obstacles to the exchange of all prisoners. The Iranian delegation's goal with these actions was to reduce propaganda pressure of Western and Arab newspapers. During this trip, documents pertaining to over three thousand Iranian prisoners and missing persons were handed over to Red Cross officials.

At that time it just so happened that the biggest supporter of Iranian captives, [[Abu Torabifard, Seyyed Aliakbar|Seyed Ali-Akbar Abutorabi-Fard]], passed away on June 2nd, 2000, in a car accident, a heavy blow and loss indeed!. This incident once again brought the issue of the liberated prisoners to the pages of journals and newspapers and revitalized their memories<ref name=":1" />.

On June 29th, 2000, Iran unilaterally released 450 Iraqi prisoners once again. On August 9th and 10th of the same year, 728 more Iraqi prisoners were unilaterally released in two groups. Following their release, the Red Cross issued a statement announcing that it had interviewed Iraqi prisoners of war who had sought refuge in Iran and found that they had no intention of returning to Iraq. This statement largely reduced the intensity of the propaganda against Iran. During this period, one of the newspapers, in an innovative move, began publishing photos and details pertaining to the captivity of the remaining prisoners which was a timely and effective action in line with documenting the claims of our country's officials<ref name=":1" />.

More than two decades after the outbreak of war , the families of the remaining prisoners and the missing , whose fates had not been determined, became restless and were waiting to hear definite news and expecting the uncertainty to end at long last. In the interim, some of them had passed away or been martyred. Therefore, the Iranian delegation decided to propose another solution to the Red Cross: that both delegations become active, at least for a while, on the issue of prisoners who had died or been martyred, so that at least some families could terminate the prolonged uncertainty. In this regard, a plan was prepared and presented to the Iraqi side. Based on a clause in this plan, the two sides agreed not to publicize news of the pursuit of prisoners' freedom periodically, so that the work could proceed with more calm. However, the Iraqi officials, contrary to their commitment, after the release of 24 Iranian prisoners, 6 of whom were Iraqis, reflected the issue in the press and once again resorted to media uproar against our country.

After some time had passed since the new plan was implemented, the bodies of 570 Iranian prisoners, who had either died or been martyred during captivity, were exchanged for 1179 Iraqi bodies, among whom was the body of Martyr Abbas Doran. The arrival of the martyrs' bodies affected the country's atmosphere and gave it a spiritual aura. In such an atmosphere, the domestic press once again made an effort and brought the issue of prisoners up in the media<ref name=":1" />.

Following the emergence of a new wave in November 2002, a new round of negotiations between Iran and Iraq resumed, and the two countries agreed to release all prisoners they held. As a result, the path was paved for the release of all prisoners on both sides , and in their last meeting, the parties decided to exchange 941 Iraqi captives plus 30 Iraqi prisoners with 351 Iranian prisoners-of-war . This important event was realized in March 2003, and after that, the head of the Prisoners' Commission officially announced in the final days of 2003 that "we no longer have any prisoners in Iraq."

== See also ==
• The Imposed War of Iraq against Iran

• [[Abu Torabifard, Seyyed Aliakbar|Seyyed Ali Akbar Abutorabi Fard]]

• Red Cross

• Red Crescent

• Return of the liberated prisoners of war to the Homeland

• [[Hossein Lashgari|Hossein Lashkary]]

• [[Tondguyan, Mohammad Javad|Mohammad Javad Tondguyan]]

== Bibliography ==
<references />

== For Further Reading ==
Darvishi, Farhad (2011). Iran-Iraq War, Questions and Answers. 7th ed. Tehran: Center for War Studies and Research.

Dehnamaki, Masoud (2005). Encyclopedia of Captivity 2: Captivity and Liberated Prisoners in Newspapers. Tehran: Aseman Danesh.

Velayati, Ali Akbar (1997). Political History of the Imposed War of Iraq on Iran. Tehran: Office of Islamic Culture Publication.

Hashemi Rafsanjani, Akbar (2013). End of Defense, Beginning of Reconstruction / Record and Memoirs of 1988. Tehran: Office of Islamic Revolution Knowledge Publication.

Metz, Helen Chapin, ed. (1988), "The Soviet Union", Iraq: a Country Study, Library of Congress Country Studies

== Author ==
Ismail Alavi Yeganeh
[[Category:Prisoners]]
[[fa:اسارت، اسرا و آزادگان در مطبوعات]]
[[ar:الأسرى والأحرار في الصحافة]]

Captivity, Prisoners of War, and Liberated Prisoners of War in the Press

2026-09-01T08:41:08Z

Marjan-khanlari: /* Bibliography */

Captivity, Prisoners of War, and Liberated Prisoners of War in the Press

2026-09-01T08:33:08Z

Marjan-khanlari: Created page with "'''Reflection of news and reports related to prisoners of war and liberated prisoners of war in domestic newspapers and publications.''' == From the beginning of the imposed war until the acceptance of the resolution == On September 22, 1980 (Shahrivar 31, 1359), Iraq launched an attack on the Islamic Republic of Iran from three fronts, with the strategy of "heavy initial assault" followed by negotiations based on "new conditions," imposing the longest conventional war..."

'''Reflection of news and reports related to prisoners of war and liberated prisoners of war in domestic newspapers and publications.'''

== From the beginning of the imposed war until the acceptance of the resolution ==
On September 22, 1980 (Shahrivar 31, 1359), Iraq launched an attack on the Islamic Republic of Iran from three fronts, with the strategy of "heavy initial assault" followed by negotiations based on "new conditions," imposing the longest conventional war of the 20th century on our country. Utilizing the element of surprise, the Iraqi army occupied over 20,000 square kilometers of Iranian territory during the initial days of the attack, including many cities and villages (Mohammad Daroudian's website, war history researcher, quoting Brigadier General Mehrabi, Deputy Intelligence Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces), and with the aim of gaining superiority in future negotiations, took defenders and ordinary people in border cities and villages into captivity<ref>Habiban, Mohammad Hasan and Asgari, Shadab (2014). Iraqi Prisoners or Guests. 2nd ed. Tehran: Organization for the Preservation of the Values of the Sacred Defense of AJA, p. 41.

</ref>.

The Iraqi army, despite claiming to be engaged in an unavoidable and defensive war, took the disabled, sick, and elderly residents of cities and villages as prisoners of war, mistreated them, and refused to register many of them with the International Red Cross<ref>Alaei, Hossein (2012). The Trend of the Iran-Iraq War. Vol. 1. Tehran: Marzoboom, pp. 218 and 230.</ref><ref name=":0">Aghaei, Abbas and Rostami, Fatemeh (2014). Side by Side with . Memoirs of the Liberated Brigadier General Abdollah Najafi, 2nd ed. Tehran: Islamic Revolution Document Center, p. 97.

</ref>. Domestic media, spearheaded by the three widely circulated newspapers of the capital (Keyhan, Ettela'at, and Jomhouri Eslami), along with other publications, showed sensitivity to the issue of Iranian prisoners of war from the beginning of the imposed war over a 22-year period. Through responsible follow-up and timely and favorable coverage of news and reports related to them, they provided moral support for humanitarian actions that led to the determination of their status, facilitation of their living conditions, and their release. In times of necessity, they also confronted the propaganda machine of the Ba'athist enemy and its allies (at that time, the newspapers Enghelab Eslami, Bamdad, Azadeghan, Mizan, and Abrar also covered this issue and echoed the three leading newspapers in defending the human rights of prisoners, just as this trend continued later with the publication of newspapers such as Salam, Resalat, Hamshahri, Iran, and others). The media's objective in this regard was to expose the brutal behavior of the Iraqi government towards Iranian prisoners, compel Baghdad's rulers to comply with international conventions to recognize the rights of prisoners of war, to explain the social status of prisoners to public opinion, and to create a suitable environment for their earlier and easier release. In this context, the media, taking the initiative within the framework of the war propaganda management system's discretion, produced and reflected diverse news and reports, forming a front to counter the enemy's propaganda front and its supporters.

== The first news to reach publications ==
In the months leading up to the imposed war, when the Iraqi army was causing insecurity in some border areas and cities with its provocative actions, even in the early days of the imposed war, due to the prevailing conditions in the country's public sphere, news with local and sometimes unreliable sources found its way into the pages of the press. The continuation of this trend could have had negative consequences and ultimately led to the weakening of the national defense morale. Such news, by forming a bleak picture, pushed society into inactivity and caused an atmosphere of fear and despair. However, with the vigilance of officials and the cooperation of all stakeholders and media professionals, the continuation of this trend was stopped very quickly, and news related to the war was published after being confirmed by official sources. Thus, the first news on the subject of captivity, as a hegemonic strategy and as the first propaganda axis in the framework of comprehensive confrontation with enemy aggression, was published thirteen days after the start of the war. This axis was first propounded by the highest executive official of the country, the then Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali Rajai, in a speech from the podium of the United Nations, addressing the Security Council. In this speech, he states: "The Iraqi regime has abducted civilians and ordinary citizens living in border towns and villages and is taking them as prisoners, torturing and killing them along with prisoners of war.

In the continuation of his speech, Mohammad-Ali Rajai calls for an investigation into the war crimes of the Iraqi ruling regime and effective action by international bodies to prevent such inhumane acts<ref name=":1">Archives of the newspapers Jomhouri Eslami, Keyhan, Ettela'at, Abrar, Salam, etc., and the magazines Saf, Azadegan, and Pasdar-e Eslam.

</ref>. Excerpts from the then-head of government's remarks were reflected in mass media, including widely circulated newspapers, and for several days became the subject of columnists and news for domestic media.

Two weeks later, the news of the capture of Mohammad Javad Tondguyan, the Minister of Oil of the Islamic Republic of Iran, along with several companions, including one of his deputies, Seyyed Mohsen Yahyavi, created a new responsibility for the country's press. For several consecutive days, it occupied one of the top half-page headlines of most daily newspapers; also, dozens of news pieces, reports, and interviews were produced and sent to print, with the central theme of most published materials being the responsibility of the Ba'athist regime of Iraq and relevant international bodies for the lives of the hostages<ref name=":1" />.

After the news wave of the oil minister's capture subsided, on March 30th, 1981, a short news item was published in Keyhan newspaper about efforts to exchange wounded and disabled Iranian and Iraqi prisoners. On June 17th and August 27th of the same year, news of the release and exchange of a number of disabled and sick Iranian prisoners of war with a group of Iraqi prisoners was published on two occasions. Following the release of these liberated prisoners, a morning newspaper, Jomhuri-e Eslami, and an evening newspaper, Ettela'at, began to publish their memoirs in serial form. At this stage, the weekly magazines Soroush and Shahed, and the monthly magazines Saf and Pasdar-e Islam, also joined in and exposed the inhumane treatment of Iranian prisoners by the Iraqi Ba'athist regime. During this period, the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross was invited to Iran by the head of the Red Crescent to hear the statements of the released Iranian prisoners, at least one-third of whom were ordinary citizens of border towns and villages. Coinciding with his presence in Tehran, the press published documented reports of mistreatment of Iranian prisoners and coordinately printed images of an elderly woman who had been taken captive by the Iraqi army and was among the exchanged prisoners<ref name=":1" />.

The head of the International Committee of the Red Cross, despite hearing the statements of newly released Iranian prisoners and observing numerous pieces of concrete evidence confirming the violation of international conventions regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, refused to take even the slightest stance on the inhumane treatment of Iranian prisoners by the Iraqi government. This significant silence, in practice, provided a great opportunity for the Baghdad regime to continue with its crimes, and also led to pessimism among the country's officials and elites regarding the integrity and impartiality of international institutions. Naturally, this perception also found its way into the country's propaganda system, including domestic media, and consequently, from this point on, Iran's relations with international institutions, including the global Red Cross, soured and entered a new phase, a process consisting of many ups and downs until the end of the war. In line with this behavior, renowned global media also published very little news regarding the torture of Iranian prisoners and the blatant violation of international laws, and by their silence, effectively followed the Red Cross's practice. Following this event, the War Propaganda Headquarters, in order to break the media silence, invited a number of high-circulation Western media outlets and regional countries to visit Iran and directly understand the facts and take action to introduce the true face of the Ba'athist regime of Iraq. At the same time, the Supreme Defense Council unilaterally released a number of disabled and sick Iraqi prisoners and simultaneously created conditions for Iraqi prisoners to meet their families in their detention camps. The least impact of these measures, if adequately reflected in the global media, would have been to break the propaganda atmosphere against our country, which would have reduced Iraq's mistreatment of Iranian prisoners. However, this strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, although fully supported by domestic media and its dimensions reflected through various reports, especially visual reports, did not receive much coverage in foreign publications<ref name=":1" />.

== Confronting the Iraqi Regime's New Tactic ==
On the other hand, the Baghdad regime, in an attempt to downplay Iran's humanitarian actions, especially regarding the unilateral release of sick Iraqi prisoners, launched a new propaganda maneuver. By inviting journalists and cameramen from India, Pakistan, Greece, France, Italy, and other countries, it tried to confront them with young Iranian prisoners. Through this, it aimed to promote the narrative that Iran's basis in the war with Iraq was to expand the influence of its religious-revolutionary ideas in the region, and to achieve this goal, it even recruited underage students, thereby mobilizing public opinion against Iran. This propaganda line could position Iraq in the spotlight of Western and Arab countries as the frontline against the export of the Islamic Revolution, garnering their political and military support. However, the political-propaganda ploy of the Ba'athist Iraqi regime, launched with the motive of undermining the national and legitimate defense of the Iranian people, did not go unanswered. The War Propaganda Headquarters took retaliatory action and organized an intelligent effort to enlighten public opinion on a broad scale, with domestic media playing a significant role in this regard. Domestic newspapers, dedicating considerable effort and resources, designed and implemented various themes, among which publicizing the mistreatment of Iranian prisoners by Iraqis and emphasizing the Baghdad regime's violation of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions regarding the rights of prisoners of war were prominent<ref name=":1" />.

Another area that the domestic press designed and implemented in this regard and at this juncture was questioning the indifference of the International Red Cross towards the Iraqi government's behavior contrary to international regulations concerning Iranian prisoners of war. In this regard, ETTELA'AT newspaper, in an influential note, asked this committee to publish a report on its members' visits to Iranian POW camps in Iraq and not to support the crimes of the Iraqi regime with biased silence. In this note, Iranian prisoners were referred to as "Azadegan" (liberated ones) for the first time<ref name=":1" />.

Following the wave created by the domestic press, 500 [[family]] members of prisoners staged a sit-in in front of the International Red Cross representative office, demanding serious action from this organization in line with its inherent duties. Alongside this movement, Keyhan newspaper published a shocking report on the brutal tortures inflicted on Iranian prisoners in Iraq and revealed that during the occupation of border cities, the Iraqi army had taken the disabled and incapacitated individuals who failed to escape as prisoners of war [4]. In such circumstances, after a long silence, the International Red Cross officially announced that Iraq was refusing to show Iranian prisoners to Red Cross representatives and that 74 Iranian civilian prisoners were being held in only one Baghdad prison<ref name=":1" />.

At that juncture, the stance of the International Red Cross provided a suitable opportunity for the Islamic Republic of Iran to emerge from a media boycott by mainstream media, allowing the country's officials to expand their cross-border information activities. During this period, the War Propaganda Headquarters was tasked with inviting journalists from high-circulation publications in several Asian and European countries to observe the conditions of Iraqi prisoners of war in camps within Iran and compare their situation with that of Iranian prisoners held in Iraq. This initiative by Iran proved effective, and following the publication of positive reports in some foreign journals regarding the humane treatment of Iraqi prisoners by the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Iraqi government was compelled to respond. This led to an unprecedented and, at the same time, hypocritical action, where, for the first time, in an attempt to present a humanitarian image of itself, Iraq released 100 sick and disabled Iranian prisoners<ref name=":1" />.

However, in the political dimension, in response to the statements of the representative of the International Red Cross, regarding the possession of civilian prisoners and Iraq's concealment of Iranian prisoners, the Baghdad government refused to accept the representatives of the International Red Cross Committee and in effect prevented them from investigating the situation of Iranian prisoners. In an authoritarian maneuver, backed up by the major powers, they forced the Red Cross to prepare a new, and of course incomplete and one-sided, report. With the publication of the new Red Cross report, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in an official letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, demanded the correction of the Red Cross Committee's report based on facts<ref name=":1" />. At this point, the domestic press once again entered the arena and, by raising the legitimate demands of the Islamic Republic of Iran, created an effective news wave against the unilateral action of the International Red Cross. Simultaneously with these actions and in line with following up and addressing the complaints of the families of prisoners and missing persons, a committee was formed and submitted the families' complaints as legally actionable documents to international bodies. The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran also issued a statement addressed to the UN delegation to Iraq, requesting that during its mission, it obtain and provide clear information on the status of 20,000 missing persons and 7,800 Iranian prisoners<ref name=":1" />. The Iranian government did not remain content with this action, and the Deputy Minister for International Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs documented cases of the Iraqi regime's ill-treatment of Iranian prisoners and reiterated Iran's request to the UN delegation<ref name=":1" />.

The Iraqi press, in response to Iran's actions, published numerous reports on services provided to Iranian prisoners of war, including literacy [[education]] for underage prisoners of war, accompanied by sarcastic and humiliating remarks, thus engaging in a confrontation. In response to this action taken by Iraqi media, Iran's permanent representative at the United Nations, in a press conference, proposed an exchange of prisoners of war under 16 and disabled ones, and declared Iran's readiness to implement humanitarian affairs<ref name=":1" />. Although the media coverage of this meeting somewhat deprived the Iraqi side of propaganda opportunities, the Iraqi government, in a childish and stubborn act, resorted to an unethical show of force by parading Iranian prisoners captured in Operation Badr through the streets of Baghdad. The Iraqi press also extensively photographed and reported on the POW parade. With the issue of the liberated prisoners escalating, the then-President of Iran intervened and strongly criticized international organizations for not pursuing the fate of civilian prisoners held in Iraq. Following the explicit stance of the country's highest political authority, the War Propaganda Headquarters, with a view to maximizing the President's statements in global media, held a meeting attended by foreign diplomats residing in Tehran and domestic and foreign journalists, and exposed the inhumane nature of the Iraqi Ba'ath regime's treatment of Iranian prisoners<ref name=":1" />. The Iraqi Ba'ath regime, to neutralize this Iranian action, immediately released 30 disabled Iranian prisoners along with a propaganda uproar in its domestic and aligned media, and announced the arrival of 2000 letters from the families of Iranian prisoners.

In the midst of the competition between the Iranian and Iraqi press to influence global public opinion, a transnational center was established at the initiative of the then Prime Minister. This center, with the participation of families of prisoners of war and missing persons, aimed to address the humanitarian issues of prisoners of war and take necessary measures to alleviate the sufferings of Iranian prisoners. It was intended to act as a non-governmental organization to pursue the demands of their families<ref name=":1" />.

At this juncture, the Guardian's report on the camp for Iranian POWs in Iraq was among the few articles published in Western journals that, with a mild tone, addressed some of the realities concerning the camp life of Iranian POWs. At a time when most Western media outlets were influenced by the media campaigns of the Iraqi government and other enemies of Iran, this report tried to remain neutral. It is not unlikely that the unilateral release of 29 disabled and sick Iranian prisoners by Iraq, immediately after the publication of The Guardian's report<ref>The Guardian, July 24, 1985: 6

</ref>, was a reflection of it. In any case, as a result of visits by families of Iranian POWs and missing persons, requests for follow-up and attention from the International Red Cross, and parallel effective actions by the Red Crescent and the country's diplomacy, alongside the efforts of domestic media, the Red Cross Committee finally stated in a report that Iraq had violated the Geneva Convention regarding the treatment of prisoners of war<ref name=":1" />. In response to this statement, and to show goodwill, the Iranian government immediately released a group of Iraqi prisoners and simultaneously urged the International Red Cross to investigate the issue of hidden Iranian prisoners and the non-repatriation of civilian prisoners by the Iraqi side. At the same time, the Iraqi government also reciprocated by theatrically releasing 55 Iranian prisoners<ref name=":1" />. Following these developments, Iran established new relations based on goodwill and interaction with the International Red Cross, the first reflection of which was the reopening of the Red Cross office in Tehran after a period of strained and cold relations.

Dr. Dastjerdi, the then Secretary-General of the Red Crescent Society of the Islamic Republic of Iran, welcomed the new atmosphere and called for the simultaneous exchange of all disabled and elderly Iranian and Iraqi prisoners, mediated by the Red Cross. In this regard, a plan was prepared by the Secretary of the Supreme Defense Council and presented for this purpose<ref name=":1" />. The then government, in parallel with serious and continuous follow-ups on issues pertaining to Iranian prisoners within the framework of diplomatic relations, submitted a comprehensive plan to the Islamic Consultative Assembly in the autumn of 1987, providing the basis for resolving financial problems and addressing the welfare affairs of the families of liberated prisoners and missing persons, alongside other veterans, to ensure principled service delivery to this segment of the veteran community<ref name=":1" />.

== Background of the Collective Exchange of Prisoners and the Reflection of the Return of Liberated Prisoners in the Country's Press ==
Following the historic decision of Imam Khomeini (PBUHS) to end the eight-year war through a political solution instead of a military one, Iran officially accepted UN Security Council Resolution 598 on July 18th, 1988 (27th Tir 1367), one year after its adoption, and announced the news in the first news broadcast via [[radio]] and television.

Despite accepting the resolution, the Iraqi government, immediately after its approval, in response to Iran's acceptance, refused to adhere to its previous agreement, childishly mentioning Iran's military superiority at the time the resolution was issued and the moral impact of this superiority on its provisions. It hastily launched extensive military operations and resumed its attacks by land and air against our country. The Iraqi army, by expanding aerial attacks against economic targets in cities and mercantile ships in the Persian Gulf, as well as organizing a comprehensive sally from the west and south deep into our country's territory on July 22nd, 1988, sought to compensate for the humiliation of the war years and to end the war in its favor. As a result, although these attacks were met with a crushing response from Iranian fighters, in addition to inflicting significant material and moral damage, they took approximately 10,000 Iranian forces into captivity to approach an equal number of prisoners. Finally, the Iraqi Ba'athist regime, observing the widespread uprising of Iranians, in order to preserve its military capability and the futility of continuing its mischief, accepted a ceasefire one month later on August 19th, 1988, and ended its major military movements.

With the establishment of the ceasefire, various committees were formed under the United Nations to implement the provisions of the resolution, and Ataollah Mohajerani was appointed by Iran as the head of the Prisoners Committee. The first round of negotiations between Iran and Iraq, led by Jan Eliasson, the representative of the UN Secretary-General, began on August 25th, 1988, in Geneva, and from the outset, faced disputes over the priorities of each party. Iraq wanted to prioritize the dredging of the Arvand Rud (Shatt al-Arab) and the possibility of navigation in this waterway before any other action, to emerge from the naval stalemate as soon as possible and to organize its economic situation. Iran, however, emphasized the priority of the complete withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Iranian territory and the exchange of prisoners based on the order of the resolution's provisions, considering these two to be more important than the dredging of the Arvand Rud. Thus, the first round of negotiations ended in failure after two weeks, and no agreement was reached<ref>Velayati, Ali Akbar (1997). Political History of the Imposed War of Iraq on Iran. Tehran: Office of Islamic Culture Publication.</ref>. During this period, and during the Geneva negotiations, and while the ceasefire was in effect and Iranian army personnel were present in the region unarmed, the Iraqi Ba'athist army, in a surprise move contrary to all international norms, captured 600 Iranian army personnel to gain leverage in the peace negotiations.

The next round of negotiations began on October 2nd, 1988, first in New York and then continued in Geneva, lasting until early 1990, but yielded no desirable results. The Iraqi side's introduction of diversionary topics and demands for concessions, aimed at achieving political goals that it had failed to secure through war, prevented the attainment of a favorable outcome.

During this period, the global media landscape shifted somewhat in Iran's favor; at one point (October 1988), by order of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, the country's mass media, which had been among the media supporters of the Baghdad regime during the war, were prohibited from campaigning against Iran<ref>Hashemi Rafsanjani, Akbar (2013). End of Defense, Beginning of Reconstruction / Record and Memoirs of 1988. Tehran: Office of Islamic Revolution Knowledge Publication.

</ref>. Consequently, the positions of the Iranian delegation in the peace negotiations received favorable coverage in influential media outlets. In this period, the core of the Iranian delegation's strategic efforts was to establish a just and lasting peace in the region and to resolve the issues and obstacles to the return of over 100,000 Iranian and Iraqi prisoners to their families in the shortest possible time; a strategy that would be realized through the implementation of the initial clauses of the resolution and, ultimately, was welcomed and supported by global public opinion. The scope of this wave also extended to regional countries, and the 18th Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in Riyadh, held concurrently with the peace negotiations, issued a statement calling for the exchange of prisoners of war between the two countries in the shortest possible time, in accordance with the third clause of the resolution. In these circumstances, the Iraqi side, under pressure from public opinion and some political circles, suddenly demanded the exchange of all prisoners before any other action. This ploy could, while freeing the Iraqi government from human rights accusations, facilitate a way out of the difficult situation it found itself in. In this deal, Iraq would release 40,000 prisoners and receive 60,000 prisoners, thereby resolving the issue of prisoners without any pressure or cost. However, this was at a time when the Iraqi government had hidden a large number of Iranian prisoners and prevented their registration with the International Red Cross. Therefore, the Iranian peace delegation, with the aim of proving the insincerity of this Iraqi proposal, proposed the simultaneous release of all prisoners of war from both sides along with withdrawal behind internationally recognized borders, which was met with indifference by the Iraqis.

In such circumstances, despite overcoming the problems and difficulties of a decade of war and unrest, the domestic press, on the verge of the country's development and prosperity during a period of stability and peace, still considered the consequences of the imposed war one of its priorities and responsibly covered and followed up on news and topics related to it; so much so that between the acceptance of Resolution 598 (July 1988) and the arrival of the last large groups of liberated prisoners (September 1990), more than 600 pieces of news, reports, interviews, notes, and articles, solely on the subject of liberated prisoners, were published in several high-circulation publications of that period. The central content of most of these was supporting the rightful positions of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the prisoners of war<ref>Dehnamaki, Masoud (2005). Encyclopedia of Captivity 2: Captivity and Liberated Prisoners in Newspapers. Tehran: Aseman Danesh.

</ref>.

The country's press, with a view to ending the sufferings of the imprisoned captives and their families, explaining their social status, and honoring and respecting these exemplars of patience and steadfastness, produced content across several axes and, on behalf of public opinion, supported the Iranian negotiating team in Geneva. "Exposing the anti-human crimes of the Ba'athist regime of Iraq and its behavior contrary to the international Geneva Convention towards prisoners of war," "pressuring the International Red Cross to register all Iranian prisoners in captivity," "creating a news wave against the obstructionism of the Iraqi side in bilateral negotiations," "emphasizing the continuation of peace talks within the framework of the resolution and under the supervision of the UN Secretary-General," and "expediting the exchange of sick and disabled prisoners" were among the axes determined by the country's press and pursued in a coordinated and continuous manner. In this regard, the Jomhouri-e Eslami newspaper, in the winter of 1988, began publishing the memoirs of previously released prisoners in serialized form, under the title of "The Story of Captivity," which was dedicated to narrating the inhumane treatment of Iranian prisoners by the Ba'athist regime of Iraq. Also, by monitoring the statements of Iraqi officials and the news and content of Iraqi media, they tried to collect effective documents pertaining to the disregard for the human rights of Iranian prisoners by the Iraqis. In this regard, when Asem Yaqoub, the Iraqi ambassador to Kuwait, stated in a press conference that some Iranian prisoners had not been registered, it was immediately reflected in the domestic press and recorded in history as undeniable evidence, becoming the subject of columnists in the domestic press and the focus of legal discussions with experts and specialists in international law (this news and its margins were first published in domestic media on December 19th, 1989).

At this point, following continuous obstruction by the Iraqi side, negotiations stalled, and even Mikhail Gorbachev's recommendation to Saddam, then leader of the Soviet Union, failed to break the deadlock<ref name=":1" />.

At this time, Iraq was willing to continue negotiations bilaterally and without the presence of the UN Secretary-General's representative, in order to extort concessions, such as holding a part of our country's territory and thousands of unregistered Iranian prisoners. However, the position of Iran and the UN Secretary-General was the full implementation of the resolution and the continuation of negotiations with the presence of the UN representative and within the framework of the resolution<ref name=":1" />. Eventually, the Iraqi side's obstruction reached a point where Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, then UN Secretary-General, openly criticized the Iraqi government for disrupting the peace negotiations and invited the Iraqi delegation to go to New York to resume talks. But the Iraqis paid no heed and left his invitation unanswered. This led the UN Secretary-General, despite his conservatism, to criticize the Iraqi government and state: "The Security Council insists on Resolution 598 as the framework for peace negotiations between Iran and Iraq and is determined and serious in its implementation<ref name=":1" />. In such circumstances, and following Iraq's decision to attack Kuwait, a new process began regarding the fate of thousands of Iranian and Iraqi prisoners, and after six stages of correspondence between Saddam and high-ranking officials of our country, over one month, from August 17th, 1990, to September 17th of the same year, 37,532 Iranian prisoners were exchanged with 37,934 Iraqi prisoners<ref name=":0" />. A large portion of the released Iranian prisoners at this stage (about 19,000 people) were among the unregistered ones<ref name=":1" />.

The unexpected process of liberating Iranian prisoners at this juncture, who constituted over 83% of the total number of freed individuals in the country, created a wave of joy and excitement across different parts of the nation. Periodicals, especially national newspapers, daily added to this joy and enthusiasm by publishing pictures and various reports of the liberated prisoners' return to their homeland and the public's welcome; in such a way that the news and images published in the press pages of those days remained in the memory of Iranians like an album of souvenir photos, connecting all members of the nation and awakening a sense of national solidarity whenever they were revisited.

== The grueling marathon of liberating the remaining prisoners and determining the fate of the missing: ==
While it was expected that all captives would be liberated and returned to their homeland at that very time, suddenly on September 18th, 1990, Iraq announced that it held no more Iranian prisoners and ended the exchange process. This was despite the fact that at least 3,000 Iranian prisoners, many of whom had their voices, images, or names reflected in Iraqi media, had not yet had their fate determined<ref name=":0" />. In response to this behavior by the Iraqi government, domestic media, with a unified approach, prioritized the pursuit of freeing the remaining Iranian prisoners in captivity and, by guiding the news-propaganda flow, supported the bargaining diplomacy of statesmen with the Iraqi side. Following media campaigns and as a result of officials' efforts, by late 1990`s, a total of 415 more Iranian prisoners were set free in 9 stages. In one of these stages, the Iraqi government proceeded to exchange 239 Iranian prisoners who had judicial convictions and were serving their sentences in prisons outside of prisoner camps. In the winter of the same year, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, Vice Chairman of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council, came to Tehran at the head of a high-ranking delegation to unilaterally arrange for the release of all Iraqi prisoners, including 4,564 prisoners who had entered our country during America's involvement in the Iraq-Kuwait war, without any compensation. The discussions between the two sides did not yield a favorable outcome, and from this point, bilateral relations were severed and grew cold for a while.

In July 1991, on the eve of the UN Secretary-General's declaration of Iraq as the initiator of the war, an Iraqi delegation arrived in Iran under the pretext of normalizing relations, but actually with the aim of reclaiming their aircraft that had been brought to Iran during the war with Kuwait. As a gesture of goodwill, they brought five Iranian prisoners of war with them. In response to the Iraqi request, Iranian officials insisted on tripartite negotiations, demanding the resumption of the process of releasing prisoners and determining the fate of the missing, and reciprocally released 100 Iraqi prisoners.

== Return of the Body of Martyr Tondguyan ==
During the group return of liberated prisoners, everyone was awaiting the return of Mohammad Javad Tondguyan, the Minister of Petroleum in Martyr Rajai's cabinet. So much so that the possibility of Gholamreza Aghazadeh, the then Minister of Petroleum, resigning due to this expectation, was reflected in the country's press. However, with the return of the last group of liberated prisoners, hopes largely turned to despair. Even the reports from Kuwaiti prisoners released from Baghdad's POW camps, stating that Engineer Tondguyan was alive, did not raise much hope. Although the publication of these reports provided a good subject for newspaper columnists and reminded the Iraqi government of its legal responsibility for this abduction. Simultaneously, Iran's representative office at the United Nations issued a statement, requesting the release of the remaining prisoners and demanding that international circles address the issue of Mohammad Javad Tondguyan's abduction in the early days of the war. Pressures consistent with diplomatic actions prompted international circles to react to the request of our people and officials, and Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, in his first reaction to this request, stated: "I will personally try in this regard." The consequence of these remarks was that a few days later, the news of the return of the body of Martyr Tondguyan appeared on the front page of the country's newspapers, and the martyrdom of another oppressed innocent figure

was recorded in the history of the eight-year imposed war.

The return of the body of Martyr Tondguyan fostered the public belief that some of the remaining prisoners of war in Iraq might have been martyred and should not be expected to return. The press also sporadically and indirectly reinforced this belief to prepare the community, especially the waiting families, for this bitter reality. On the other hand, these circumstances made it possible for an Iranian delegation led by Mohammad Javad Zarif to travel to Baghdad and establish a commission to find and exchange the bodies of martyrs under the supervision of the International Red Cross. Following these negotiations and with the foresight of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a special committee was formed to search for the bodies of war martyrs, which continues to this day, and the bodies of many martyrs have been exhumed in Iraq and transferred to Iran. In one such instance, according to a Western journalist, the bodies of 54 Iranian martyrs were discovered in a mass grave, indicating they had been executed with their hands tied immediately after capture<ref name=":1" />. (← [[Tondguyan, Mohammad Javad|Mohammad Javad Tondguyan]])

== Iran and Iraq's Press Confrontation ==
The year 1994 can, in a sense, be called the year of media warfare between the Iranian and Iraqi press. In this year, the statesmen of both countries accused each other of irresponsibility and negligence in determining the fate of prisoners of war and missing persons. Naturally, the press of both countries served as the platform for such statements or responses to them. The Iraqi government, by politicizing a humanitarian issue, tried to gain propaganda advantage to sideline its inhumane treatment of Iranian prisoners. Iraq claimed that Iran had hidden 20,000 Iraqi prisoners and was not releasing them. However, Iran asserted that after each operation, it had allowed Red Cross officials to register all Iraqi prisoners and that there was no report of even a single Iraqi prisoner going missing. Moreover, the Iraqi side never managed to provide a complete list of the claimed number to the Red Cross. It is worth noting that out of the Iraqi prisoners, 7,634 had become refugees and, in one-on-one interviews with Red Cross officials, had expressed their desire to stay in Iran and were unwilling to return. In contrast, Iran had submitted a complete list of the names and details of 30,000 unregistered and missing Iranian prisoners, along with documentation of the presence of a large number of them in Iraq, to the Red Cross. Iran's documents were based on statements by individuals such as Sa'doun Hammadi, then Iraq's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, in an interview with Basra Radio, which explicitly referred to the presence of over 50,000 Iranian prisoners in Iraqi camps; furthermore, copies of the audio and video of 1,181 Iranian prisoners, which had been broadcast by Iraqi state radio and television or whose interviews and photos had been published in the Iraqi press, were available to the Red Cross, while the Iraqi side only accounted for 33 of them; additionally, 67 prisoners had been captured by the Iraqi army on Iranian soil after the war, and despite interviews with each of them by Red Cross representatives, the Iraqi government denied the presence of such individuals in Iraq.

At the end of 1994, despite Iran's sincere cooperation with the International Red Cross and continuous clarification of the status of Iraqi prisoners and vice versa, the Iraqi side's lack of cooperation and concealment led the UN Security Council to cite a report by the head of the Organization of Islamic Conference (prepared under the influence of Iraqi-Arab press and provided to the Council through the Red Cross), to jointly condemn Iran and Iraq for obstructing the progress of humanitarian plans and acting contrary to the resolution's objectives. The Security Council's condemnation of Iran was based on the use of the phrase "one prisoner for one prisoner" by Mohammad Ali Nazaran, the former head of the Prisoners' Commission. However, he had passed away a year earlier, and Brigadier General Abdullah Najafi had taken over as the head of the Prisoners' Commission. The Red Cross's cooperation in issuing the Security Council's statement led Iran to once again sever its ties with the Red Cross for a period and refuse to accept its representatives in Iran, preferring to pursue further negotiations bilaterally. Following this decision, a delegation led by Brigadier General Abdullah Najafi traveled to Baghdad to negotiate with the Iraqi side. As a result of these negotiations, the parties agreed to pursue talks within the framework of four independent committees: "Remaining Prisoner Affairs," "Refugees," "Search for Bodies," and "Border Issues."

== Pilot Lashkari's survival after 15 years. ==
For years, no one had any news of the pilot Hossein Lashkari, who was kept in a cell away from public view. The Ba'athist regime of Iraq kept pilot Lashkari alive with the aim of one day using him as proof that Iran started the war! After Iraq was officially declared the initiator of the war and this tactic failed, the Iraqi government, for the first time in May 1995, made public the captivity of pilot Lashkari and allowed the Red Cross to meet with him. With the news of Lashkari's survival, a new wave swept through the country's press, and every media outlet tried to gather and publish more information about the oldest prisoner of war. The Islamic Republic, in response to society's need, arranged an interview with his family and, by choosing the emotional headline "A wait that became 17 years long," alluding to the age of Lashkari's only child, who had been deprived of his father's presence since the first day of his life, added to the emotional atmosphere of society. In these circumstances, a new flurry of activity regarding the release of prisoners took shape, and officials, in order to break grounds for his release, would unilaterally release a number of Iraqi prisoners from time to time. However, the Iraqi side, due to the outbreak of the Intifada in Iraq and the fact that most Iraqi prisoners were Shiites and their inclination to join the Intifada, showed signs of no intention to release them at that time. And that applied to the pilot Lashkari too..

== The second wave of propaganda warfare against Iran ==
With the help of agents from the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization, the Iraqi government launched extensive propaganda in Iraqi-Arab and even European publications against Iran, focusing on Iran's non-adherence to humanitarian principles. The central point of this propaganda was Iran's refusal to release Iraqi prisoners, even though there was no equivalent for exchange. With this propaganda tactic, Iraq had managed to mobilize a segment of active global public opinion against Iran. At this juncture, due to the Iraqi side's better access to transnational media, they had surpassed Iran in press propaganda and were considered victorious in the media war. To change the balance and overcome the propaganda atmosphere, the Islamic Republic of Iran unilaterally released 874 Iraqi prisoners on two occasions, 24 of whom were Christians. The release of Christian prisoners, which coincided with the birth of Jesus Christ (PBUH), somewhat broke the propaganda atmosphere against Iran and was reflected in media circles. In response to this action, Soma Ruga, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, met with Cyrus Nasseri, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Geneva, in a friendly atmosphere and stated:<blockquote>"What you did regarding the unilateral release of Iraqi prisoners was a very fundamental and serious action, but there is still a fundamental problem concerning Iranian prisoners."</blockquote>These remarks from the highest international official indicated the belief that there were no Iranian prisoners in Iraq, which was a cause for concern in itself. Iran's Permanent Representative in Geneva replied:<blockquote>"Officially announce your opinion and accept responsibility for it."</blockquote>Ruga refused, and Nasseri pointed out that If there were still some Iranians in Iraq`s prisons contrary to what they claimed, their lives would easily be endangered by the Iraqis. He asked Ruga to pressure the Iraqi side, out of humanitarian concern, to be accountable for the remaining Iranian prisoners. After this meeting, Michel Cagnon traveled to Iran on behalf of the Red Cross, and relations between the two sides were re-established after a long time.

== A year of change in the situation of prisoners ==
The year 1995 began with signs of change in the situation of war prisoners. The dispatch of a delegation to Baghdad, led by Ali Khorram, advisor to our country's Minister of Foreign Affairs, marked the beginning of this transformation. With this trip, negotiations were reopened, and the release of the remaining prisoners in Iraq was pursued. Determining the fate of missing persons and refugees was another issue on the agenda of this delegation. During this trip, Khorram met and discussed with the then Iraqi Foreign Minister and stated in a press conference:<blockquote>"Iran's policy is to find a fundamental and practical solution instead of debate and contention for the release of the remaining prisoners of the two countries; because the issue of prisoners is a humanitarian one."</blockquote>The outcome of these negotiations was that both sides would list and present their claimed cases. This ultimately benefited Iran; because the Iraqi side merely made claims and could not provide a true list of its remaining prisoners in Iran and was forced to reduce the astronomical number of its prisoners. This action also took away the propaganda weapon from Iraqi media and limited their propaganda topics, creating a positive environment for continuing discussions in a calm atmosphere to find a practical and fair solution. Until then, no such action had been taken, and therefore, it was considered a step towards resolving mutual issues away from propaganda and media pressures. Among the achievements of this trip was the continuation of work within the framework of four independent committees: "Prisoners," "Refugees," "Search for Bodies," and "Border Issues," which helped facilitate matters. At this juncture, the domestic press, while supporting the achievements of the Iranian delegation, patiently demonstrated another phase of interaction and tolerance within the general policies of the system to provide conditions for the release of the remaining prisoners. (For example, see Jomhouri Eslami and Salam on 1995/06/11)<ref name=":1" />.

On September 10th, 1995, an Iraqi delegation led by Saad Abdul Majid Al-Faisal,the Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister, arrived in Tehran and held talks with Iranian officials. The outcome of these negotiations was documented in a 7-article memorandum and signed by both parties. According to the memorandum, the parties agreed to exchange lists of their prisoners to serve as a basis for final action after review and verification. It was also decided that another sub-committee would thoroughly examine disputed cases regarding prisoners to facilitate the exchange of all remaining prisoners of both sides under the supervision of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Thus, for the first time, a written agreement between the two countries concerning prisoners was signed, recording the claims of both sides without exaggeration. Although this agreement was not implemented in practice, as the Iraqi side refused to exchange the lists of prisoners it claimed, it became the basis for future negotiations.

The approach of the domestic press during this period was to support the decision-makers and executive officials of the country. One of the characteristics of the press's performance during these days was the honoring of the social status of the liberated prisoners and emphasizing their importance and position in Iranian society. This approach indicated the importance of the issue and Iran's seriousness in freeing all prisoners, and reflected the attention of the country's officials to the issue of releasing captives. This stance was not hidden from experts and impartial circles. At that time, due to the Shiite intifada, the Iraqis had no desire for the return of their prisoners, who were mostly Shiite, and in practice, apart from the release of a group of officers affiliated with the Ba'ath Party, there was not much enthusiasm for the exchange of the remaining prisoners (pages of newspapers such as Salam, Kayhan, Ettela'at, and Jomhuri-e Eslami during this period attest to this fact)<ref name=":1" />.

Domestic media, following the policy of tolerance of the country's officials, also tried to maintain the level of relations with Iraq and not fuel aggression and conflict. In contrast, the Iraqi media began another phase of one-sided attacks against Iran and, through victim-playing, tried to portray Iran as the main culprit in obstructing the release of the remaining prisoners. On this score, the Iraqi government, with the aim of creating content for publications supported by Iraq, drafted and sent four letters to the UN Secretary-General, the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, and the Secretary-General of the Non-Aligned Movement, in which it introduced Iran as the obstructing party in the negotiations for the release of prisoners. Iraqi media and other aligned media, in support of Saddam's Ba'athist government's propaganda policies, paid full attention and raised a huge uproar. In these circumstances, Kamal Kharazi, Iran's permanent representative to the United Nations, in order to counter the uproar of the Iraqi media group and its Western and regional supporters, held frequent press conferences, criticizing Iraq's behavior regarding the issue of prisoner release and pointing to the obstructions and reasons for the prolonged and fruitless negotiations with the Iraqi government's involvement. The reflection of these meetings, which took place in New York, had a relatively positive impact on domestic and foreign media in shedding light on the nature of the Ba'athist regime's propaganda uproar for the world public opinion.

In mid-1996, the Iraqi government, by assigning the continuation of negotiations to the Ministry of Intelligence (Istikhbarat), effectively took the matter out of the hands of its Foreign Ministry, thus adopting a new tactic to prolong and render the negotiations fruitless. The Iraqi Minister of Intelligence immediately came to Iran and, with a false approach of trying to break the deadlock in negotiations, declared his main demand to be ignoring previous agreements. He claimed that because intelligence elements had more influence on the government, they could better accomplish their mission. During his trip to Tehran for negotiations, he went to the Ministry of Intelligence and expected to negotiate with his intelligence counterpart. However, the head of the Prisoners' Commission went to the Ministry of Intelligence for discussions. In this meeting, the issue of the release of all prisoners held in Iran and Iraq was discussed. The Iranian representative, while emphasizing previous agreements, strongly criticized the Iraqi side's wavering positions and condemned the Iraqi media's disregard for the human aspects of the prisoner issue and its use as a propaganda tool.

Iran's firm and principled positions led the Iraqi side to once again entrust the continuation of negotiations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and pursue bilateral issues through that channel.

With the aim of breaking the deadlock in negotiations, Iran unilaterally released more than 150 Iraqi prisoners on October 26th, 1996, which received positive media coverage in European countries. Following these actions, the Red Cross was encouraged to send a representative to Tehran to advance the negotiations. Subsequently, Michel Caignard, Director-General for the Middle East and North Africa, arrived in Tehran on December 3rd, 1996, and held talks with Iranian officials. During these negotiations, the necessity of the Red Cross's neutrality was raised, and an honest effort to find practical solutions for resolving prisoner-related issues and correcting the Red Cross's [[statistics]] on the number of prisoners from both sides was requested. However, the Red Cross representative, under the pretext that "we can only accept statistics based on evidence and visits," in practice supported the positions of the Iraqi side. Concurrently with the presence of the Red Cross representative, some widely circulated newspapers published articles and notes raising serious criticisms regarding the performance of the International Red Cross and reminded it of its international mission. (For example, see Keyhan, Ettela'at, and Jomhuri-e Eslami newspapers, December 1996)<ref name=":1" />.

== Continuation of Diplomatic Challenges in 1997 ==
On March 27th, 1997, following a meeting between the foreign ministers of Iran and Iraq on the sidelines of the Organization of Islamic Conference summit in Rabat, emphasis was placed on pursuing the issue of prisoners of war between the two countries through diplomatic channels, with a focus on the foreign ministries of both governments. The Iraqi foreign minister also expressed readiness to release 64 Iranian prisoners who were in held custody. In this situation, the newly emerging press, which had entered the scene after the May 23rd, 1997 elections along with the wave of modernism and community-oriented demands, in company with other media rooted in the war era, bore the main burden of news and propaganda support for peace negotiations and the release of the remaining captives.

== Another Confrontation Between Iranian and Iraqi Press ==
In September 1997, a representative of the Red Cross once again visited Iran and explicitly stated that, apart from 64 prisoners and one pilot, Hossein Lashkari, they had no information about any other captives. This representative's stance, which was close to the Iraqi positions, meant disregarding many documents and evidence that Iranian officials had provided to the Red Cross concerning the presence of thousands of Iranian prisoners in overt and covert Iraqi POW camps. Following the Red Cross representative's (← Red Cross) statements, the head of the Prisoners Commission, in a press conference, declared the number of Iranian prisoners in Iraq announced by the Red Cross representative to be incorrect and confirmed that it was an endorsement of the Iraqi side's obstruction in definitively resolving the prisoner issue. Iraqi officials, in response, reiterated their usual accusations, and consequently, the attacks by the Iraqi press against Iran, which had subsided for a while, escalated once again.

In a televised speech, Saddam also condemned Iran for expansionism and addressed peripheral issues from the imaginary position of leadership of Arab-speaking countries. In response to Saddam's statements, Dr. Khorram, senior advisor to our country's Foreign Minister, announced in an interview with domestic media:<blockquote>"We should not be expected to react sharply to Saddam's statements. We have seen many such ups and downs from Iraq, and therefore our approach will be balanced."</blockquote>He employed a diplomatic language to belittle Saddam and tried to expose the rift between Iraq and the Arab world. Following this political stance, the Prisoners' Commission also unilaterally released 46 Iraqi prisoners in a practical move; thus, Iran's wise stance and sincere practical action on the eve of the Islamic Conference had a positive impact on the atmosphere of the conference and prevented the leaders of Islamic countries from being influenced by the propaganda of the Iraqi press. In this situation, Iran released another 500 Iraqi prisoners to reaffirm Iran's humanitarian positions. Iraq, in a passive move, released two missing Iranian prisoners, who provided much information about other prisoners, which was very effective in the continuation of negotiations.

In mid-December 1997, Saeed al-Sahhaf, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, unexpectedly arrived in Tehran to participate in the Islamic Conference and distributed copies of a letter containing repetitive content among the members, claiming that there were no Iranian prisoners in Iraq! Whereas 18092 Iraqi prisoners were still in Iran. He had asked the members of the organization to help release the Iraqi prisoners out of humanitarianism. Following this action, he held a press conference and was waiting for reporters to ask questions about the letter. However, representatives of the country's press community, without any reference to his letter, intelligently did not give him the opportunity to exploit it and simultaneously published news about a list of 9424 Iranian prisoners present in Iraq. The solidarity of the domestic press with the responsible authorities strengthened Iran's position in international circles, and finally, the status of 1267 Iranian prisoners and detainees was clarified, of whom, unfortunately, only 175 were alive and imprisoned in Iraq. This number was exchanged with 2170 Iraqi prisoners in a short period.

== Release of Pilot Hossein Lashkary ==
Following the relentless efforts of officials to determine the fate and secure the release of prisoners, in April 1998, another 319 liberated prisoners were exchanged, with 15 Iraqi prisoners for each Iranian liberated prisoner. Among those released in this phase was Pilot Hossein Lashkary, who returned to his homeland after 18 years. At this stage, for the first time, domestic and international journalists were allowed to participate in the reception ceremony held for the released prisoners and to prepare reports and images from the ceremony to publish in their outlets.

According to numerous pieces of evidence, at least more than 474 Iranian prisoners were held by Iraq. Therefore, it was necessary to continue the follow-ups. Thus, the relevant officials began another round of efforts to release the remaining prisoners.

Three days after the release of this group of liberated prisoners, the Iraqi newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat wrote:<blockquote>"The file of Iranian prisoners will be closed by the end of the year."</blockquote>This news, which was confirmed by other Iraqi publications such as Al-Musawwar Al-Arabi, gave Iranian officials new strength and motivation to redouble their efforts in order to determine the fate of the remaining prisoners.

The first achievement of these efforts was compelling the Iraqi side to acknowledge statistics closer to reality, which was realized at the joint Iran-Iraq committee meeting on June 17th, 1998, in Baghdad. At this meeting, the Iraqis largely organized their claims and accepted the list of remaining and missing Iranian prisoners. According to this list, 3120 Iranian prisoners were in Iraq and needed to have their status determined. The minutes of the agreed-upon list were signed by both parties. Also, by determining the status of Iraqi prisoners, it became clear that another 2838 Iraqi prisoners were held by Iran. With the exchange of these lists in the presence of a representative of the International Red Cross, the Iraqis' hands were tied for negative propaganda against Iran.

It was expected that the year 1998, which saw the release of 494 Iranian prisoners, would be the year for resolving the status of all prisoners of war and missing persons. However, with the Iraqi authorities changing the designation of Iranian prisoners to "political prisoners" and repeatedly claiming that there were no Iranian prisoners in Iraq, all hopes were once again dashed. This behavior by the Iraqis even surprised Western news agencies and prompted a reaction (Agence France-Presse covered this issue in one of its April 1998 editions).

The change in the Iraqi side's stance was met with a clear and firm position from the then-President, Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani:<blockquote>"The resolution of the Tehran-Baghdad problem hinges on clarifying the status of the remaining prisoners."</blockquote>Concurrently, the head of the Prisoners of War Commission, presenting his documentation to the Red Cross, reported the presence of 3206 Iranian prisoners in Iraqi territory. In response, an Iraqi official, in an interview with the Iraqi newspaper "Sawt al-Talaba" (Voice of the Student), referred to a list of Iraqi prisoners that had been handed over to the Iranian delegation. In this vein, in July 1999, Iraqi newspapers, on the occasion of the anniversary of their victory in the war!, designated the remaining prisoners in Iran as one of their central themes and extensively wrote about it. In this regard, the newspaper "Babel," managed by Uday, Saddam's son, wrote in the main column of its front page:<blockquote>"Among the problems between the two countries there is the unresolved issue of prisoners."</blockquote>Saddam also claimed in a speech:<blockquote>"Iran is holding several thousand Iraqi prisoners and is not releasing them, and we will resort to force if necessary to free the Iraqi prisoners."</blockquote>Following these statements, the Iraqi press launched a new uproar against our country. These interactions did not escape the sharp eyes of the press, and while reflecting them favorably, they responded. In this regard, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by inviting domestic and foreign journalists to a press conference, responded to Saddam's ramblings and dismissed his claims as contrary to existing realities: "Iran's stance on prisoners and those missing during the imposed war is a humanitarian one, coupled with Islamic compassion and kindness. It is the Iraqis who have toyed with the fate of several thousand Iranian prisoners and are evading their release."

Simultaneously with launching a propaganda and media war, the Iraqi government published 24 volumes of memoirs by captured Ba'athist officers in Iran to create documentation. The Iraqi press also published excerpts from them and printed articles against Iran, and to some extent, managed to align Western and Arab media with themselves. To break the new propaganda atmosphere, the Islamic Republic of Iran unilaterally released 277 Iraqi prisoners on October 10th, 1999. Concurrently, the Iranian press focused on topics such as Iran's humanitarianism and the development of relations based on peace and friendship. In the continuation of this confrontation, Iran unilaterally released another 500 Iraqi prisoners, and again in mid-May 2000, given its effectiveness, released 480 Iraqi prisoners. Twenty days later, another 440 Iraqi prisoners were unilaterally released by Iran, and in an unprecedented move 1697 prisoners were unilaterally released within a few months. Following their release, the Red Cross invited Iran to resume negotiations again under its supervision. Our country's officials responded positively to this request, and after a long hiatus, in January 2000, an Iranian delegation traveled to Geneva to continue negotiations. During this trip, officials, in an innovative move, took several of the liberated prisoners with them to Geneva to bring the issue of the remaining Iranian prisoners in Iraq to the attention of global media. Dr. Alborzi, the plenipotentiary representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in negotiations with Kelly Berger, then head of the International Committee of the Red Cross, asked him to officially reflect Iran's actions in a statement issued by the Red Cross and to formally request the Iraqi President in a letter to remove the obstacles to the exchange of all prisoners. The Iranian delegation's goal with these actions was to reduce propaganda pressure of Western and Arab newspapers. During this trip, documents pertaining to over three thousand Iranian prisoners and missing persons were handed over to Red Cross officials.

At that time it just so happened that the biggest supporter of Iranian captives, Seyed Ali-Akbar Abutorabi-Fard, passed away on June 2nd, 2000, in a car accident, a heavy blow and loss indeed!. This incident once again brought the issue of the liberated prisoners to the pages of journals and newspapers and revitalized their memories<ref name=":1" />.

On June 29th, 2000, Iran unilaterally released 450 Iraqi prisoners once again. On August 9th and 10th of the same year, 728 more Iraqi prisoners were unilaterally released in two groups. Following their release, the Red Cross issued a statement announcing that it had interviewed Iraqi prisoners of war who had sought refuge in Iran and found that they had no intention of returning to Iraq. This statement largely reduced the intensity of the propaganda against Iran. During this period, one of the newspapers, in an innovative move, began publishing photos and details pertaining to the captivity of the remaining prisoners which was a timely and effective action in line with documenting the claims of our country's officials<ref name=":1" />.

More than two decades after the outbreak of war , the families of the remaining prisoners and the missing , whose fates had not been determined, became restless and were waiting to hear definite news and expecting the uncertainty to end at long last. In the interim, some of them had passed away or been martyred. Therefore, the Iranian delegation decided to propose another solution to the Red Cross: that both delegations become active, at least for a while, on the issue of prisoners who had died or been martyred, so that at least some families could terminate the prolonged uncertainty. In this regard, a plan was prepared and presented to the Iraqi side. Based on a clause in this plan, the two sides agreed not to publicize news of the pursuit of prisoners' freedom periodically, so that the work could proceed with more calm. However, the Iraqi officials, contrary to their commitment, after the release of 24 Iranian prisoners, 6 of whom were Iraqis, reflected the issue in the press and once again resorted to media uproar against our country.

After some time had passed since the new plan was implemented, the bodies of 570 Iranian prisoners, who had either died or been martyred during captivity, were exchanged for 1179 Iraqi bodies, among whom was the body of Martyr Abbas Doran. The arrival of the martyrs' bodies affected the country's atmosphere and gave it a spiritual aura. In such an atmosphere, the domestic press once again made an effort and brought the issue of prisoners up in the media.

Following the emergence of a new wave in November 2002, a new round of negotiations between Iran and Iraq resumed, and the two countries agreed to release all prisoners they held. As a result, the path was paved for the release of all prisoners on both sides , and in their last meeting, the parties decided to exchange 941 Iraqi captives plus 30 Iraqi prisoners with 351 Iranian prisoners-of-war . This important event was realized in March 2003, and after that, the head of the Prisoners' Commission officially announced in the final days of 2003 that "we no longer have any prisoners in Iraq."

== See also ==
• The Imposed War of Iraq against Iran

• Seyyed Ali Akbar Abutorabi Fard

• Red Cross

• Red Crescent

• Return of the liberated prisoners of war to the Homeland

• Hossein Lashkary

• Mohammad Javad Tondguyan

== Bibliography ==

The Impact of Saying Prayers and Supplication on Prisoners of War

2026-09-01T07:21:34Z

Marjan-khanlari:

During their captivity, prisoners of war endured the harshest physical and psychological tortures. Their only hope and weapon against the enemy was saying prayers, communion, and supplicating the Prophet`s [[family]] members (peace be upon them). The impact of saying prayers and supplication on the prisoners is as follows:

=== 1. Revival of Hope ===
In times of despair, the supplicant connects themselves with a primordial power to whom difficult or easy makes no difference, and who pours into their hearts as a ray of hope. Once in the abyss of despair when one`s hope for liberation from bondage and hardships of living under tyranny is ebbing away, the only factor that could help the captives out was to boost their morale and religious faith. To protect themselves from the enemy's comprehensive cultural invasion, which manifested itself through newspapers, magazines, [[radio]], and television, the prisoners strengthened their spiritual morale through prayers, recitation of the Quranic verses,and consulting such sacred books as Nahj al-Balagha, and Mafatih<ref name=":0">Mohammadi, Abdollah (2006). Atash va Marefat (Thirst and Knowledge). Ardabil: Bagh-e Andisheh, p. 139.</ref>. By reciting the Supplication of Tawassul on Tuesday nights, the Supplication of Kumayl on Friday nights, Ziyarat Ashura, and the Supplication of Nudbah on Fridays, they purified their hearts, and when grief and sorrow attacked, they sought refuge in prayers and the Quran.

=== 2. Invitation to Purity, Goodness, and Piety ===
During captivity, saying prayers ensured that purity, good deeds, and avoidance of sins were part of the prisoners' daily agenda.

=== 3. An Important Factor in Upbringing ===
The more important the subject of saying prayers is for a person, and the greater the hope and need for its fulfillment, the more efforts will be spent to create the above-mentioned conditions , and the profound effect of prayers on the moral upbringing of individuals will be more palpable. For this reason, during captivity, saying prayers and supplication had a positive impact on others.

=== 4. Strengthening Altruism ===
Saying prayers strengthens a person's sense of altruism and their care for the conditions and problems of other human beings. For this reason, we should first pray for others and then for ourselves. During captivity, a concrete example of this altruism and prioritizing their interests over one's own was observed.

=== 5. Battling Inner Anxieties ===
Saying prayers and supplicating the Almighty Lord, and reliance on the Creator's eternal power wholeheartedly, reassure a person. This reassurance and entrusting oneself to Him give a person peace. Performing the recommended duties and saying prayers and Quranic incantations created a kind of spiritual and psychological peace of mind in the captives and eliminated their despair and sorrow<ref name=":0" />. In rooms where saying prayers and religious ceremonies were held more frequently, greater spiritual and psychological well-being prevailed.

== See also ==
• [[Prayer and spiritual recourse|Prayers and Supplication]]

== Bibliography ==
<references />

== Author ==
Zahra Yazdinejad
[[Category:Prayer and appeal]]
[[fa:تاثیر دعا و توسل بر اسرا]]
[[ar:تأثير الدعاء والتوسل على الأسرى]]

The Impact of Saying Prayers and Supplication on Prisoners of War

2026-09-01T07:18:59Z

Marjan-khanlari: /* Bibliography */

The Impact of Saying Prayers and Supplication on Prisoners of War

2026-09-01T07:17:04Z

Marjan-khanlari: Created page with "During their captivity, prisoners of war endured the harshest physical and psychological tortures. Their only hope and weapon against the enemy was saying prayers, communion, and supplicating the Prophet`s family members (peace be upon them). The impact of saying prayers and supplication on the prisoners is as follows: === 1. Revival of Hope === In times of despair, the supplicant connects themselves with a primordial power to whom difficult or easy makes no differenc..."

Literature and Art

2026-08-12T19:26:55Z

Marjan-khanlari:

'''The literary and artistic forms during captivity were employed in order to improve the morale of the prisoners and neutralize the propagandas of the Baathist enemy.'''

Literature and art played a significant role in creating vitality and dynamism of the prisoners during the [[resistance]] period in the prisons of the Saddam regime, and on most occasions, the tools of literature and art were used in a suitable way to maintain and improve the morale of the prisoners and neutralize the venomous propagandas of the Saddam regime. Of course, this matter depended on the atmosphere of the camp and the number of men of letter & art. In some camps, such as the Mosul camps, due to the presence of artists, this category had a more considerable quantity and quality, and in some other camps, it was less prosperous due to the number of literati and artists. But what is important is that this tool has been used in captivity during all stages of resistance period.

== Literature ==

==== Poetry ====
Throughout the period of captivity, captive poets rendered significant services to their fellow prisoners by composing poems in different formats and with political, social, revolutionary, religious, mystical and satirical themes and played a significant role in maintaining their morale. These poems were written in the form of sonnets, odes, masnavis, quatrains, couplets and modern poetry and can be evaluated at different levels depending on the poet's mastery of poetry.

In some camps, because of the security situation, poets were not known by everybody except for the cultural activists or mangers and their poems were read out in public without their names being mentioned, however, in other camps with more agreeable circumstances everyone knew the poems and normally the poet recited his own poems and even if he wasn’t there, other people read out his poems in full acknowledgement . Although for political poems the poet`s name wasn’t mentioned unless he himself chose to do so<ref>Rahmanian, Abdul Majeed (2010). Theater in captivity. Tehran: [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam Azadegan].</ref>.

In some camps, poets did not communicate with each other. But in other camps, poets secretly held literary meetings and read out their poems to each other and criticized them. These meetings were effective in developing talents and enriching poems, as well as giving morale to the prisoners in the camp. Among other things, in the Mosul camps, poets were in contact with each other, and even in the Mosul 1 camp, a poetry association was formed and weekly meetings were held. In this secret association, the camp's cultural managers, through their contact, who was a member of the association, would order poems for any occasion, and the contact would ask the members of the association to write poems on the desired topic, and after the poem was composed and critiqued, it would be handed over to the cultural officer of the camp and he in return would provide it to the cultural officials of the rooms. In this regard, they usually chose the best poems to present in the programs. Hymns were also written and performed by the members of the association.

Poetry festivals were held under the guidance of the association. In the Mosul 1 camp, a poetry festival was held during the ten days of Fajr, and all the poets recited poems related to the Islamic Revolution. A lamentation was also held on the occasion of Imam Khomeini's death by the same association in 1368 in Mosul 1. Among the other activities of the association was the holding of poetry debates especially to cap verses which were welcomed by all liberated captives. Designing a three-part show with a poetic dialect was another memorable action of the Poetry Society members. Poetry debates generally took on a theatrical aspect and in some cases, were held with humorous content.

===== Political poems =====
The political poems usually were about Imam Khomeini and Islamic revolution and sometimes on the occasion of victory on the frontline, poems were written by the liberated captive poets. Some of the political poems dealt with the remonstration against Saddam's regime and the tyrant himself. In general, the Baathists were sensitive to all poems, but their sensitivity was double when it came to political poems. The poet was severely tortured if disclosed. According to Abdul Hossein Jalalund, in one case, when a piece of political poetry fell into the hands of the Baathists in Tikrit Camp 11, the person who took responsibility for writing it was taken to solitary confinement and severely tortured in such a way that he was unable to walk for six months as he had been whipped so ruthlessly on the soles of his feet.

The poets mostly learned their poems off by heart for security reasons and If they were to be recited at a circle, the cultural officials would dispose of the poet`s hand-written version lest it might fall into the hands of Iraqis.

===== Humorous poets =====
Humorous poets were the most popular at the time of resistance. Seyyed of LCs, [[Abu Torabifard, Seyyed Aliakbar|Abu Torabifard]] in all the camps encouraged the poets to compose humorous poems and read them out in public. He was trying to raise their hopes by creating sense of humor and cheerfulness. Because of that so many hilarious poems were composed . Some of these poems lingered in the minds of the listeners for a long time, and sometimes, some of its verses were referred to and expanded the minds of the listeners. Humorous poems were mostly read out during Nowruz and religious holidays. These poems mostly originated in Mosul camps, especially Mosul 1.

===== Anthem =====
The arrangement of the anthem sometimes was so hard and took a lot of time. In some camps every room had one singing group ; naturally the camp singing group consisted of those with fairly good voices and they gave public performances . Some anthems were liked a lot and were engraved in their hearts.

The hymns had different forms and themes: uplifting and sublime hymns; visual hymns; humorous hymns (some of the hymns were performed in a theatrical and humorous form. The performance of such hymns created a sensation good costumes and make-up were considered for them); and hymns that were used as incidental music; A collection of hymns that was played at a certain time and at the request of listeners and viewers. The singing official was in great danger, especially because the musical performance was quite ostentatious and tended to attract attention of Iraqis.

==== Essay and Declamation ====
Along with poetry and hymns, essays and poem recitals were performed on special occasions, and If necessary, texts in the form of essays or speeches were delivered by those familiar with rhetoric, and oratory The essays or speeches were supposed to be terse and to the point sometimes due to the lack of time and not to mention writing wares. The Essays and speeches were mostly used during religious and national holidays.

Sometimes an essay writing contest on the topic of the Islamic Revolution was held during the celebration of the victory of the Islamic Revolution, and after judgement, prizes were awarded to the authors of the best essays. The best essayist or the winner would read out his essay to the audiences during the Fajr period.

==== story ====
Story-writing was one of the other domains challenging some captive writers during the resistance period. This domain was not as extensive as poetry and had a narrower range of audience. In the camps where pen and paper were put at the disposal of captives in the middle of the resistance period and the Red Cross delegations provided them to the prisoners, several writers tried to write medium and long stories or novels. The text of the story was written in good handwriting in a notebook and was made available to those interested. Readers would finish reading the story within one to two weeks and provide it to the next applicant. The reception of the stories depended on the content and style of writing and its author. Therefore, some stories were shared throughout the camp and others were used in one or two rooms<ref>Kashanizadeh Parvin (2015). I am Alireza, born in Opatan, Tehran: [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam Azadegan].</ref>.

In Mosel 1 camp, 2 or 3 stories which had good plots, were dramatized, staged, and received a lot of attention. These three stories were written by Ahmad Rezaei Hassan Abadi and Daud Haddadi.

== Dramatic Literature ==
One of the most effective areas of art, followed by many enthusiasts, was plays or dramatic literature. The staged plays mostly represented political, religious, and humorous issues. The political plays were influenced by the political and revolutionary circumstances, and were staged a few times in the year. The religious plays too were staged on a limited scale. Humorous plays were more popular and<ref>This article is the result of the author's observations and personal experiences during the captivity, as well as a review of a collection of oral memories of Azadegan, which is available in the database of [https://www.mfpa.ir Payam Azadegan] Cultural and Artistic Institution.</ref>…

== See also ==

* Literature in captivity
* Painting in captivity
* Engraving and embroidery in captivity
* Design in captivity
* Calligraphy in captivity
* Show in captivity
* Poetry in captivity
* Captivity in poetry

== bibliography ==
[[fa:ادبیات_و_هنر]]
<references />
[[Category:Literature and art]]
[[Category:Literature in captivity]]
[[Category:Art in captivity]]
[[Category:Poetry in captivity]]
[[Category:Performing arts in art]]
[[Category:Theater in captivity]]
[[Category:Anthem in captivity]]
[[Category:Essay and speech in captivity]]
[[Category:A story in captivity]]
[[Category:Painting in captivity]]
[[Category:Calligraphy in captivity]]
[[Category:Design in captivity]]
[[Category:Engraving and embroidery in captivity]]
[[Category:Handicrafts in captivity]]
[[Category:Show in captivity]]
[[ar:الأدب والفن]]

Prayer and spiritual recourse

2026-08-12T19:26:18Z

Marjan-khanlari:

'''One of the factors of [[resistance]] and stability of captives during captivity.'''<blockquote>'''قُلْ مَا یَعْبَأُ بِكُمْ رَبِّی لَوْلَا دُعَاؤُكُمْ...'''</blockquote>Say: If it is not for your supplication, my Lord will not pay any attention to you. (Furqan/77)

== Introduction ==
During captivity, prisoners were subjected to the most severe physical and mental tortures. As a result of these tortures and punishments, they would suffer from diseases, infections, and disability, and their friends would be martyred. In general, the Iraqis prevented them from performing their religious services, supplication, and rituals. At the highest level of need and necessity, their only hope and weapon against the enemy was praying and having recourse to the Ahl al-Bayt (members of the sacred [[family]]; peace be upon them). The LC Sarfaraz Abdullahi says:<blockquote>The only weapon we had that effectively protected us in all situations was praying, and we resorted to praying and prayers and got so heavily immersed in our faith, that nothing seemed to sway us. <ref>Abdullahi, Sarfaraz (2004). Qunut in a cage. Tehran: Nasim Hayat, p. 106.</ref></blockquote>Undoubtedly, besides the people's efforts and sacrifice of warriors and resistance, captivity and struggle in very difficult and arduous conditions , and the fact that our country right after a big revolution had been abruptly attacked by enemies, there were other factors which led to the triumph of our Islamic forces based on the endurance and patience of our captives, most importantly prayers and resort to our saints and prophets, which should be thought of as a miracle of contemporary history.

== The philosophy of answering the prayers of captives ==
<blockquote>'''وَمَن یَتَّقِ اللَّـهَ یَجْعَل لَّهُ مَخْرَجًا.'''</blockquote>And whoever fears God, [God] will make a way out for him. (divorce/2)<blockquote>..'''.وَمَن یَتَوَكَّلْ عَلَى اللَّـهِ فَهُوَ حَسْبُهُ..'''.</blockquote>God will suffice for those who put their trust in Him... (Divorce/3)

At the frontlines, warriors communed with God by night especially on the point of a critical military operation, beseeching Him to bestow the honor of martyrdom upon them, and these supplications helped them to resist the enemy and defend their homeland in face of the harsh conditions of captivity.

== Types of prayer in captivity ==
Prayers can be divided into two categories, individual and collective. Individual emergency prayer is divided into two categories: individual for individual and individual for group. Collective emergency prayer is also divided into two categories: group for individual and group for group. Individual prayers included: prayer prior to evening and night praying: Monajat-e-Khamse-e-Ashr, 40 day prayer Hadith-e-Kasa; after morning praying , Taghibat, Ziyarat-e-Ashura, Ziyarat Amin-o-llah, between two prayings: Salavat-e-Shabaniye;after the collective praying: Unity prayer, and prayers of Rajab and Shaban months, collective prayers including Tavassol prayer, Komeyl prayer, Ashura Ziyarat, Nodbe, Ashura night prayer, Monajat-e-Yavaran-e-Aba Abdollah-el-Hossein, joint Taghibat between the daily prayings, Joshan-e-Kabir prayer and the Dawn prayer.
During the captivity of Iranian prisoners in Iraqi camps, there were many cases of prayer being answered, some of which have been extracted from the diaries of the LCs and related as follows:

'''The answered emergency prayer of one individual for another'''

Haj Mehdi Khosravi:<blockquote>I had severe kidney pain and needed a kidney transplant, but they could not do it. So I resorted to Hazrat Fatima (Peace Be Upon Her Soul/PBUHS) and was healed <ref name=":0">Bozor Mehranjad, Fath Ali (2014). Captive No. 3918. Yasouj: 3 hard: Farhang Mana, p. 99.</ref></blockquote>Hamidreza Ghoruyan:<blockquote>As a result of the sudden invasion of the Iraqis, my bag, which contained my newspaper,and messages from Imam Khomeini (RA) and documents against the Baathist regime, were discovered, and the day of my trial and execution coincided with the birthday of Imam Reza (PBUHS). I resorted to Imam Reza (PBUHS)and he saved me.</blockquote>

=== The answered emergency prayer of one group for an individual ===
On Sunday, March 18th, 1986, Qadratullah Nazem while playing a football match as a part of a tournament between the teams of different barracks, fell down with such a momentum that his head hit the ground and he went into convulsions. Seeing him like that anybody would say he was spending the last moments of his life. He was taken first to the camp infirmary and then to the hospital with concussion. His friends prayed all night. After ten days Qadratullah as right as the rain entered the camp and struck more than 750 captives with awe and amazement. Nazem describes what happened to him in that situation as follows:<blockquote>A corner of the hospital was on fire .The speaker of the hospital warned that if the fire were not extinguished right away, the entire hospital and patients would fall prey to it. Anybody venturing to put the fire out, would be hugely rewarded. A woman with a black chador approached me with dignity and calmness and addressed me thus: Ghodrat my lad! You can put out this fire. Try your best. I am your mother. Go and put out the fire.’ I ran to the fire and put it out one way or another. The black-clad lady turned to me and said with a smile:’ You are free, this is your reward!’ And was lost to the sight.in a trice" <ref>Rahmanian, Abdul Majeed (2012). Rahmanian, Abdul Majeed (2012). permanently open doors. Tehran: Omid Azadegan, pp. 39-40.</ref></blockquote>Yahya Asadzadeh:<blockquote>One night, I asked the wounded brothers to pray for the healing of my eyes. In the end, with their pure hearts, they prayed until morning and my eyes were healed<ref>Asgharinejad, Mohammad (2015). A gleam on the butler's face. Qom: Zaer, p. 21.</ref></blockquote>

== Problems the captives faced when they tried to hold prayer and spiritual resort ceremonies ==
Prayer books were not available and requests for prayer books were not accepted. Notebooks were made from cigarette wrapping paper, cigarette packets, bags, and cement wrapping paper, and the prayers that the prisoners had memorized were written on them, and finally a selection of Komeil prayer, Tavassol prayer, and Ziyarat Ashura was prepared, and each barrack had a copy of it.<ref>Zain al-Abidin, Massoud (2012). Gathering is prohibited. East Azerbaijan: Surah Mehr, p. 67.</ref>

The Iraqis took all the books of prayer and the Qur'an with them, and did not return the Mafatih and Nahjolbalaghe, under the pretext that the prisoners prayed at night and the sound would reach everywhere. The captives had detached pages from those books and then little by little had bound them together, so that finally they were in possession of the above-mentioned books. Collective praying, political speeches, political discussions, theatrical performances, singing, , mourning, martial arts, and ordering others to do the due or conventional thing as well as prohibiting them from doing the unorthodox or improper thing(= Amr-e-be-Maruf & Nahy-e-az-Monkar) all boded ill for the Iraqis and were bound to make them jumpy.<ref name=":1">Mohammadi, Abdullah (1385). Thirst and knowledge. Ardabil: Bagh Andisheh, p. 139.</ref>

It was forbidden to say prayers in the camps, but the situation was controlled with the help of two barrack guards and triangular mirrors. As soon as the sentry announced that it was cloudy or at the crack of dawn, the captives who were saying prayers, would stop and take a normal posture and once it was ascertained the Iraqi sentry had passed, they would carry on with their prayers. <ref name=":0" />

== The rituals and praying ceremonies of Iranian captives and how Iraqis feared them ==
The Iraqis usually strictly prevented rituals that would strengthen the morale of the captives. The captives convened with God with great interest and away from all worldly affairs and did not pay attention to the warnings of the Iraqi guards. Even the Iraqis had noticed the importance of praying and its constructive effects on the captives, and it had become clear to them that these prayers and spiritual resort helped the captives keep their chins up and fortify their solidarity.<ref name=":0" />

At noon, no sound could be heard in the entire Mosul 2 camp (barrack number 13) as everyone was busy convening with God, and that they did with the enemy soldiers standing by. Although the Iraqis had banned collective praying, this form of praying which was done simultaneously had the same effect as collective praying. The Iraqis had forbidden the presence of more than ten people in the barrack, and this issue was to our advantage at least about noon, to attract the enemy's attention by means of this type of praying and supplication, and to respond duly to their propaganda . After each praying while the captives were applying their worry-beads enumerating the virtues of Hazrat Zahra, the Iraqi soldiers looked at them awe-struck and sometimes asked about what the captives said in their prayers or why they moved their worry-beads in that manner between their fingers, or when they noticed how the captives prolonged their praying, they exclaimed: ”What long prayings you have to do several times a day!” <ref>Scafi, Mohammad Javad (2014). Years of captivity. first volume. Tehran: Scientific and Cultural, vol.1, p.84.</ref>

== The results of praying and spiritual resort ==
1. '''Reviving the spirit of hope'''

Totally disappointed, the supplicant connects himself with the power of The Infinite, , and the light of hope shines in his heart. At the nadir of despair, every day the hope for freedom and release from the shackles and life of hardship and torture to death diminished. The only factor that could help the prisoners in those difficult and perilous conditions was strengthening their spirit and faith. In order to be safe from the all-round cultural attack of the enemy, which was carried out through the press, [[radio]] and television, the prisoners strengthened their spirit by praying and reciting verses of the Qur'an,and parts of Nahj al-Balagha and Mafatih<ref name=":2">Mohammadi, Abdullah (1385). Thirst and knowledge. Ardabil: Bagh Andisheh, p. 139.</ref>, and by saying Prayers of supplication on Tuesday nights and Komeil prayer on Friday nights, Ashura Ziyarat and Nodbeh prayer on Fridays would polish their hearts and they would take refuge in prayers and the Quran when they were overwhelmed with grief.

2.'''Calling for purity, goodness and piety'''

During the captivity, prayers and religious services on the whole got the captives to include purity, good work and avoidance of sins atop their daily agenda.

3. '''The important factor of [[education]]'''

The more important the subject of prayer is for a person and the greater the hope and need for an answer, the greater the effort to provide the mentioned conditions and the more noticeable the deep effect of prayer on the moral education of people will be; For this reason, during captivity, prayer had a positive effect on others.

4. '''Strengthening the sense of altruism'''

Prayers strengthens the sense of altruism and empathy for the sufferings and problems of others. For this reason, we should first pray for others and then for ourselves. During the captivity, vivid examples of this empathy for others and self-sacrifice were seen.

5. '''Grappling with inner anxieties'''

Praying and convening with God and trusting Him as the Almighty Creator of the universe imparts a sense of assurance to man and this results in the beautiful peace and tranquility of mind. Conducting religious services and saying prayers soothed the souls of the captives and drove their despair and grief away.<ref name=":2" />. In the rooms where there were more prayers and religious ceremonies, there was more spiritual and mental health.

== The effect of the religious services and supplications of captives on the morale of Iraqi soldiers ==
The humility of the captives while they were praying and their agonizing need of compassion rent the hearts of every spectator and listener and made a deep impression. The authorities in charge of prisoners' affairs did not bring religious people into the camp, and whenever they found out that a soldier or a ranking servant had been influenced by Iranian prisoners, they took him out of the camp or directly to the front line. Usually, the people in the camp were Baathists and the families of those killed or disabled in war, so that they hated the Iranians, and they refused to bring reasonable and truthful soldiers and officers into the camp. Iraqi guards and soldiers were afraid to conduct religious services and , the commander and the person in charge of political justification did not like religious people either. One day I asked an Iraqi soldier ‘How come you don't pray? He said: Praying in the barracks can endanger my position. But when I go on leave, I perform two months of prayer at home.<ref name=":1" /> One of these supplicants related: One day I was praying in the middle of the garden, and Haj Agha [[Abu Torabifard, Seyyed Aliakbar|Seyyed Ali Akbar Abu Torabi Fard]] was also shedding tears. Suddenly, an Iraqi soldier named Saleh came over us. Seyed raised his head. And when he saw Sayyid's tearful eyes, he said in Arabic: <blockquote>"You have had a good meeting." </blockquote>Seyyed looked at him and said, "Sit with us and let`s cry together." The soldier said nothing and left. Although Saleh was a secretive soldier and was always looking for an opportunity as to ingratiate himself with his Iraqi superiors, to all appearances, Seyyed`s special state of mind had had a profound impact on him <ref>Alidost Qazvini, Ali (2015). Alidost Qazvini, Ali (2015). Aber Fayyaz Qom: Arsh Andisheh, p. 65.</ref>

== See also ==

* [[Prayer]]
* [[Fasting and how to fast]]

== bibliography ==
<references />

== To read more ==
Keep it up, Ali. [https://www.mfpa.ir/ Payam Azadegan Cultural Institute.]

Khoshzad, Akbar (1391). joyful captivity Tehran: Al Ahmad.

Rasouli, Bahman (1389). From dream to reality. Tehran: Fakhr al-Islam.

Neiri, Hossein (2006).The little big man Tehran: Surah Mehr.

'''Zahra Yazdinejad'''
[[Category:Prayer and appeal]]
[[Category:Captivity and captives]]
[[Category:Prisoners]]
[[Category:Types of prayer in captivity]]
[[Category:Prisoners' problems in holding prayer and appeal ceremonies]]
[[Category:The results of prayer and appeal to captives]]
[[Category:The effect of worshiping captives on Iraqi soldiers]]
[[fa:دعا و توسل]]
[[ar:الدعاء والتوسل]]

Musel camp 3

2026-08-12T19:25:26Z

Marjan-khanlari:

'''One of the detention camps of Iranian prisoners in Iraq.'''

musel 3 was the last unit of the camps in the musel region and the smallest camp in this region. That is why it was called small musel . This camp was located on the western side of musel city and was one of the four military barracks in northern Iraq, which after the start of the war, was turned into a place to keep Iranian prisoners. The Iraqis named these four camps in chronological order that is to say [[Mosul camp 1|musel camp 1]] was set up a lot earlier than the other ones and [[musel camp 4]] was the most recent one. Therefore,musel camp 3 was known as musel 4 because it was the fourth camp housing Iranian prisoners in the city of musel . At the end of 1982, the International Committee of the Red Cross started naming the camps of Iranian prisoners, which was done in the order of the placement of the camps, and also because this was the third camp in the city of musel , it was known as musel 3<ref>Zekriyayee, Maryam Sadat (1390). LCs memories at the moment of the year turning new. Mazandaran: Editing and Publishing Committee of the Congress of Generals and Ten Thousand Martyrs of Mazandaran Province.</ref>.

== Geographical and architectural characteristics ==
The dimensions of this camp were 180 x 80 square meters and around it there was a yard of 50 x 150 square meters plus a circular tower in each corner. Vegetables were planted in two-thirds of the yard and the other third was used as the sports field. Prisoners lived in seven asylums (five large asylums and two small ones) and did not have access to the upper floor. There were four barracks on the right side and one on the left side of the camp. There were several empty rooms on each side, which were used in the following order:

Left side: library, store, barbershop and tailor`s workshop. The punishment cell measured 5x20 square meters with an iron door 3 meters high and windows with iron bars that opened to the yard. Inside this cell, there was a fan on the ceiling and six moonlight lamps, and it had oppressive heat and inadequate air flow.

Right side: kitchen, room of kitchen staff, room of representatives of the detention center and barrack for patients.

Like the rest of the musel camps, there was an oblong courtyard in the camp in the south of the building . After entering the courtyard, one would find the barracks on the eastern and western sides<ref>Dai, Ali (2007). Violation of the rights of Iranian prisoners of war and the international responsibility of the Iraqi government. Tehran: [https://www.mfpa.ir/ Payam Azadegan].</ref>. A 4-meter-wide cement road was stretched towards the end of the detention center and crossed in the middle of the yard. A covered-in terrace with a width of 3 meters overlooked the yard and its two sides were 150 meters long<ref name=":0">Khaji, Ali (1391). Description of cages, prisoner of war camps. Tehran: [https://www.mfpa.ir/ Payam Azadegan.]</ref>.

Each large room had two iron doors, one of which opened to the courtyard, but was always closed. It had twelve windows with dimensions of 0.8 x 1.8 meters facing the yard and these windows were guarded by iron bars. The smaller windows facing the outside were blocked with cement. Inside the rooms, there were eight ceiling fans that were controlled by the prisoners. Sixteen double moonlight lamps, some of which were burned out, provided the light of the rooms. These lamps were on even when the prisoners were sleeping. There were pegs on the walls and the prisoners could hang their clothes. The Iraqis had installed loudspeakers inside the barracks and broadcast programs through them as they saw fit.

== History and dwellers of musel camp 3 ==
How this camp was set up differed from other camps. The Iraqis brought a number of Iranian prisoners to this camp several times, and for unknown reasons, after a few months, they transferred all of them to other camps, and the camp remained uninhabited for several months<ref name=":0" />.

The first group of prisoners consisting of 700 people, came to this camp in the winter of 1982 after the conflict in the [[musel camp 2]], and some time later they were transferred to other camps. In 1983, about 150 prisoners were brought from mousel camp 4 and three months later they were taken back to the same camp, where Hojjat ol-Islam [[Abu Torabifard, Seyyed Aliakbar|Seyyed Ali Akbar Abu Torabi Fard]] was serving his time as a captive. At the beginning of May 1984, about 200 prisoners were brought to this camp, and after two or three months, another 500 prisoners came from the [[musel camp 4]], and most of these people stayed in this camp until the summer of 1988<ref>Kamvar Bakshaish, Javad (2014). Musel prison Tehran: Surah Mehr.</ref>.

After the end of the war in the summer of 1987, the Iraqis captured a number of Iranians and placed them in different camps. About 900 new prisoners were also brought to the musel camp 3. For this reason, the camp was also called "musel of 1988 captives". The prisoners of this camp were mainly from the 21st Hamzah and 77th Mashhad divisions. About two months had passed since the captivity of these people when they were registered by the Red Cross. The new group of prisoners was settled in this place until August 1990<ref name=":0" />.(the calendar of musel camp 3)

== Important events ==
1. Before the governor of musel entered the camp, the Iraqis had propagandized about his influence and ability to solve the problems and to meet the needs of the prisoners, but when he came to the camp, except for a few Iranian officials of the camp, who had to keep in touch with him, others distanced themselves from the governor and no request was made to him, which surprised the Iraqi soldiers as well as the governor himself.

2. Iraqis, during the inspection of the WCs of the camp, found one of the Arabic newspapers with Saddam's photo, which caused the prisoners to be punished and imprisoned in the enclosure of the barracks.

3. In 1985, a drama was staged in which the image of Saddam and the Arab leaders were displayed in the form of caricatures on wooden boards, and the message was that America manipulated them like puppets. Although the drama was being staged in the 6th Asylum in compliance with security rules, the security guards took the hint and immediately and quickly entered the asylum, stopped the show and seized the equipment. The Iraqi commander of the camp was fairly reasonable and with the interference of the camp functionaries, the matter ended well<ref>Hashemi, Ali Akbar (1398). Interview. Dated 13 September 2018.</ref>.

4. In 1990, the prisoners decided to punish some of the spies (→[[espionage]]) and beat them up during a strike. Following this incident, the Iraqis imprisoned Seyyed Ataollah Rahmani, the functionary of the camp. The prisoners also went on strike. Seeing the prisoners' strike, the Iraqis released Seyyed Ataullah Rahmani from prison after four or five days.

== See also ==

* [[musel camp 1]]
* [[musel camp 2]]
* [[musel camp 4]]

== Bibliography ==
<references />

== To read more ==
Ashrafi, Morteza (2014). "War, humanitarian rights prisoners, Geneva Convention, peace, political science". Tehran: [http://rbo.ir/ Bagheral Uloom] Research Institute (AS).

https://www.dehnamaki.com

https://musel.ir
[[fa:اردوگاه موصل 3]]

'''Maryam Sadat Zekriyayee'''